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On June 30, 1865, Samuel A. Mudd was 
convicted of conspiring with John Wilkes 
Booth and others ro assassinate President 
Abraham Lincoln. He was sentenced ro life 
imprisonment on an island off the coast of 
Florida. Dr. Mudd was pardoned in 1869 by 
President Andrew Johnson, based on his 
assistance in a yellow fever epidemic rather 
than on the merits. of his case, leaving unre-
solved until the present day the question of 
his ultimate guilt or innocence. 
On February 12, 1993, the University of 
Richmond School of Law convened a distin-
guished group of jurists and Civil War histori-
ans to thoroughly present both sides of the 
case of Samuel Mudd and the broader Lincoln 
Conspiracy before a panel of judges in an 
actual courtroom. 
Dr. Mudd was represented by F. Lee Bailey, 
Attorney at Law and former Marine fighter 
pilot and legal officer; and Candida Ewing 
Staempfli Steel, Attorney at Law and great-
great-granddaughter of General Thomas 
Ewing, Dr. Mudd's original counsel. 
The government was represented by John 
Jay Douglass, Dean of the National College of 
District Attorneys and former Commandant 
(continued on back flap) 
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of the Judge Advocate General's School; and 
Admiral JohnS. Jenkins, Associate Dean and 
Lecturer at the George Washington Univer-
sity National Law Center, and former Judge 
Advocate General of the U.S. Navy. 
The attorneys presented their arguments 
with all the detail and color of a modern legal 
case. Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination 
is the complete record of the proceedings, 
with added commentaty by distinguished 
historians. 
Some scholars argue that Mudd was com-
pletely innocent, while others cite eyewitness 
reports of seeing Mudd in the company of 
John Wilkes Booth in Washington prior to 
the assassination. In Dr. Mudd and the 
Lincoln Assassination the legality of the 
military tribunal that tried Mudd is both 
defended and attacked in fascinating detail. 
This volume combines the drama of the 
Civil War with the suspense of a modern trial 
and contains a wealth of detail on the Lincoln 
Conspiracy, much of it unknown to the 
general public. 
Dr. Mudd contains the complete text of 
recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals and other bodies in the matter of 
Samuel Mudd, a case still pending in U.S. 
courts. The main text is backed up by exten-
sive references for further reading, few of 
which normally appear in Civil War books. • 
Editor John Paul Jones is a former naval 
aviator and intelligence officer and teaches 
administrative, constitutional and military 
law at the University of Richmond School of 
Law. 
In the words of F. Lee Bailey, counsel for the accused: 
" ... the fabric of any criminal proceeding is that which deserves the 
overview-the calm, deliberate, combined wisdom in the overview of 
an appellate court." 
"Here is history at its best, relived with all its controversies, passions, and struggles for 
justice." -Senator Paul Simon 
As a simultaneous contribution to legal studies and Civil War studies, Dr. Mudd and the 
Lincoln Assassination: The Case Reopened is a perfect example of the kind of fresh perspec-
tive the United States Civil War Center supports as one of its major missions. 
-David Madden, Director, The United States 
Civil War Center, Louisiana State University 
Here's a fresh and provocative look at legal aspects of the Mudd conviction. Since it consists 
largely of pro and con analyses, it bears directly upon other Civil War cases. Even more 
important is the fashion in which it throws a great deal of light upon the whole issue of civil 
rights under a military regime. 
-Webb Garrison, author of The Lincoln No One Knows 
They have assembled in a single volume a prodigious collection of legal and historical 
opinion and documentation. The exercise of re-visiting the case of Samuel Mudd was a 
procedure useful not just to those scholars fascinated with the intricacies of the legal dis-
pute, but also to historians and readers drawn to this story because of the drama and 
poignancy associated with this man and his family, caught as if in some time warp of 
unresolved accusation, guilt and doubt. 
-Dan Roberts, National Public Radio's 
"A Moment in Time" 
This book provides the modern reader with the arguments needed to make the difficult 
decision as to whether or not Samuel Mudd was guilty as charged of conspiring with John 
Wilkes Booth to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. 
-Joseph R. George, Jr. , Professor Emeritus, 
Villanova University 
Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination is thorough history and remarkable courtroom 
advocacy. Had Dr. Mudd enjoyed benefit of counsel equal to Professor Jones' law students, 
the defendant-appellant would not have gone to prison. 
-Douglas Savage, author of 
The Court Martial of Robert E Lee 
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Introduction 
On June 30, 1865, Samuel A. Mudd was convicted of 
conspiring with John Wilkes Booth and others to assassina te 
President Lincoln and other leaders of the Union. The Mary-
land planter and physician was also found guilty of aiding 
and abetting the assassins in the execution of their plot. Dr. 
Mudd's conviction, and a sentence to prison for the remainder 
of his life, issued from a type of military court known as a 
commission. Seven senior officers of the Union army com-
prised the commission that tried Dr. Mudd. Its most senior 
member, Major General David Hunter, acted as its president; 
history has given it his name. 
As Commander in Chief, President Johnson had convened 
the Hunter Commission and referred to it Mudd's case, and 
those of seven others said to co!llprise Booth's gang. Samuel 
Mudd fared better than most; after a trial of eighteen days, the 
commission found all eight defendants guilty, and sen tenced 
four, David Herold, George Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, and Mary 
Surratt, to death. The commission spared from the gallows 
Mudd and three others, Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler, 
and Samuel Arnold, sentencing them instead to prison. Presi-
dent Johnson reviewed and approved the sentences. He 
ordered that Mudd serve his life sentence at Fort Jefferson, an 
island penitentiary off the coast of Florida. Mudd's lawyers 
then tried for a writ of habeas corpus, but to no avail. In the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 
Judge Thomas J. Boynton refused to hold that the Hunter 
vii 
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Commission lacked authority to try a civilian like Mudd for 
the crimes in question. Judge Boynton's opinion represents 
the only formal assessment of Mudd's case by a federal judge 
to date. Never officially published, it appears in this book as 
Appendix A. 
As it happened, Mudd served less than four years before 
the same President pardoned him. There is no hint in that 
pardon that the President acted to correct a miscarriage of 
justice by the doctor's earlier conviction; indeed, the Presi-
dent took the opportunity to reaffirm his satisfaction that the 
evidence proved Mudd had aided and abetted Booth and 
Herold in their escape. Instead, the President based his deci-
sion to pardon Mudd on the doctor's humanitarian efforts in 
combatting a yellow fever epidemic at Fort Jefferson. In 1869, 
the President, therefore, merely freed Samuel Mudd; he did 
not absolve him. Mudd returned to Maryland where, not-
withstanding prison's toll on his health, he lived another 
fourteen years, siring fourteen children. For the rest of his life, 
he would publicly insist on his innocence of any complicity 
with Booth. After Mudd's death, his family and friends 
would continue to agitate on his behalf, seeking some defini-
tive statement that the United States had convicted and pun-
ished an innocent man. 
For the most part, that campaign focused on the likelihood 
of prejudice in a jury of Union officers, some of them person-
ally acquainted with the murdered President, on the manner 
in which the trial was conducted, and on the evidence that 
was offered by the government. The United States has never 
admitted error, but the resultant' and enduring controversy 
has made the doctor a cause celebre, an American Dreyfus. 
In early 1992, lawyers representing Dr. Mudd's family 
obtained a hearing before the Army Board for the Correction 
of Military Records, a tribunal of civil servants hearing claims 
that particular military records are in error. Typically, the 
board hears cases from aggrieved soldiers and veterans who 
claim they were wrongfully d~nied an award or promotion, 
insufficiently compensated, or refused disability benefits. 
The board acts somewhat like a court, taking evidence and 
making findings of fact and conclusions of law . Unlike a 
court, however, the board lacks the power to decide; it can 
only recommend that military records be altered in the inter-
I 
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Introduction ix 
ests of justice. Its findings and conclusions serve only to 
inform the final decision maker, the Secretary of the Army, or 
his designated subordinate. In Dr. Mudd's case, the family 
argued, and the board found, that, since the conviction ex-
isted in the record of a military court, the board could hear the 
family's claim of error, and, if it agreed, recommend that the 
record be expunged. The board heard arguments and evi-
dence offered by the family, the most important of which was 
the opinion of an expert, Colonel Jan Horbaly, that no basis 
existed in 1865 for assertion by the military of jurisdiction 
over crimes by civilians in the circumstances of Lincoln's 
assassination. The board looked only at the question of 
whether the law permitted a military commission to try a 
civilian like Dr. Mudd; it carefully avoided weighing the 
evidence on which Dr. Mudd's conviction must have been 
based. 
The board's hearings are not adversarial; an Examiner, 
trained in law and acting for the board, presents the salient 
facts and relevant law in the case. The board may put ques-
tions to its Examiner; it may direct him or her to conduct 
additional investigation of the facts or research in the law and 
report back. Otherwise, the board may conclude on what is 
placed before it. Thus, in the hearing on Dr. Mudd's convic-
tion, it was not out of the ordinary that nobody appeared to 
defend President Johnson's convening order and its execu-
tion by the Hunter Commission. The board subsequently 
adopted its Examiner's recommendation that relief be granted 
Samuel Mudd and his family, and referred the case to the 
Secretary for final action. The 'board's report appears in this 
book as Appendix B. 
On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, the Acting Assis-
tant Secretary then reviewed the board's findings, but re-
jected its recommendation. Secretary Clark refused to act in 
Dr. Mudd's case because he found it improper for the board 
to reconsider historical controversies so long after legal au-
thorities had rendered their best judgments. His letter com-
municating this decision to the board appears in this book as 
Appendix C. 
After the board had submitted its assessment of the Mudd 
family's case, but before Secretary Clark could issue his opin-
ion, the University of Richmond School of Law approached 
:-
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the family's tireless spokesman, Richard Mudd of Saginaw, 
Michigan. The law school proposed a full, adversarial, and 
expert hearing for the family's claims, in a moot staged in its 
courtroom. For more than three hundred years, students of 
the law have considered hypothetical cases anddifficul t legal 
issues in moots, simulated hearings before mock judicial 
panels. The practice originated in the English Inns of Court, 
where barristers had trained since the fifteenth century, and 
experienced a revival in American law schools in the nine-
teenth century. Nowadays, several moots occur each aca-
demic year in most law schools. The University of Richmond 
proposed an appellate hearing before experienced jurists 
trained in military law, a hearing in which not only the 
commission's jurisdiction might be considered, but also the 
fairness of the way in which Dr. Mudd's trial was conducted, 
as well as the persuasiveness of the evidence originally of-
fered against him. In accordance with a fundamental prin-
ciple of judicial review, the moot court's judges and advocates 
would be asked to limit themselves to addressing the 
commission's 1865 decision, and therefore only those facts 
and legal rules available to the commission at the time. 
For the family, Richard Mudd accepted with enthusiasm. 
The novelty of the questions and the drama in the facts 
enabled the school to enlist exceptionally experienced court-
room lawyers to present Dr. Mudd's case for expungement 
and the United States government's defense of its commis-
sion. F. Lee Bailey appeared for the petitioner with Candida 
Ewing Steel, the great great granddaughter of Union Army 
Brigadier Thomas Ewing, Jr:, who had so ably represented 
Samuel Mudd at trial. Rear Admiral JohnS. Jenkins, former 
Judge Advocate General of the Navy and Special Counsel to 
the Secretary of the Navy, joined Colonel John Jay Douglass, 
former Commandant of the Judge Advocate General's School 
and Dean of the National College of 'District Attorneys, in 
defending the decision and workings of the Hunter Commis-
sion. For each side, the law school recruited a staff of student 
researchers and brief writers. Furnished with copies of the 
commission's actual records, and the contents of the ten best 
military law collections in American libraries, the two teams 
labored for more than three months drafting the appellate 
briefs for each side. 
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To constitute a court for the hearing of Dr. Mudd's case, 
the law school had no choice but to indulge in a legal fiction. 
In fact, no judicial organ existed in 1867 to consider the 
decisions of either courts martial or military commissions. 
Except when the sentence was death, the judgment of any 
military court after trial was finat subject only to action by the 
military commander who had convened it and thus could set 
aside its findings or reduce the sentence it recommended. In 
those cases in which a death penalty was approved by the 
convening authority, the Commander in Chief had also to 
concur. Not until 1920 would Congress at last establish a 
board of judge advocates, and thus, for the first time, guaran-
tee for military convictions review by professionals trained in 
the discipline. Not unti11950, would Congress at last appoint 
civilian judges to a genuine court reviewing military cases. If 
Mudd's case were to receive contemporaneous review by a 
true appellate court, history would have to be altered, at least 
a little. This was accomplished by simply inventing the three-
judge Special Court of Military Appeal, and the 1865 Act of 
Congress that created it. 
During their preparations, the team representing Dr. Mudd 
learned that, at the time of Dr. Mudd's trial, the government 
had possessed a diary written by John Wilkes Booth. The 
prosecution had not offered the diary in evidence at the trial, 
nor had it informed the defense of its existence, although 
mention of it had appeared in the New York Times and other 
newspapers almost two weeks before the trial began. On 
behalf of Dr. Mudd, his legal team argued strenuously in 1992 
that the Special Court ought to order the government to either 
share the document or else deny its possession. With equal 
vigor, the government argued that, even if the diary were 
produced, it would be inadmissible as evidence because it 
would constitute hearsay, i .e., a statement made out of the 
court's presence offered as proof of what it says. Without 
reaching either petitioner's argument that the prosecution 
had concealed potentially exculpatory evidence, or the 
government's argument that the diary was inadmissible any-
way, the court refused to permit the diary to be added to the 
record before it. In the court's view, newspaper stories about 
the diary before trial put defense counsel on notice then, and 
counsel's failure to raise the matter at trial could not be 
xii Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination 
excused sufficiently to warrant action so long afterward. 
Skirmishing complete, preparation continued. 
To hear the case as the Special Court of Military Appeal, 
the law school recruited three eminent jurists well-versed not 
only in the military law of the United States, but in the 
international law of armed conflict (for the government was 
sure to argue that jurisdiction rested on jus belli, the law of 
war). The Honorable Robinson 0. Everett, former Chief 
Judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals (and 
now Senior Judge of its successor, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces) accepted an invitation with 
enthusiasm. The Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge 
Emeritus and Senior Judge (ret.) of the United States Court of 
International Trade and Judge Walter Thompson Cox III of 
the then Court of Military Appeals (now Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces) promptly joined Judge Everett to form the 
three-judge panel. 
The hearing took place at the law school, in a packed 
courtroom on February 12, 1993. Despite a severe winter 
storm, other spectators crowded three adjacent classrooms 
and watched on dosed-circuit television. For ninety minutes, 
the two sides presented their positions orally and fielded 
questions from the bench. When they were done, the court 
adjourned to consider what it had heard, returning within the 
hour to render judgment and share the considerations that 
produced it. Each judge offered his own opinion. All agreed 
that the judgment of the Hunter Commission had been in 
error and should be set aside. 
Part One of this book presents the arguments for Dr. 
Mudd and the government, a verbatim record of the oral 
argument, and the final versions of the judgment and opin-
ions of the court. Part One concerns itself with a question 
narrow in scope: whether the Hunter Commission made a 
legal blunder that ought to have been cor-rected. As the Acting 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army correctly noted last 
year, the commission's judgment should not be impeached by 
resort to modern legal standards foreign to the era in which 
the trial occurred. Similarly, the commission's judgment 
should not be impeached by reference to facts of which it had 
no inkling at the time. Part One, therefore, answers only the 
question of whether Mudd was wronged by the commission, 
r 
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not whether he was wronged by history. 
Part Two offers the comments of several legal and histori-
cal experts familiar with the law and facts relevant to the case. 
Part Two concerns itself with the broader and remaining 
question: whether the light of history reveals that Samuel 
Mudd was wrongly condemned. The essayists in Part Two 
have been left free to use facts unknown to the commission, 
some emergent only long after the triaL Their work taps the 
full measure of history's preoccupation with this particular 
case, among the thousands tried by Union military commis-
sions during the Civil War. Part Two, therefore, judges not 
the commission but the accused. 
Final judgment remains to be pronounced. It has not come 
from this moot court, and it will not come from the Secretary 
of the Army, who has yet to rule on Mrs. Steel's appeal on 
behalf of the family. Samuel Mudd has become history's 
chattel, and history shall judge him again and again. To its 
record, this book is submitted by the authors. 
A number of people contributed generously in various 
ways to the moot court and to this book. The encouragement 
and support of Joe Harbaugh, Dean of the University of 
Richmond School of Law, were vital to the success of the 
former and the realization of the latter. Nancy O'Brien, my 
secretary and right arm, managed innumerable tasks and 
delicate situations throughout. David Madden, Director of 
the U.S. Civil War Center at Louisiana State University, kindly 
furnished advice essential to the book's publication. The law 
firm of Hunton & Williams, Virginia's largest, generously 
supported its editing. Sean Everhart, Janet Jenness, Janet 
Munro, and Adele Nighman, outstanding members of the 
Class of 1995, exhibited exceptional initiative, rare savvy, and 
formidable endurance in preparing the manuscripts for print. 
Shelley Jones stood by with patience, love, and a sharp eye. 
For all the pleasure I took from this sojourn in scholarship, 1 
am, to them aJt very gratefuL 
John Paul Jones 
Richmond, 1994 
Part One 
The Appeal 

Brief on Behalf 
of Samuel A. Mudd 
Catherine Stuart Greer,* W. Scott Magargee,** 
and John Thurston Pendletont 
INTRODUCTION 
On the night of Aprill4, 1865, John Wilkes Booth appar-
ently assassinated Abraham Lincoln, the President of the 
United States, in Washington, D.C. Somehow, the assassin 
injured his leg after shooting the President. Accompanied by 
David E. Herold, Booth sought medical attention early the 
next morning at the Charles County, Maryland residence of 
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd. Several days later, Federal troops killed 
Booth near Fredericksburg, Virginia as he resisted apprehen-
sion. Thus, the person said to be the President's murderer was 
never brought to book; eight other persons, however, includ-
ing Dr. Mudd, were subsequently arrested by Federal au-
thorities and tried in connection with the assassination. 
All the defendants were civilians. Even though ordinary 
courts were open and functioning regularly in both the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Maryland, President Johnson ordered 
Dr. Mudd and the others tried by a military commission of the 
new President's choosing. On June 30, 1865, that tribunal 
found the defendants guilty, sentencing four to death and Dr. 
Mudd to imprisonment at hard labor for life. On July 5, 
*J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; B.A., 1988, University of Virginia. 
**J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; A.B., 1988, Princeton University. 
t J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; B.A., 1989, Trinity College. 
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President Johnson approved the sentences. It is from this 
conviction that Dr. Mudd appeals to this Special Court of 
Military Appeal. 
For three reasons, Dr. Mudd's conviction was unlawful: 
first, it came at the hands of a tribunal that lacked authority to 
try him; second, it resulted from a process contrary to the 
United States Constitution and to the law of the United States 
governing military trials; and third, it came after the prosecu-
tion had failed to carry its burden of proof. Each of these 
errors will be set forth in greater detail in what follows. 
PART ONE: JURISDICTION 
The Special Court of Military Appeal must find the 
commission's judgment in Dr. Mudd's case invalid and set it 
aside because the commission lacked jurisdiction, the power 
to decide. The first section of Article III of the United States 
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States "in 
one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Congress 
did not vestthe military commission that tried Dr. Mudd with 
judicial power. Thus, the proceedings of this commission 
must be declared a nullity unless the Constitution could 
otherwise authorize its jurisdiction. 
Heretofore, as the Attorney General admitted in his opin-
ion for President Johnson on the Constitutional power of a 
military commission to try this case, such a tribunal has had 
jurisdiction to try civilians in the United States only for crimes 
committed during a period of martial law or for violations of 
the law ofwar.1 Martial law derives from the laws and usages 
of war, as well as from reason. Like martial law, the laws of 
war are based in reason and exist, according to the Supreme 
Court, to "mitigate the cruelties and misery produced by the 
scourge of war. " 2 
Neither martial law, nor the laws of war, authorized a 
military commission to try Dr. Mudd in June 1865 in Washing-
ton, D.C. The case against him involved neither public neces-
sity nor an offense peculiar to the laws of war, so there was no 
reason for substituting an extraordinary military tribunal for 
the ordinary civil courts in the trial of a civilian resident of a 
loyal state. Without such justification, a military commission 
lacked jurisdiction over this case and this defendant. 
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Pursuant to traditional concepts of martial law, a military 
commission may try crimes only in cases of public necessity. 
As a New York court noted recently in Matter of Egan,' a state 
of such necessity must be proved definitively by the one 
claiming it. Absent such proof, the doctrine of necessity does 
not justify the exercise of martial law when the civil laws can 
be exercised. 
In Luther v. Borden•, the United States Supreme Court 
admitted that a real crisis in government may lead to martial 
law, but cautioned that this does not mean martial law can 
serve as a pretext for oppression. Even where martial law 
exists, the Constitution remains superior to martial law as the 
guardian of the private citizen who is neither a government 
enemy nor a hostile foe. Such was the position taken recently 
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Corbin v. Marsh.' 
That martial law may exist only by necessity is beyond 
dispute. Blackstone and Hale, for example, agree that this 
restriction forms part of the common law.6 As Blackstone put 
it, "The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only 
thing which can give it countenance; and therefore, it ought 
not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king' s courts 
are open to all persons to receive justice according to the laws 
of the land." The despotism made possible by martial law 
and enforceable by a military commission ought not prevail 
when the regularly established civil courts are capable of 
routinely administering justice. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently and com-
pletely settled this issue, finding martial law an inadequate 
excuse for the exercise of military jurisdiction over a civilian 
resident of a loyal state. In Ex parte Milligan,' the Court 
reviewed the conviction by military commission of a civilian 
residing in Indiana. Among the numerous charges against 
Milligan were those that he had afforded aid to rebels, incited 
insurrection, engaged in disloyal practices, and violated the 
laws of war. Before the Supreme Court, the government 
argued that loyal states were placed within military districts 
and that martial law existed because Indiana properly consti-
tuted a "theater of military operations." The Court could find, 
however, no condition of necessity that would have war-
ranted martial law in Indiana at the time of Milligan's arrest 
and trial. The mere existence of strife in one part of the 
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country does not sanction the suspension of laws pursuant to 
martial law in other, loyal parts of the country where the 
Constitution and other laws are capable of enforcement by 
ordinary means. According to the Court, martial law permits 
trial by military authority only if the necessity that creates 
martial law is real and existing. As the Court saw it, armies 
were present in Indiana only to be located to another district 
where hostilities were actually occurring. In Indiana, "There 
was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion was at an 
end and with it all pretext for martial law." 
The Court went on to reject the argument that martial law 
could exist in response to a "threatened invasion," observing 
that, "the necessity must be actual and present; the invasion 
real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil 
administration." Martial law is properly limited to the "local-
ity of actual war" and in time by the necessity creating its 
existence. "It is," wrote Justice Davis for the Court, "the 
birthright of every American citizen when charged with a 
crime, to be tried and punished according to law." 
The government also contended in Milligan that a military 
commission could have jurisdiction to try a civilian under the 
"laws and usages of war." The Supreme Court rejected this 
contention as well, stating that, "It can serve no useful pur-
pose to inquire what the laws and usages are, ... they can never 
be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the author-
ity ofthe government, and where the courts are open and their 
process unobstructed." Because the civil courts in Indiana 
were open and operating regularly, a military commission 
could not try a civilian residing in Indiana. The ancient and 
fundamental right of trial by jury found in the Bill of Rights 
"cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or political 
necessity." 
The President's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
does not warrant a different conclusion in this case. The 
power to suspend the Great Writ set forth in Article I, Section 
9 should not be read as inferring a condition in addition to 
those expressly limiting the grant of judicial power in Article 
III, Section 1. Indeed, the Court in Milligan found that the 
Constitution "does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is 
denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the 
course of the common law; if it had intended this result, it was 
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easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished it." 
If the Constitution does not authorize jurisdiction over a 
civilian by a military commission, the commission's proceed-
ings against Dr. Mudd must be a nullity. The Supreme Court 
noted in Milligan that the Constitution lays down the law in 
war as well as in peace, finding that, "No doctrine, involving 
more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit 
of man than any of its provisions can be suspended during 
any of the great exigencies of government." The Court's 
holding in Ex parte Milligan is simple and clear: even in time 
of civil war, the Constitution does not permit military juris-
diction over a civilian resident in a loyal state when the civil 
courts are open and operating. 
The law enunciated by the Supreme Court binds this 
court. "The practical effect of a judicial precedent of the 
Supreme Court is to settle a rule of construction for all inferior 
courts."' If, despite the circumstance of martial law, military 
jurisdiction over Mr. Milligan could not lie in the State of 
Indiana in 1864, it surely could not lie over Dr. Mudd in the 
State of Maryland or in the District of Columbia a year later. 
In this case, the government has not even attempted to 
meet its burden of proving that the courts of the District of 
Columbia and the State of Maryland were not open and 
operating at the time of appellant's arrest and trial. Indeed, 
such an attempt would have been futile, as the published 
decisions of those courts in numerous cases decided at that 
time make abundantly clear. Attorney General Speed, in his 
opinion for the President, admitted that, notwithstanding the 
declaration of martial law in the District of Columbia, "The 
civil courts were open and held their regular sessions, and 
transacted business as in times of peace."' The same could as 
easily have been said of the civil courts of Maryland. It 
follows, therefore, that this court must find that, like the 
military commission convened at Indianapolis to try Mr. 
Milligan, the military commission convened at Washington to 
try Dr. Mudd was without authority under the Constitution. 
Nor can it be said that the law of nations permits what the 
Constitution does not. Even if it were assumed for the mo-
ment that the law of nations implicitly limits the United States 
Constitution respecting both the judicial power and the Bill of 
Rights, international law would not warrant jurisdiction over 
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Dr. Mudd in this case. That aspect of the law of nations known 
as jus belli, the law of war, operates only between belligerents. 
The law of war applies only in a state of war. War arises 
from acts of sovereignty, creating rights of belligerency, mak-
ing enemies of opposing factions. At best, the Confederacy 
represented states in insurrection or rebellion as declared by 
Congress in the Act of July 13, 1861. Indeed, the United States 
never declared war because, as Wheaton puts it, "there was no 
body-politic against which to declare it, the very existence of 
the Confederate government being treason .... "10 An insur-
rection does not warrant application of the law of war unless 
the rebels assume the legal status of belligerents. According 
to the War Department's own General Orders No. 100, issued 
April24, 1863, an insurrection may lead to rebellion that can 
rise to civil war, but there remains a distinction between 
insurgency and belligerency. A civil war remains an insur-
gency until the government recognizes its adversary as a 
belligerent. In the words of Chancellor Kent, 
But though a solemn declaration, or previous notice to 
the enemy, be now laid aside, it is essential that some 
formal act, proceeding directly from the competent 
source, should announce to the people at home their 
new relations and duties growing out of a state of war, 
and which should equally apprize neutral nations of 
the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to the 
rights belonging to the new state of things. 11 
Without some formal act from the "competent source," noti-
fying that the opposing factions would act as belligerents, the 
laws of war cannot govern. 
No formal act of this nature respecting the Confederacy 
and its armies ever occurred. According to the eighth section 
of Article I of the United States Constitution, the Congress is 
the organ of government authorized to make such a notifica-
tion, that is, to declare war. But the Congress did not declare 
war during the recent rebellion. By the Act ofJuly 13,1861, the 
Congress did permit the President to declare a state of insur-
rection, and, by the Act of July 29, 1861, it did authorize him 
to call forth the militia to suppress the rebellion in states 
opposing the United States laws, but it never declared war. A 
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civil war de facto, perhaps, the rebellion nevertheless re-
mained an insurrection de jure and never attained the legal 
status that would afford the rebels rights or liabilities derived 
by the law of nations from belligerency. There was simply 
never any acknowledgment by the United States that the 
seceding states had formed an independent nation. 
That, from a civil war, may sometimes emerge a govern-
ment enjoying international recognition and belligerency sta-
tus does not mean that the Confederacy must. The recent 
experience of the United States is readily distinguishable 
from that of Great Britain during its civil war. At all times 
during the late insurrection, the United and Confederate 
States remained one nation, albeit one in which raged a 
rebellion. From April 1861 until its demise in 1865, the 
Confederacy never constituted even a de facto government 
engaged in war with the United States. Unlike Cromwell, the 
leaders of the Confederacy never succeeded in ousting the 
public officials of the Federal Government from this country, 
never formed treaties, and never gained recognition for the 
Confederacy as an independent power from the United States 
or a foreign nation. Cromwell's government was viewed by 
other nations as having the authority to make laws and 
contracts and to form treaties; Jefferson Davis's organization 
was not. 
Rights of a belligerent can exist only during war. How-
ever, as the War Department has noted in General Orders No. 
100, belligerent status is not conferred upon the mere treat-
ment and exchange of prisoners of war, the acceptance of flags 
symbolizing truce, the proclamation of martial law in rebel 
territory, or other agreements to moderate war. Although the 
United States may have treated the rebels in some respect as 
it would treat belligerents, this, according to Wheaton: 
was not a recognition of belligerent rights in the rebels, 
or a recognition of a legal status in them as belligerents. 
It was a course of policy from day to day, and from 
place to place, held under political discretion all the 
while ... Y 
Certain practices by the United States government may have 
mitigated the harshness of the late hostilities, but, without the 
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intention that they do so, they cannot be nottaken as acknowl-
edgment of belligerency status. 
What the Union did not intend, foreign sovereigns could 
not otherwise accomplish. Recognition by the Queen of 
England on May 13, 1861, of hostilities between the United 
and the Confederate States was not sufficient to confer the 
legal status of belligerency. So noted a Federal court in the 
1862 case, United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement: 
The position of foreign nations with respect to this 
insurrection, it must be remembered, does not 
determine its status in American courts. The latter 
follow exclusively the decision of the political 
department of the United States government on that 
question. Even if other nations had recognized the so-
called Confederate government as an independent 
power, their recognition would bind themselves and 
their subjects alone -not the United States .... All 
American courts are bound to treat the insurrectionary 
states as integral parts of the Union, and subject to its 
constitution and laws13 
As the Supreme Court has said in the Prize Cases, proclama-
tion by a foreign sovereign of hostilities between two nations 
can preclude the sovereign's own people from denying the 
existence of war, but only the government of the United 
States, in exercise of the sovereignty of the United States, can 
confer the legal status of belligerency upon opposing rebels. 
The government made no such conferral in the late rebellion. 
It might be argued that the exercise of a belligerent right 
by the United States, in establishing a blockade of the Confed-
erate states, had the consequence of conferring belligerent 
status on those states and their armed forces. Even if this 
exercise of a belligerent right by the United States during the 
rebellion could be taken as the basis for conferring belliger-
ency status on the rebels under the law of war, such status 
would not have lasted as late as the time of appellant's arrest 
and trial. 
Blockade is a belligerent right under the law of nations. In 
the Prize Cases, the Court held that the President's "proclama-
tion of blockade [was] itself official conclusive evidence to the 
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Court that a state of war existed which demanded and autho-
rized a recourse to such a measure .... " The Supreme Court 
deferred to the President's discretion in establishing the block-
ade, finding him the appropriate person to make this procla-
mation in his role as Commander in Chief. This court need not 
in Dr. Mudd's case consider the separate question of whether 
this act was sufficient to bestow belligerency rights upon the 
Confederacy. Even if it were assumed that the President's 
proclamation had such an unintended result, the fact remains 
that a subsequent proclamation ended the blockade. By 
proclamation on April 29, 1865, President Johnson declared: 
[t]hat all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and 
coastwise commercial intercourse be discontinued in 
such parts of the [southern] States ... [and] ... military 
and naval orders in any manner restricting internal, 
domestic, and coastwise commercial intercourse and 
trade with or in the localities above named be, and the 
same are hereby, revoked .... 
Even if this court were disposed to recognizing belligerency 
status as a consequence of the blockade, it ought to defer with 
grace equal to that of the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases and 
find that a necessary consequence of President Johnson's 
proclamation lifting the blockade was the termination of 
whatever belligerency status President Lincoln's proclama-
tion might have unintentionally conferred. 
Absent belligerency, the law of war has no sway, and the 
jurisdiction of a military commission to try a civilian resident 
of a loyal state cannot survive the extinguishment of belliger-
ency status. In this case, it follows therefore that trial by a 
commission not even created until two days after the block-
ade-ending proclamation is unwarranted by the law of war. 
By May 9,1865, when Dr. Mudd's trial began, the war de facto 
was over, and war de jure had never been declared. Lee had 
surrendered his forces at Appomattox on April 9, and the 
President had ordered the removal of all trade restrictions on 
April29. No formal surrender on behalf of the Confederacy 
itself could be demanded or obtained because, as Wheaton 
observed, the United States did not recognize any authority 
competent to make such a surrender. The Presidents' procla-
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mations in 1861 and 1865 thus represent the best evidence of 
both the beginning and the end of the war. On this evidence, 
Dr. Mudd was tried too late for the law of war to sanction trial 
by a military commission. 
PART TWO: PROCEDURE 
Samuel Mudd's conviction should also be overturned 
because his trial by a military commission in Washington, 
D.C. violated his rights under the United States Constitution's 
third article and its Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
As the Supreme Court declared in Marbury v. Madison, 14 
the Constitution represents "the fundamental and paramount 
law ofthe nation." Indeed, the Attorney General advised the 
President that the military commission that convicted Samuel 
Mudd had a "duty" to try him in" obedience to the Constitu-
tion and the law." The Constitution protects persons within 
the United States during peace or war. As the court noted in 
Corbin v. Marsh, military power, even in the conduct of war, 
cannot authorize that which the Constitution prohibits, nor 
deny that which the Constitution guarantees. 
The last sentence of the second section of Article III of the 
Constitution requires that the "Trial of all Crimes, except in 
Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall 
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed; but when not committed within any State, the 
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by 
Law have directed." Implicit in this specification of a particu-
lar procedure- trial by jury and venue in the state in which 
the crime is said to have been committed -is a Constitutional 
right on the part of the accused to trial as specified. In the 
Sixth Amendment, a similar specification of procedure and 
venue appears: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law .... " Thus, both the basic document 
and its contemporaneous amendment by the Bill of Rights 
guarantee an accused trial by jury in the place in which his 
offense is said to have occurred. Dr. Mudd was accused of 
conspiring with Booth during the actor's visit to Charles 
County, Maryland, and of aiding and abetting Booth and his 
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accomplice by sheltering them in his Charles County home, 
yet he was denied a trial in a Maryland court and a jury of the 
men of Charles County. 
It is no defense of these Constitutional deprivations to 
note the existence of a rebellion in 1865. Even if the dying 
embers of that rebellion elsewhere could justify suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus in loyal Maryland at that time, the 
rights to jury and venue, unlike the right to the Great Writ, are 
set out in absolute, not conditional terms. Every man's right 
to a writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in time of 
rebellion only because that exception is set forth explicitly 
where the Great Writ is mentioned in Article I. To the 
contrary, no man's rights to a jury and to proper venue can be 
suspended precisely because no exception appears in either 
Article III or the Sixth Amendment. Courts should not infer 
exceptions to Constitutional rights set down without excep-
tion by the Framers. 
That the absolute terms of the jury and venue rights in 
Article III and the Sixth Amendment were not oversights by 
the Framers is reinforced by the text of the Fifth Amendment, 
which in pertinent part promises that, "No person shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger." As 
this clause illustrates, where the Framers intended a different 
criminal process for military courts, the Framers took care to 
say so explicitly. The jury and venue rights of the Third 
Article and the Sixth Amendment ought to be read free of 
exceptions for military justice precisely because the Fifth 
Amendment contains such an exception. Speaking of the jury 
right, the Supreme Court recently said in Ex parte Milligan, a 
case on all fours with that of Dr. Mudd, that, "This privilege 
is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of 
criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be 
frittered away on any plea of state or political necessity."" Dr. 
Mudd therefore correctly challenges his conviction as void for 
want of a jury and for want of a Maryland venue. 
Dr. Mudd also attacks his conviction for want of prior 
Grand Jury action. By the express words of the Fifth Amend-
ment, no person can be held to account for crimes of the sort 
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of which Dr. Mudd was convicted unless on the presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces. According to the Supreme Court in Ex 
parte Milligan, the Constitution preserves this right to every 
one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, the 
navy, or the militia in actual service. It is uncontested that 
Samuel Mudd was a civilian resident of a free state, and that 
he was unconnected with the military. His trial by a military 
commission in the District of Columbia therefore violated his 
Constitutional right to a Grand Jury as well as his Constitu-
tional rights to a petit jury and to a Maryland trial. As the 
Supreme Court observed in the Milligan case: 
If it was dangerous, in the distracted condition of 
affairs, to leave Milligan unrestrained of his liberty, 
because he 'conspired against the government, afforded 
aid and comfort to rebels, ... ,' the law said arrest him, 
confine him closely, render him powerless to do further 
mischief; and then present his case to the grand jury of 
the district, with proofs of his guilt, and, ifindicted, try 
him according to the course of the common law. If this 
had been done, the Constitution would have been 
vindicated, ... and the securities for personal liberty 
preserved and defended. 16 
Although the nation may have been "distracted" over the 
President's death, the civil courts in Maryland were capable 
of trying Dr. Mudd. His trial by military commission was 
improper under the Constitution, and his conviction should 
be set aside. 
The government charged Dr. Mudd in such vague terms 
as to violate his Constitutional right to due process. The Fifth 
Amendment ensures that criminal charges will be set out with 
particularity sufficient to permit the· accused to make an 
adequate defense. In this case, the charge and specification 
were deficient in three ways: first, they failed to advise the 
accused according to what law or code the commission would 
proceed; second, they failed to make clear for what crime 
previously recognized at law he would be tried; and third, the 
charge contained a series of separate and distinct accusations 
that were not set out in separate and distinct counts. 
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The military commission that tried Dr. Mudd failed to 
inform him of the law by which he would be tried. The 
government proceeded by reference to the custom or common 
law of war, but the charge and specifications are devoid of any 
reference to such a source. There is no body of law recognized 
as a common law of war. Instead, as Captain De Hart has 
observed, "The custom of war is rather sought for, as explana-
tory of some doubtful question in which, without its aid, a 
decision might be uncertain, than as a source of authority by 
itself." 17 
Even if Dr. Mudd had been notified by the charges and 
specifications that a common law of war formed the basis of 
his culpability, Dr. Mudd could not defend himself against a 
body of law that did not exist. The commission refused to say 
what precedents would be considered controlling under the 
common law of war leaving Dr. Mudd severely handicapped 
in the preparation of his defense. When invited to specify 
whether this "common law of war" referred to English com-
mon law, military common law, or the law of nations, the 
commission remained silent. Accordingly, Dr. Mudd was 
forced to construct his defense based on tentative assump-
tions regarding what law would both inform and bind the 
commission's rulings, hardly the opportunity envisioned by 
those who framed the Fifth Amendment. 
Not only was Dr. Mudd denied adequate reference to the 
body of law according by which he was tried, he was also 
denied an adequate statement of the offense or offenses of 
which he stood accused. According to Major General Macomb, 
the Constitution, the Articles of War, and the common law 
agree that an accused is entitled to know and face the charges 
made against him. Specifically, the charge 
must set forth the crime or offense in a manner 
sufficiently specific, to enable the person accused to 
know to what he is to answer .... The facts ought also 
to be distinctly specified or alleged, in such a manner, 
that neither the prisoner nor the Court can have any 
difficulty in knowing what is the precise object of the 
trial. The same minuteness and precision ought to be 
observed in specifying the time and place, when and 
where, the facts charged were committedY 
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The correctness of General Macomb's statement of the 
applicable standard is borne out by United States v. Sharp." In 
that case, the court refused to refer to a jury the charge of 
making a revolt, a capital offense "insufficiently defined by 
[the statute] or by any other standard, to which reference 
could safely be made .... If we resort to definitions given by 
philologists," wrote Justice Washington, "they are so multi-
farious, and so different, that I cannot avoid feeling a natural 
repugnance, to selecting from this mass of definitions, one, 
which may fix a crime upon these men." 
In United States v. MacKenzie, it was held that federal 
courts can take no cognizance of any matter not 
specifically declared to be a crime or offense by Act of 
Congress, and accordingly cannot inquire into 
violations of the common law, or law of nations, ... 
[unless] the act is prohibited and punished by express 
statutory provisions.20 
What federal courts cannot do, federal military commissions 
cannot do. Even what the common law might permit, how-
ever, the law of war does not. 
A military commission cannot make law as it goes along, 
that is, make definite by its own statement what the law of war 
does not. The customary law of war ought not to be confused 
with the common law. The former, part of the law of nations, 
cannot trace its development in the accretion of case deci-
sions, as does the latter. Thus, military tribunals cannot make 
the law of war as courts embodying Anglo-Saxon tradition 
make common law. According to Whiting, a military com-
mission can only hear cases that are" established by evidence, 
in conformity with known punishments in like cases in some 
one of the States of the United States of America."21 Here, 
Whiting has simply refined, in the particular context of mili-
tary law, a principle operating generally in federal law. Fed-
eral courts are not common law courts; the Constitution 
withholds from them the common law power to pronounce 
adjudicative law. In United States v. Hudson," the Supreme 
Court held that a federal court could not entertain an indict-
ment for libel on the President because the crime existed, if at 
all, only at common law and not by Federal statute. Because 
Brief on Behalf of Samuel A. Mudd 17 
Article III courts lack jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
common law crimes, they necessarily lack the power to add 
crimes to the common law's collection. A lawmaking power 
that the Supreme Court has denied Article III tribunals surely 
ought not be ascribed by this court to a tribunal empowered 
only by an inference from Article IL Without that power, the 
commission that tried Dr. Mudd could not have repaired the 
fatally imprecise charge and specification with which it was 
presented. 
The single charge against Dr. Mudd and seven co-defen-
dants improperly commingled facts and crimes. The military 
law of the United States incorporates the same pleading 
standard which Federal law has inherited from the common 
law. 23 In the words of General Macomb, "Facts distinct in 
their nature, are not to be included in one and the same 
charge, or specification of a charge, but must be the subject of 
a distinct charge or specification."" According to Captain De 
Hart, "The facts ought also to be distinctly specified or al-
leged, in such a manner, that neither the prisoner nor the court 
can have any difficulty in knowing what is the precise object 
of the trial." 25 Dr. Mudd was denied his right to a charge in 
conformity with this standard. The single count accusing Dr. 
Mudd and the others could be taken to refer to at least four 
crimes: conspiring in aid of the existing armed rebellion to 
murder the President and others; murdering the President in 
pursuance of this conspiracy, assaulting with intent to mur-
der the Secretary of State; and lying in wait with intent to kill 
the Vice President and General Grant. Such a charge pre-
vented Dr. Mudd from determining with which of the four 
crimes he himself was charged, and from thereby marshalling 
a responsive defense. The lack of specificity made it impos-
sible for Dr. Mudd to know what evidence he needed to refute 
or establish in order to verify his innocence. 
On this ground alone, Dr. Mudd's conviction ought to be 
overturned. As General Macomb put it; "The total want of 
specification in the charge, may be urged ... as a ground for 
acquitting the prisoner, and that such a defect would render 
the proceedings nugatory. "26 
The charge against Dr. Mudd stated that he "did, at 
Washington City, ... on or before the 6th day of March, A.D. 
1865, and on divers other days and times between that day 
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and the 20th day of April, A.D. 1865, advise, encourage, 
receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid and assist" the 
conspiracy. Dr. Mudd could not construct an effective de-
fense against such a general charge. No specific act was 
alleged, nor was a specific date or time set forth. The charge 
left the defendant to account for the entire period between the 
6th day of March and the 20th day of April. Therefore, he was 
unable to rebut effectively the evidence submitted against 
him by the prosecution. According to General Macomb: 
The facts ought also to be distinctly specified or alleged, 
in such a manner, that neither the prisoner nor the 
Court can have any difficulty in knowing what is the 
precise object of the trial. The same minuteness and 
precision ought to be observed in specifying the time 
and place, when and where, the facts charged were 
committed, for such specification may be essentially 
necessary to the prisoner's defense." 
Before the military commission in Washington, therefore, 
Dr. Mudd was denied adequate notice of both the procedure 
according to which his trial would be staged and the specific 
offense to which he had to mount a defense. Either inad-
equacy constitutes reversible error in the form of a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Conse-
quently, this court ought to reverse Dr. Mudd's conviction. 
Even if it were admitted that the charge and specification 
against Dr. Mudd was not so vague and indiscriminate as to 
lack sufficient meaning for the Fifth Amendment, its most 
discernible meaning would be that Dr. Mudd was accused of 
treason. The only charge against Dr. Mudd opens by describ-
ing him as "maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid 
of the armed rebellion against the United States ... combining, 
confederating and conspiring." It follows by referring to the 
conspiracy as "malicious, unlawful, and traitorous." It reports 
that Dr. Mudd and others went about murder of the President, 
assault on the Secretary of State, and attempts to ambush the 
Vice President and General Grant "IT)aliciously, unlawfully, 
and traitorously." Moreover, the only specification directed at 
Dr. Mudd describes him as acting in aid of the conspiracy by 
advising, concealing, aiding and assisting others "with know!-
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edge of the murderous and traitorous conspiracy." Any ambi-
guity in the criminal charge and specific a lion ought to be read 
against the drafter; here, the government. In this case, such a 
reading would lead naturally to the conclusion that the 
government's repeated use of the words "traitorous" and 
"traitorously" in the charge and specification shows that the 
government intended to try Dr. Mudd for treason. Such an 
interpretation would mean his conviction was unconstitu-
tional. 
If Dr. Mudd was tried for treason, he was convicted in 
violation of the Constitution. The third section of Article III 
defines treason as "levying war against the [United States], or 
in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," 
and conditions conviction for treason on either the testimony 
of two witnesses to the same overt act or else the defendant's 
confession in open court. Thus, Dr. Mudd could not have 
been convicted of treason according to the Constitution un-
less the record of the military commission contained the 
requisite testimony of two witnesses or his confession. The 
record contains no such evidence. His conviction ought 
therefore be overturned for failure of compliance with the 
procedural prerequisites found in the third section of Article 
III. 
The Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees every 
accused the assistance of counsel for his defense. Captain 
Benet noted recently that the right pertains equally in pros-
ecutions at military law.28 Twenty-five years ago, General 
Macomb wrote that a prisoner was not "precluded the advan-
tage of [counsel's] presence."2~ Captain De Hart seconded 
this view when he wrote in 1846 that, "Courts-martial always 
admit counsel for the prisoner; and all military writers admit 
it to the custom to allow prisoners to have counsel."30 Held 
incommunicado before trial, Dr. Mudd was arraigned with-
out counsel, on charges unclear even to. those trained in the 
law. He was only permitted counsel after his plea to the 
charge had been taken. He was then given but one night to 
collaborate with his counsel in preparation of a defense. 
Denying Dr. Mudd access to counsel during the pleading 
process is action by the commission contrary to the estab-
lished military law of criminal procedure. 
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by 
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improperly limiting the admission of defense testimony to the 
scope of the prosecution's case, contrary to accepted practice 
in military courts. Military law permits a defendant to present 
evidence not touched on in the prosecution's case or to im-
peach prosecution evidence by introducing new evidence of 
his own. As General Macomb put it: "The utmost liberty 
consistent with the interest of parties not before the court and 
with the respect due to the court itself, should, at all times, be 
allowed a prisoner .... The Court is bound to hear whatever 
address, in his defense, the accused may think fit to offer, not 
being in itself contemptuous or disrespectful."" Here again, 
military law only reflects in its particular context a rule of law 
generally recognized in the courts of the United States. See, 
for example, United States v. Craig,'' in which the court noted 
that "the declarations of the prisoner may be admitted to 
account for his silence when that silence would operate against 
him," and Sessions v. Little,33 where the court observed that 
"whenever the conduct of a person at a given time becomes 
the subject ofinquiry, his expressions, as constituting a part of 
his conduct and indicating his intention, can not be rejected as 
irrelevant, but are admissible as part of the res gestae." 
The commission refused on more than one occasion to 
admit material evidence offered by Dr. Mudd in his defense. 
For instance, the record shows that the commission refused to 
hear a defense witness, Bennet Gwynn, tell his version of an 
episode in 1863 or 1864 in which Dr. Mudd was said to have 
concealed persons in Confederate service from Federal au-
thorities. The prosecution had earlier introduced this episode 
as tending to prove Dr. Mudd's inclination toward treason. 
Dr. Mudd offered Gwynn's testimony to prove not only that 
the episode had occurred years earlier than the prosecution 
suggested, but also that the persons involved, while fugitive, 
were not in Confederate service. The commission sustained 
the Assistant Judge Advocate's objection that this line of 
questioning went beyond the Government's case. Similar 
objections by the Assistant Judge Advocate were sustained 
when Dr. Mudd sought to question Dr. George Mudd and 
Benjamin Gardiner. The defense had s0ught their accounts of 
a meeting with Dr. Mudd on Sunday morning, April 16, 
during which he was said to have expressed his intent to 
inform federal authorities of the presence at his farm of two 
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suspicious persons. Such testimony went to the heart of the 
matter, that is, to whether Dr. Mudd knowingly or willingly 
concealed the escaping assassin and his henchman. Its exclu-
sion, on the sole ground that it exceeded the scope of the 
government's case, is contrary to prevailing standards of 
military law and manifestly prejudicial to Dr. Mudd. 
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by 
improperly refusing severance of his trial from that of his co-
defendants. 
The compound charge against Dr. Mudd accused him and 
his co-defendants of conspiring to murder the President and 
other government officials. Compelling Dr. Mudd to accept 
trial jointly with his alleged co-conspirators denied Dr. Mudd 
the chance to exonerate himself through the testimony of the 
others, for a defendant cannot testify. In the aforementioned 
case of United States v. Sharp, the court granted a motion for 
severance of the trials of several sailors charged in one indict-
ment with the same offense, endeavoring to make a revolt. In 
Sharp, as in Dr. Mudd's case, several co-defendants faced the 
same charge, a charge that required the government to prove 
concert of action. In Sharp, it was endeavoring to make a 
revolt; in Dr. Mudd's case, it was conspiring to murder the 
President. In both cases, joint trial would have denied an 
accused the opportunity to elicit exculpatory testimony from 
other defendants. The military commission denied Dr. Mudd 
his Fifth Amendment right to present his defense; otherwise, 
at the very least, it abused its discretion when it refused 
severance. 
The 1827 case of United States v. Marchant34 does not per-
suade an opposite conclusion. In that case, the Supreme 
Court declined to recognize co-defendants' rights to separate 
trials derived from co-defendants' common law rights to 
accept or oppose individual jurors for their jury panel. The 
Supreme Court properly limited its decision in Marchant & 
Colby to that question, and that case ought to be regarded as 
inapposite here, where no jury at all was involved. 
At military law, a joint trial presents the same impediment 
for an accused, for, as Captain De Hart observes, "Persons 
collectively arraigned are incompetent tor each other."35 On 
the other hand, accomplices separately indicted for the same 
offense may be called to testify for each other. In their 
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treatises, Captains De Hart and Benet agree that a prisoner 
who desires to avail himself of the testimony of others charged 
with the same offense, ought to petition the convening au-
thority for a separate trial.36 In the event that the convening 
authority declines, military law recognizes the military 
prisoner's right to judicial relief. In this case, by overruling 
Dr. Mudd's application for severance, the commission denied 
him the opportunity to elicit from his co-defendants testi-
mony that he was no part of the alleged conspiracy. Contrary 
to notions of due process embodied in both the Constitution 
and military law of the United States, this decision warrants 
reversal of Dr. Mudd's subsequent conviction. 
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by 
refusing to admit the testimony of Mrs. Mudd. While it is 
generally true that the law does not permit a spouse to testify, 
military law sometimes recognizes an exception. According 
to Greenleaf, the other spouse may testify when the act with 
which the accused spouse is charged is so private that the 
other is the only one who can prove or disprove the charge.37 
Now that Booth is dead, the charge of treason against Dr. 
Mudd cannot stand without the testimony of Mrs. Mudd, for 
treason must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, 
and only Herold and Mrs. Mudd were there when Dr. Mudd 
received the injured actor in his home on April 15, 1865. As 
Captain De Hart notes, the competence or incompetence of a 
spouse to testify does not depend on whether she testifies for 
or against the interests of her husband. Because Mrs. Mudd's 
testimony would be necessary to convict Dr. Mudd of treason, 
her testimony that he was not a traitor ought to have been 
admitted. The commission's failure to admit her testimony 
thus denied Dr. Mudd due process and warrants reversal of 
the conviction that followed. 
PART THREE: PROOF 
Even if the commission had jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd, 
and even if its many procedural errors did not annul its 
judgment, Dr. Mudd's conviction should nevertheless be 
overturned because the record cannot S<\tisfy the government's 
burden of proof. 
According to Captain M'Naghten, a military court must 
provide the highest level of justice available under the cir-
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cumstances.38 Notions of due process and fundamental fair-
ness require the government to carry the burden of proving 
Dr. Mudd was guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The government's evidence linking Dr. Mudd to the 
late President's assassination clearly fails to satisfy this bur-
den of proof. Accordingly, this court should set aside the 
commission's judgment. 
Both the common law and the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution impose on a felony prosecution the strictest 
standard of proof, that which is sufficient to produce in the 
decision maker certainty beyond any reasonable doubt. In-
deed, many reported decisions in the United States establish 
that a person accused of a crime must be found guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In State v. Roe,39 the Supreme Court of 
Vermont declared that "the only degree of certainty known to 
the law and recognized, is this: conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt." Decisions of the highest courts of New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts confirm the position of the 
court in State v. Roe.40 In the words of Chief Justice Shaw, 
writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Common-
wealth v. Webster: 
What is reasonable doubt? ... The evidence must 
establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and a 
moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs 
the understanding, and satisfies the reason and 
judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it.41 
The highest courts of New Jersey and of California have 
specifically relied upon Webster when insisting that the pros-
ecution offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt.42 Both 
Greenleaf and Halsted!' in their celebrated works on the law 
of evidence, acknowledge the prevalence in American law of 
the reasonable doubt standard. That a similar- or even more 
stringent standard- applies in cases governed by the mili-
tary law of the United States is clear from General Macomb's 
observation that no person may be conv,icted by court martial 
"unless upon the strongest and most satisfactory evidence."44 
If the charge and specification against Dr. Mudd amounted 
to treason, the government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew 
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Booth was a public enemy when he gave him aid and comfort; 
if the charge and specification amounted to conspiracy, the 
government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew Booth and the 
others had agreed to murder the President; if the charge and 
specification amounted to aiding and abetting a felon, the 
government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew Booth had mur-
dered the President. Judged by the most lenient of proof 
standards, the government's evidence, as set forth in the 
commission's record, would prove wanting; judged by the 
applicable reasonable doubt standard, the government's evi-
dence is wholly inadequate. Therefore, the Court should 
overturn the commission's judgment for its failure to find 
proof of an essential element of any of the crimes derivable 
from the charge and specification. 
Before the commission, witnesses for the government, as 
well as those for the defense, testified that Dr. Mudd had met 
with Booth when he visited Charles County in December of 
1864, some months prior to the President's murder. The 
record thus shows that the doctor was acquainted with the 
actor. It does not show, however, that they joined in a 
conspiracy. Regarding that Charles County meeting, the only 
testimony that went directly to the substance of Dr. Mudd's 
conversations with Booth came from defense witnesses Th-
ompson and Bowman, both of whom reported conversation 
of lawful and innocuous business. 
Only one government witness, Weichmann, placed Dr. 
Mudd again in the company of Booth or any of his alleged 
gang during the several months before the assassination. 
Weichmann testified that he witnessed a meeting between Dr. 
Mudd and Booth in Washington's National Hotel on January 
15. On the stand, Weichmann offered to fix this date with 
greater certainty using the register of the Pennsylvania House, 
the hotel at which he said Dr. Mudd had registered. The 
defense later showed that the only time the doctor had stayed 
in the Pennsylvania House was on December 23, not January 
15, calling into question the accuracy of Weichmann's testi-
mony. As to the business between the actor and the doctor on 
that occasion, Weichmann' s testimony was.that he was out of 
earshot, but that the doctor and the actor afterwards told him 
they discussed a real estate transaction. 
Two other government witnesses placed Dr. Mudd in the 
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city of Washington in the first three days of March, when the 
government claimed Booth was meeting with his henchmen. 
Evans testified that he saw Dr. Mudd enter Mrs. Suratt's 
house on March 1 or 2. Norton placed the doctor in the 
National Hotel on March 3. Defense witnesses, however, 
insisted the doctor was in and around Bryantown, Maryland 
during that period. Even if the commission accepted the 
testimony of Evans and Norton, and rejected the testimony of 
the doctor's five alibi witnesses, the most that the testimony of 
Evans and Norton can prove is that Dr. Mudd passed through 
Washington's National Hotel at a time when Booth was reg-
istered. Neither of these witnesses could put the two men 
together, much less report the nature of the business they 
might have conducted had they met. 
Of all the crimes that might be construed from the charge 
and specification against Dr. Mudd, the only two that re-
mained capable of proof when the government closed its case 
were conspiracy to commit murder and aiding and abetting 
the assassin. As to the conspiracy charge, the record was 
devoid of direct evidence of Dr. Mudd's involvement, since it 
contained nothing as to whether Dr. Mudd had learned, much 
less embraced, the object of the alleged conspiracy before 
April15. Any inference regarding Dr. Mudd's knowledge of, 
and commitment to, Booth's intentions drawn from the cir-
cumstantial evidence of one or more meetings between Dr. 
Mudd and Booth, must come, if at all, from the doctor's 
actions after the assassination. If the doctor knew Booth had 
killed the President when he sheltered Booth after the assas-
sination, then the commission might infer that his meetings 
beforehand had been to plan such an object. If the doctor did 
not know that Booth and Herold were connected with the 
assassination until after they left his care, then there is no 
basis in the record for assuming Dr. Mudd's part in Booth's 
conspiracy. The government's case for· conspiracy is there-
fore inextricably intertwined with its case for aiding and 
abetting. 
Before turning to the state of the record regarding a case 
against Dr. Mudd for aiding and abetting in Booth's escape, 
there remains to be addressed one more weakness in the 
government's case against Dr. Mudd for the charge of con-
spiracy with Booth to murder the president and other officers. 
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Even if it were accepted that Dr. Mudd conspired with Booth 
as early as November of 1864 or earlier, the record shows that 
the object of such a conspiracy was not the murder of the 
President. A conspirator may not be held accountable for the 
acts of a co-conspirator which were beyond the scope of the 
conspiracy's common purpose. Wharton writes that: 
while the parties are responsible for consequent acts, 
growing out of the general design, they are not for 
independent acts growing out of one of the particular 
malice of individuals. Thus, if one of the party, on his 
own hook, turns aside to commit a felony foreign to the 
original design, his companions do not participate in 
his guilt.45 
The record contains uncontradicted evidence of the gov-
ern-ment's own witness, Chester, that Booth at first planned 
only to kidnap the President and take him to Richmond. 
Chester testified that Booth did not abandon his intention to 
kidnap in favor of one to murder until mid-February. There is 
no evidence at all that Booth communicated with Dr. Mudd 
after January. Thus, even if Dr. Mudd had once been a party to 
Booth's kidnapping plan, the government offered no evi-
dence that Dr. Mudd even knew of the subsequent murder 
plan. The only charge against Dr. Mudd was conspiracy to 
murder, not conspiracy to kidnap. As the record clearly 
shows, Booth's conspiracy underwent a fundamental change 
of object after Dr. Mudd's last alleged communication with 
the group. The government has therefore failed to prove -
for this defendant- a key element of the crime of conspiracy, 
any commitment of Dr. Mudd to its common object. 
Essential to the government's case against Dr. Mudd for 
both conspiracy and aiding and abetting is whether the doctor 
recognized Booth and knew he had murdered the President 
when Booth stopped for help at the farm on April 15. If the 
government did not prove that Dr. Mudd knew he was help-
ing an assassin, there was no basis even in the circumstantial 
evidence of the record from which the commission could infer 
an unlawful purpose to Dr. Mudd's earlier meetings with 
Booth. The record would therefore fail to prove Dr. Mudd 
knowingly took part in the conspiracy. If the government did 
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not prove that Dr. Mudd knew he was treating and harboring 
the President's assassin, then the government failed also to 
prove the doctor intended to aid and abet an escaping felon. 
The government called several witnesses to show that Dr. 
Mudd aided Booth knowing what Booth had done. Lieuten-
ant Lovett testified that, onApril18, Dr. Mudd volunteered to 
him that two strangers had come to his house on the morning 
of Saturday, AprillS, and that he had treated one of them for 
a broken leg. Dr. Mudd told Lt. Lovett that he could not 
identify either of his visitors, and that his patient had shaved 
a mustache but retained a pair of long whiskers. Lt. Lovett 
also testified that Dr. Mudd pointed out to him the route by 
which, the next day, the doctor had directed them through the 
nearby swamp to Dr. Wilmer's, before Dr. Mudd rode on to 
church. According to Lt. Lovett, Dr. Mudd said he only 
learned of the assassination when he spoke with fellow wor-
shippers at church. Colonel Wells testified regarding three 
conversations with the doctor. According to the Colonel, the 
doctor told him substantially what the doctor had already 
told the lieutenant, that Dr. Mudd had entertained two strang-
ers on Saturday, treating one for an injured leg; that his 
patient arrived with a mustache and whiskers; and that the 
doctor did not recognize his patient as John Wilkes Booth. 
To rebut Dr. Mudd's claim that he neither recognized 
Booth nor knew Booth had anything to do with the assassina-
tion when he treated him, the government offered testimony 
that the doctor visited Bryantown on Saturday afternoon, 
after news of the assassination and of Booth's role had been 
broadcast. That Dr. Mudd traveled that afternoon to town 
and heard of the assassination was never disputed. The issue 
is whether he heard on that trip that Booth was wanted as the 
assassin. Three government witnesses testified that they 
learned of the assassination in Bryantown on Saturday after-
noon. Only one of these was able to discover the name of the 
alleged assassin; the others were not. There was testimony 
that Bryantown rumors that Saturday afternoon otherwise 
identified the murderer, including some that named Boyle, a 
locally notorious outlaw. Ultimately, however, the govern-
ment failed to produce evidence directly contradicting the 
doctor's statements to the government's investigators, Lieu-
tenant Lovett and Colonel Wells. At best, the government 
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proved that Dr. Mudd had an opportunity to learn Booth was 
being sought earlier than the doctor claimed. It failed to prove 
that Dr. Mudd took that opportunity. 
Review of the record before the commission shows that 
the government failed to offer any evidence which could be 
said to prove Dr. Mudd's intentional participation in any 
conspiracy, much less in one for murder as to which he was 
charged. It also shows that the government failed to offer any 
evidence which could be said to prove Dr. Mudd knew he was 
harboring a felon when he set Booth's leg and sent his travel-
ers back on the road that fateful Saturday. For this failure of 
proof respecting essential elements of the crimes of con-
spiracy and aiding and abetting, the commission's judgment 
should be set aside and the case against Dr. Mudd dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of Dr. Mudd should be overturned because 
the record shows that the commission which tried him com-
mitted many errors of sufficient gravity to warrant correction 
on appeal. The commission's first and most serious error was 
trying him at all. Under the United States Constitution, a 
military tribunal cannot try a civilian resident of a free state 
when the civil courts are functioning normally. That martial 
law may be in force makes no difference. Nor may the law of 
war justify military jurisdiction over a civilian resident of a 
loyal state. The military commission which tried Dr. Mudd 
had no power to do so. 
Trial by military commission cost Dr. Mudd his rights 
under the Constitution to action by a grand jury, trial by a 
petit jury, and trial in an appropriate venue. These rights may 
not be denied a civilian resident of a free state by the unilateral 
action of the government. The attempt to do so in this case 
warrants reversal of Dr. Mudd's conviction and dismissal of 
the charge against him. 
The charge against Dr. Mudd was so vague as to prevent 
the fashioning of a specific reply. By proceeding on such a 
defective charge, the government denied Dr. Mudd's right to 
due process. By arraigning him and demanding his plea 
before allowing him to seek counsel, the government denied 
Dr. Mudd's right to due process. By refusing him the oppor-
tunity to elicit testimony beyond the scope of the government's 
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case in chief, the government denied Dr. Mudd's right to due 
process. By excluding his wife's testimony, the government 
denied Dr. Mudd's right to due process. By refusing his 
request for a separate trial, the government denied Dr. Mudd's 
right to due process. Any of these violations of rights recog-
nized by the Constitution as applicable to criminal trials 
generally, and by military law as applicable to trial by mili-
tary commission, warrants reversal of Dr. Mudd's conviction 
and dismissal of the charge against him. 
Finally, the government completely failed to prove Dr. 
Mudd even knew of the conspiracy to kill the President or of 
Booth's commission of the crime. This failure of proof of 
criminal intent on the part of the defendant warrants reversal 
of Dr. Mudd's conviction and dismissal of the charge against 
him. 
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On April14, 1865, Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth Presi-
dent of the United States and the Commander in Chief of their 
armies was assassinated at Washington, D.C. Elsewhere in 
the capital that night, William H. Seward, the Secretary of 
State, was assaulted with a knife. It would later be learned 
that simultaneous attacks were planned for the Vice Presi-
dent, Secretary of War, and General Grant. 
The President was struck down in his box at Ford's The-
ater, by the bullet of an assassin who was observed by a 
horrified audience as he escaped across the stage. Eye-
witnesses had no trouble identifying the killer as the actor 
John Wilkes Booth. He left the scene on horseback. 
In the early morning hours of the next day, two riders, one 
of them Booth, visited Samuel A. Mudd at his farm outside 
Bryantown, Maryland. Mudd, a physician, treated Booth for 
a broken leg, sheltering him and his companion until later in 
the day, when Mudd led the pair to a secret path through the 
nearby swamp. Meanwhile, numerous federal officers and 
agents were conducting an active manhunt for the President's 
assassin, issuing the hue and cry for Booth in Bryantown; 
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indeed, across the breadth of Charles County. Mudd visited 
Bryantown in the afternoon after the assassination, and there 
discussed it with others, but concealed his visitors from the 
authorities. 
Eventually, federal officers interviewed Mudd. His an-
swers and those of his wife, as well as the discovery of Booth's 
damaged riding boot in Mudd's home, led to Mudd's arrest. 
While he was in custody, additional evidence came to light of 
his clandestine meetings with Booth and John Surratt, a known 
Confederate agent, in the period preceding the assassination. 
In addition, witnesses reported other acts by Mudd revealing 
his sympathy for the rebels. Consequently, President Johnson 
ordered Mudd to appear on charges related to the assassina-
tion before a military commission in Washington in May 1865. 
During a lengthy trial, two experienced counsel represented 
Mudd and sixty-four different witnesses took the stand in his 
defense. Nevertheless, the nine senior officers comprising the 
commission found him guilty and sentenced him to prison for 
life. He remains incarcerated at Fort Jackson in the Florida 
Keys. 
Counsel for Mudd petitioned this honorable court for 
review of his conviction, claiming that the military commis-
sion lacked jurisdiction to try Mudd, that it had denied him a 
variety of procedural rights, and that the government had 
failed to carry its burden of proof. The court granted Mudd's 
Petition for Review by an order dated October 21, 1866. 
For the murder of our nation's supreme military com-
mander, Mudd was lawfully- and fairly- tried in time of 
war by the military commission in Washington. To petitioner's 
numerous claims of error, the government replies with greater 
specificity in what follows. 
PART ONE: JURISDICTION 
A military commission, convened on May 8, 1865, could 
try Mudd for conspiring to murder the nation's Commander 
in Chief. According to international law to which the United 
States subscribes, a military commission has jurisdiction in 
time of martial law to try offenses against jus belli, the law of 
war. 
As we all know only too well, at the times of both the 
assassination and the trial, civil war raged in the United 
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States. This bloody conflict arose from the attempt to secede 
by several states, including one whose borders touched both 
the District of Columbia and Charles County, Maryland. The 
war took the lives of hundreds of thousands, and destroyed 
the lives of countless more. Although Lee had surrendered 
his forces on April9, and Johnston his on April26, other rebel 
armies fought on. The rebel leader, Jefferson Davis, was not 
apprehended until two days after Mudd's trial began, and the 
rebels prevailed in battle at San Jacinto on the very day the 
prosecution opened its case. Rebel warships continued to 
attack Union vessels as late as November, long after Mudd's 
sentence had been approved. The city of Washington, seat of 
government and national headquarters of its armed forces, 
for four years faced the constant threat of rebel attack. During 
Mudd's trial, the city remained the fortified center for direct-
ing military operations against the rebels. As they had since 
1862, soldiers guarded the city's gateways and policed its 
streets. The Commander in Chief was thus killed within his 
own camp. These are undisputed facts of common knowl-
edge, and are properly considered by this court in its review. 
They are more than sufficient to support a finding by the 
commission that a state of war existed and thatthe zone of war 
embraced the place of the crime, the place of the petitioner's 
arrest, and the place of his trial. 
Like courts martial, military commissions are quasi-judi-
cial military tribunals. Courts martial try persons of the 
armed forces; military commissions try civilians accused of 
criminal acts during wartime. In England, from whence our 
law, military and civil, has come, the authority of military 
commissions has been recognized since the twelfth century. 
According to Hale, the Court of the Constable and Marshal 
was established at that time for control over the King's army, 
for appeals of death for murder committed out of the country, 
and for determination of prisoners' rights:1 General Washing-
ton ordered the earliest trial in the United States by a military 
commission, that of the spy John Andre in September 1780. A 
military commission tried Arbuthnot and Ambrister in Florida 
in 1818 for inciting the Indians to war against the United 
States 2 General Scott convened military commissions to try 
offenses against the law of war by civilians during the Mexi-
can War of 1847. On September 24, 1862, the Commander in 
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Chief ordered that "all rebels ... be subject to martial law and 
liable to trial and punishment by a court martial or military 
commission." Congress ratified this Presidential proclama-
tion by the third Act of March 3, 1863. 
Application of the law of war (or martial law) to displace 
or supplement civil law depends upon the condition of war. 
According to Professor Parker, 
Martial law is that military rule and authority which 
exists in time of war, and is conferred by the laws of 
war, in relation to persons and things under and within 
the scope of active military operations in carrying on 
the war, and which extinguishes or suspends civil 
rights, and the remedies founded upon them .... 
Founded on the necessities of war, and limited by 
those necessities, its existence does not necessarily 
suspend all civil proceedings.' 
In his Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, later promulgated by Presidential 
direction as Union Army General Orders No. 100, Professor 
Lieber wrote, "Martial law is simply military authority exer-
cised in accordance with the laws and usages of war." Whit-
ing has written that the laws of war are the laws that the 
Constitution expressly authorizes and requires to be enforced 
when martial law has been declared.' Captain Benet observed 
that, "Many offenses which in time of peace are civil offenses, 
become in time of war military offenses and are to be tried by 
a military tribunal, even in places where civil tribunals ex-
ist."' That the recent war was not international but internecine 
does not bar the authorization of military commissions by 
martial law. As the Supreme Court observed in The Prize 
Cases, "It is very evident that the common laws of war ought 
to be observed by both parties in every civil war."6 
Mudd was accused of conspiring to assassinate the Com-
mander in Chief of the armed forces of the Union, his imme-
diate Constitutional successors in the chain of command, the 
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and War, and the 
general officer in charge of the Union armies in the field. 
Mudd was thus accused of plotting, in effect, the destruction 
of the national command authorities of the Union, as effec-
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tively as if he had shelled the headquarters tent where they 
gathered in pre-battle council. Although it has not been 
shown that Mudd ever donned a uniform of the insurgent 
forces, or took a place in the ranks of its field armies, he 
nevertheless became a combatant by plotting against such a 
military target in time of war. As the Attorney General 
recently advised the President in his opinion on the power of 
a military commission to try those who conspired to kill the 
Commander in Chief," An Army has a right to protect its own 
existence by the means and mode usual among civilized 
nations when at war."' Adopted by the President, who 
ordered military trial for the conspirators, this expression of 
the inherent power of the army in time of war ought to be 
afforded great weight. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ex 
parte Milligan' is not to the contrary. In that case, it was 
conceded that Indianapolis, the seat of both the military 
district and the military commission, had never been seri-
ously threatened by insurgent armies. Indiana was properly 
regarded more as a military staging area for support of Union 
forces than as a military target threatened by rebel attack. No 
such concession is offered here regarding Washington, where 
the taking of the national capital was always a rebel military 
objective and rebel armies came distressingly close on several 
occasions. Only the valiant defense of Fort Stevens blunted 
General Early's invasion of the District of Columbia less than 
a year before the trial of this case. The District and the State 
of Maryland were truly war zones in the recent conflict. In 
both, the constant threat of attack amounted to a serious 
military emergency. The late President, by our Constitution 
both chief executive and supreme military commander, con-
cluded such conditions warranted imposition of martial law, 
establishment of military commissions, and suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus. Congress soon ratified these decisions 
by legislation, and the Supreme Court has acquiesced. The 
decision of his successor regarding the trial of this particular 
case ought to be treated with the same respect. 
The Constitution does not prohibit either application of 
the law of war or trial by military commission. Surely, it is 
beyond peradventure after The Prize Cases that the law of war, 
as part of the law of nations, is also part of the law of the 
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United States. The Framers of the Constitution left adminis-
tration of the law of war to Congress, not to the federal 
judiciary. Article I, section 8, clause 10 authorizes Congress 
"to define and punish offenses ... against the law of nations." 
That Congress may have reassigned, from time to time, some 
of that power to civil courts does not mean that Congress is 
foreclosed from assigning it also, or instead, to other tribu-
nals, including military commissions. 
Congressional authorization of trial by military commis-
sion for offenses under the law of war no more intrudes upon 
the grant of federal judicial power in Article III than does 
Congressional authorization of trial by court martial, a prac-
tice uninterrupted since promulgation of the Articles of War 
by the First Congress. In the Act of July 17, 1862, Congress 
referred approvingly to trials by military commissions, and in 
the Act of March 18, 1863, Congress explicitly authorized trial 
by military commission of" any person" for spying, an offense 
against the law of war. 
The law of war and its customary tribunals precede the 
Constitution. To the extent that the Constitution might be 
said to limit preexisting customary law regarding the power 
of the Commander in Chief to employ military commissions, 
the Constitution implicates the Congress, not the judiciary. 
Congress has lent its approval to trial by military commission 
of civilians for violations of the laws of war. No further 
approval from the federal courts is required. As Justice Story 
wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, 
in measures exclusively of a political, legislative, or 
executive character, it is plain, that as the supreme 
authority, as to these questions, belongs to the 
legislative and executive departments, they cannot be 
reexamined elsewhere. 9 
Careful assessment of the allocation of federal powers in the 
Constitution leads to the conclusion that petitioner's trial by 
military commission comported with·the supreme law of the 
land. 
Nothing in the Bill of Rights alters this conclusion. The 
assassination of the Commander in Chief by Booth and the 
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assault on the second in succession to that office by his 
henchman were attacks on military commanders and there-
fore offenses againstthe laws of war. So, also, were the related 
conspiracy and subsequent acts aiding and abetting the per-
petrators. As the Attorney General pointed out to the Presi-
dent, infractions of the laws of nations are offenses, to be 
distinguished from crimes. In Article I, the Constitution 
refers to offenses against the laws of nations, whereas in 
Article III and in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Consti-
tution refers to crimes and criminal trials. Mudd was charged 
with offenses against the laws of war; he was not charged with 
crimes in violation of Federal law. His trial was therefore 
beyond the scope of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. Justice Story cautioned that the construction of a 
power conferred in the Constitu lion ought 
not be enlarged beyond the fair scope of its terms, 
merely because the restriction is inconvenient, 
impolitic, or even mischievous. If it be mischievous, 
the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by 
an exercise of the power of amendment. If they do not 
choose to apply the remedy it may fairly be presumed, 
that the mischief is less than what would arise from a 
further extension of the power; or that it is the least of 
two evils. 10 
The same principle ought to govern judicial construction 
of procedural entitlements in the Bill of Rights. Just as the 
guarantee of a jury in the Seventh Amendment has been held 
by the Supreme Court in Shields v. Thomas" to apply only to 
those cases that arise from common law, as the text of that 
Amendment specifically provides, and not from equity, so, 
too, should the guarantee of a jury in the Sixth Amendment be 
held to apply to cases arising from common law crimes, and 
not from offenses against the law of nations. 
The law of war applies in this case even though the United 
States never formally recognized the late confederacy as a 
belligerent state. First, belligerency is the prerequisite not for 
a sovereign's assertion of power under jus belli, but for any 
assertion of legal limits to that power. Second, belligerency 
applies only to civilized and separate sovereignties at war 
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with each other, not to one sovereign beset by civil war. 
Finally, even if mutual recognition of belligerency were held 
to be prerequisite to the application of the law of war in a 
domestic insurrection, it would not lead to a finding of error 
in this case, for only legitimate combatants may assert the 
rights of a belligerent. 
With the legal state of belligerency is associated restric-
tions on the savage power of a sovereign at war. Wheaton, in 
his Elements of International Law, illustrates the point when 
he discusses prisoners of war: 
According to the law of war, as still practised by 
savage nations, prisoners taken in war are put to 
death. Among the more polished nations of antiquity, 
this practice gradually gave way .... The present usage 
of exchanging prisoners was not firmly established in 
Europe until sometime in the course of the seventeenth 
century. 12 
As this passage makes clear, the mutual consent of Euro-
pean sovereigns has produced limits on the customary or 
natural law of war. Without that mutual consent, such limits 
do not apply. In internal war, "the government must decide 
whether the municipal or the international code, in whole or 
in part, shall be adopted. "13 As President Woolsey of Yale has 
put it, "There is a difference between belligerents and bellig-
erent states, which has been too much overlooked."14 Peti-
tioner is correct in asserting that the record is devoid of any 
formal act of the United States sufficient to communicate 
recognition of the confederacy as a belligerent state. Peti-
tioner is also correct in asserting that the government's discre-
tionary resort to certain customs of prisoner parole and ex-
change is insufficient to establish a state of belligerency be-
tween the Union and the confederacy for other purposes 
when it was not so intended by the United States. Absent a 
state of belligerency, the law of war still applies, but the 
limitations for belligerent states do not. 
Belligerency's limits on the law of war have been with-
held, again by the mutual consent of sovereigns, from mur-
derous persons not enrolled in the armed forces of a consent-
ing sovereign. Citing Vattel and Kluber, Wheaton noted: 
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The horrors of war would indeed be greatly aggravated, 
if every individual of the belligerent states was allowed 
to plunder and slay indiscriminately the enemy's 
subjects without being in any manner accountable for 
his conduct. Hence it is, in land wars, irregular bands 
of marauders are liable to be treated as lawless banditti, 
not entitled to the mitigated usages of war as practiced 
by civilized nations. 15 
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In his essay "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference 
to the Laws and Usages of War," Professor Lieber referred to 
recent European military law and history when he refined the 
point made by Wheaton. Lieber distinguished various armed 
bands, including brigands, freebooters, and bushwhackers. 
None are entitled, as would be the captured soldier of the 
conventional army of a belligerent, to the privileges of the law 
of war, but only to its force. 
According to Professor Lieber, 
the armed prowler, the so-called bushwhacker, is a 
simple assassin, and will thus always be considered by 
soldier and citizen; and ... the armed bands that arise 
in a district fairly occupied by military forces, or in the 
rear of an army, are universally considered, if captured, 
brigands, and not prisoners of war. 16 
From Wheaton and Lieber, therefore, it may be concluded 
that, by international law, a bushwhacker is subject to the full 
force of the law of war, unmitigated by the actions of sover-
eigns mutually respecting their armies as belligerents. 
As charged before the commission, Mudd and his co-
defendants constituted an armed band of bushwhackers. The 
record shows that they were recruited and led by Booth, who 
held no commission from the confederacy. Forsaking uni-
forms and identifying badges, they operated secretly in the 
rear of the Union army to murder its most senior officers. 
Against such a band, as against spies, the law of war operates 
unmitigated by privileges associated with the status of bellig-
erency. So, even if a state of belligerency was necessary to 
mitigate for regular soldiers the full force of the law of war, its 
absence has no bearing on the decision in this case. 
42 Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination 
PART TWO: PROCEDURE 
Petitioner had ample opportunity to request a more defi-
nite statement of the charge and specifications before trial 
began. Now that his counsel have presented an extensive, if 
ultimately unsuccessful, defense, his claim that the vagueness 
of the charge and specifications left him unable to defend 
should fall on deaf ears. The record shows that petitioner 
made no objection to the charge and specification at his 
arraignment, and only requested a restatement near the end 
of the government's case in chief. Nevertheless, petitioner 
now argues that the charge and specification were so vague as 
to prevent him from making an adequate defense. The gov-
ernment readily concedes that an accused should be apprised 
of the extent and degree of guilt with which he stands charged, 
and of the particular facts on which the prosecutor plans to 
base the evidence against him. The government also agrees 
that, as Captain Benet observed, if a charge is found to be so 
defective in all legal respects that it is impossible to confirm a 
finding of guilt thereon, no sentence of punishment could be 
properly adjudged or enforced.17 The issue here, however, is 
whether, considering petitioner's failure to object earlier, he 
really was forestalled as he now claims. If Mudd did not 
understand the charge, he could have called upon the pros-
ecution to specify the particular facts, a request that, Captain 
De Hart noted, the commission could not refuse. 18 Since 
neither Mudd nor his counsel requested a clearer statement 
until the government's case was nearly complete, this court is 
entitled to assume that, at the time, Mudd understood well 
enough the charges under which he was indicted. Even if his 
failure to make a timely objection is excusable, the court ought 
to find that such an objection is nevertheless meritless, be-
cause the charge and specifications left no doubt as to the 
persons accused and the crimes in question. 
As presented at petitioner's arraignment, the charge and 
specifications were sufficiently clear as a matter of law. Ac-
cording to General Macomb and Captain Benet, the charge 
and specification are too vague only when they fail to point to 
any specific crime. 19 Captain De Hart has noted that, while in 
framing charges of military offenses, precision and concise-
ness should be observed, it is not necessary to follow technical 
strictness. De Hart has concluded that a requirement for 
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technical strictness would encumber the proceedings of mili-
tary courts to an inconvenient extent without any substantial 
benefits and make necessary a body of lawyers to provide 
guidance and administration of military justice, 20 All that 
should be necessary to satisfy basic fairness is enough preci-
sion and certainty in the description so that the defendant 
may know the nature of the crime charged, 
The specifications to the charge must be brief, clear, and 
explicit Captain Benet wrote that, in general, they must give 
the facts, circumstances, and intent in specific terms,21 In 
particular, when conspiracy is charged, the accused must be 
named and informed of the offense, as well as the time and 
place of its commission, In this case, the general conspiracy 
specification reported that petitioner, with Booth and John 
Surratt, on or before March 6, 1865, and from then to April15, 
1865, did "combine, confederate, and conspire together ,, 
unlawfully, maliciously, and traitorously to kill and murder 
within the Military Department of Washington, and within 
the fortified and entrenched lines thereof" Abraham Lincoln 
and other named officers, The specification then described 
the assassination in detail, including the time, place, and 
circumstances, An additional paragraph recounted the indi-
vidual involvement of the petitioner, stating that he did 
"advise, encourage, receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, 
aid, and assist" certain listed people with "knowledge of the 
murderous and traitorous conspiracy aforesaid,,," Thus, the 
charge and specifications presented the case against peti-
tioner in sufficient detail as to leave no question in a reason-
able mind about what he was called upon to answer. 
When petitioner's counsel finally did request that the 
charge and specification be stated more clearly, the govern-
ment fully complied, The record shows that, although the 
Judge Advocate replied that the charge and specification 
could not be stated "with more certainty, or with more appro-
priateness or terseness of language, than has been already 
employed," he did reiterate that the general allegation was 
conspiracy and that the applicable law would be the common 
law, When defense counsel continued to ask whether the 
accused were charged with conspiracy, both the Judge Advo-
cate and Assistant Judge Advocate Bingham answered affir-
matively, In particular, Bingham stated that they were in-
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dieted for a conspiracy and would be held accountable for as 
many overt acts in the execution of that conspiracy as they 
were guilty of. 
It strains credulity that petitioner's counsel did not under-
stand the charge and specification, when he proceeded with-
out clarification for much of the government's case. Any 
complaint as to the charge and specification should properly 
have been made at arraignment or as the trial began, yet 
petitioner made no motion to quash, offered no plea in abate-
ment, and never presented a demurrer. 
However, assuming for the sake of argument that there 
were ambiguities in the charge, the explanations given by the 
Judge Advocate and the Assistant Judge Advocate should 
have eliminated any remaining uncertainty. From the charge 
and specification introduced at arraignment, as well as from 
amplifying responses by the Judge Advocates, petitioner 
should have learned all he needed to know and all that the law 
required the government to inform him. No error sufficient to 
justify reversing the judgment of the commission ought to 
attach to the communication made by the charge and specifi-
cation. 
The commission's refusal to sever petitioner's trial from 
that of his co-defendants denied him neither a procedural 
right nor an adequate opportunity to defend himself. Where 
several persons are jointly indicted, the common law is clear 
that the accused have no right to insist upon separate trials. If 
the court, in its discretion, chooses not to separate the trials, it 
commits no error. United States v. Marchant" stands as author-
ity for the applicability of this rule in federal courts. Other 
precedents supporting its universality at common law in-
cludeMaton v. People, 23 Whitehead v. State,'' and State v. Soper. 25 
Bishop26 and Starkie27 concur in their works on criminal law. 
The same rule applies in military law. General Macomb 
and Captain Benet distinguish between cases in which the 
defendants are named in a common charge and those in which 
they are named in separate charges. 28 According to both 
learned commentators, where defendants are named in a 
common charge, they are tried together. In this case, peti-
tioner was named in the same charge and general specifica-
tion as his co-defendants. The commission therefore adhered 
to customary practice when it tried the eight together, and it 
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did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's re-
quest to be tried separately. 
The factthat Mudd's wife did not testify on his behalf does 
not support the claim that he was denied an adequate chance 
to defend. His counsel never called Mrs. Mudd to testify. The 
defense's failure to call a witness cannot later be deemed an 
error by the tribunal. By not even attempting to call Mrs. 
Mudd, the defense waived whatever right it might have to her 
testimony. 
Had the defense called Mrs. Mudd to testify, the commis-
sion would have been well justified in refusing to admit her 
testimony. Neither common law nor military law admits 
husbands and wives as witnesses for or against each other, in 
any trial where one of them may be a party. Roscoe and 
Greenleaf, in their treatises on evidence, both present as the 
common law the rule here stated. 29 General Macomb, Captain 
De Hart, and Captain Benet in their treatises on military law, 
present as the customary law of military tribunals the same 
rule30 The United States Supreme Court confirmed the rule's 
applicability in federal court in Stein v. Bowman 31 It has not 
seen fit to revisit the matter since. 
Any argument for admission of the testimony of a spouse 
can therefore be based on no more than wishful thinking. As 
Greenleaf notes, the identity of interest between husband and 
wife makes a wife's testimony as vulnerable to claims of 
improper interest as the testimony of the defendant himself. 
Petitioner fails to point to anything that might justify reas-
sessing the policy balance of public and private life that has 
long persuaded the courts to adhere to such a rule. 
PART THREE: EVIDENCE 
The prosecution furnished more than enough evidence to 
sustain Mudd's conviction. The charge against him was 
proven sufficiently to satisfy the understanding and con-
science of the commission. The government recognizes the 
long-settled principle that the obligation of proving any fact 
lies upon the party who asserts the affirmative of that fact, and 
accepts that this principle applies to trials by military tribu-
nals. According to Captain De Hart, in military courts, "He 
who makes the charge is bound to prove it."32 "Proof," 
however, is nothing more than, as De Hart puts it, the legal 
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credence that the law gives to evidence. The government 
readily concedes, therefore, that it bore the burden of proof at 
petitioner's trial. Thus the dispute here is not about which 
party bore the burden of proof but about how heavy a burden 
it had to be. Petitioner is really calling on this court to 
determine the minimum amount of credible evidence neces-
sary for his conviction. 
Petitioner makes the novel but misguided assertion that 
the prosecution had to furnish proof sufficient to meet the 
common law standard of "reasonable doubt." On this point, 
military law does not follow the common law, as the lack of 
citation to military authorities for this point in petitioner's 
brief makes clear. Moreover, as Captain Benet notes in his 
treatise, military law does not even require the same proof 
standard for a military commission as for a court martial.33 
The commission that tried petitioner was free to set for itself 
the standard of proof. Its findings should not be set aside for 
failure to follow procedures appropriate to other tribunals. 
The prosecution need on! y have provided enough evidence so 
that petitioner's guilt was a certainty in the understanding 
and conscience of the commission members. 
To assert that the prosecution was not bound to prove 
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt is not to concede 
that the government's case fell short of that strictest of stan-
dards. The commission heard evidence more than sufficient 
by any proof measure to find petitioner guilty of conspiracy 
to murder the President and other officers in the chain of 
command. 
This case presents no issue as to the nature of criminal 
conspiracy. The government and the petitioner concede that 
military law ought to define the crime of conspiracy in the 
same manner as does the common law. Maltby, Benet, and De 
Hart agree that, in the absence of specific rules found in 
military law, common law provides a· source for principles to 
guide military trials. 34 It is black letter law that a conspiracy 
is a confederacy of two or more persons to accomplish some 
unlawful object, and that the object of the conspiracy need not 
be accomplished for the crime to be· perfected. The confed-
eracy itself constitutes the crime. No further overt act other 
than the agreement need be proven. The crime is complete 
when the conspirators enter the agreement. Thus, in this case, 
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the prosecution had only to prove that petitioner agreed with 
at least one other that one of them would commit a crime. 
Whether petitioner intended to personally take part in 
attacking the President and the others is irrelevant; the issue 
is whether Mudd agreed with someone else that the attacks 
should be carried out. Conspiracy, like any other contro-
verted fact, can be proven by circumstances. As the court 
noted in United States v. Donau,35 the fact finder need only find 
that the circumstances have been satisfactorily proven as 
facts. The commission, therefore, could infer petitioner's agree-
ment to Booth's plot from the evidence of petitioner's own 
words and actions. 
Two long-settled principles, originating in the common 
law and adopted by military law, guide proof of intent. The 
first, set forth by Captain Benet, is a presumption that a 
person intends to do what he does, and intends the natural, 
necessary and probable consequences of his actions. 36 The 
second, which follows from the first, is that a person's intent 
can be inferred from his actions. The commission could 
properly rely on these principles to find that the evidence 
supported petitioner's conviction for conspiracy. 
Petitioner's statement to Daniel J. Thomas that the Presi-
dent, his cabinet, and other Union men would soon be dead 
surely permitted the inferrence of petitioner's knowing in-
volvement in a plot by those with whom he was repeatedly in 
contact during the period leading up to their attacks on such 
officers. Several witnesses testified of petitioner's meetings 
with the assassin Wilkes Booth, the Confederate agent John 
Surratt, and other conspirators. Louis Weichmann testified 
that, on January 15, 1865, he met Mudd and Booth on a 
Washington street, after Mudd had called out to John Surratt, 
and that the foursome repaired to the National Hotel for 
conference. According to Weichmann, Mudd had private 
conversations at the hotel with Booth and Surratt, during 
which Booth appeared to draw a diagram. William A. Evans, 
a minister, testified that he saw Mudd going into Mary Surratt's 
Washington home in early March. Marcus P. Norton placed 
Mudd at the National Hotel on March 3, when the doctor 
entered Norton's room looking for Booth. From this evidence 
of petitioner's repeated, furtive meetings with Booth and 
other conspirators, the commission could infer Mudd's will-
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ing participation in the planning of the attacks. 
Evidence that petitioner was an active and spirited adher-
ent to the cause of secession goes to the purpose of petitioner's 
meetings with Booth and others implicated in the attacks. 
Such evidence warrants the commission's finding that peti-
tioner met repeatedly with Booth and the other plotters dur-
ing the life of the plot to discuss the plot, and not unrelated 
matters. Witnesses testified that Mudd entertained gather-
ings of Confederate sympathizers at his horne. Several of his 
former slaves testified of secret gatherings of men, many in 
Confederate uniform, in the woods surrounding petitioner's 
home. They told of his instructing servants to provide the 
men with bedding and food, tend their horses, and serve as 
look-outs. The record also shows that the Confederate agent, 
now fugitive, John Surratt was a frequent guest in the Mudd 
horne. 
In addition to this circumstantial evidence of petitioner's 
support for the secessionists, the record contained petitioner's 
own treasonous utterances. These, too, tend to prove 
petitioner's felonious purpose in meeting with Booth and his 
gang in the months and weeks immediately before the assas-
sination. Melvina Washington recalled petitioner telling her, 
"Lincoln would not be in office for long" and cursing the 
President as a "son of a bitch" who ought to have been dead 
a long time ago. Walter Marshall had earlier heard petitioner 
praise the rebel General Jackson, stating that he had no objec-
tion if the General were to "burn Lincoln up in his house." 
Petitioner was rightly ajudged Booth's co-conspirator. 
Evidence of the actions and surrounding circumstances of 
other conspirators supports the commission's conclusion that 
Mudd was a party to an agreement to murder the President. 
The crime of conspiracy requires that an agreement between 
two or more persons to commit an unlawful act be proven. 
However, there is no authority stating that the agreement be 
formal. Indeed, as Federal courts have ruled in United States 
v. Hertz37 and United States v. Wilson, 38 the acts and words of 
the defendant's co-conspirators can prove a common con-
spiracy. As the court noted in United States v. Cole,39 this 
includes their acts both before and after the commission of the 
object of the conspiracy. The most telling act by petitioner's 
co-conspirators was the visit by Booth and Herold at the 
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Mudd home during their flight to avoid capture. From that 
visit, the commission could infer that petitioner had previ-
ously offered his home as a safe house in Charles County and 
that this contribution explained his several meetings with 
Booth and other conspirators. 
Petitioner's inaction following Booth's stopover also sug-
gests his willing participation in the plot. Informed of the 
manhunt for the President's assassin, Mudd kept silent about 
Booth's visit until he and Herold gained a vital head start 
toward Richmond. As the Indiana Supreme Court said in 
McGregor v. State,40 when circumstantial evidence is relied on 
for a conviction, the totality of the evidence must be so 
conclusive that a reasonable man would believe in the exist-
ence of the offense even in view of the most important con-
cerns of life and liberty. In this case, the commission consid-
ered the circumstances presented among the totality of the 
evidence to reach the reasonable conclusion of Mudd's com-
plicity. Thus, the commission permissibly and correctly found 
that petitioner was party to the agreement to attack the Com-
mander in Chief and the Secretary of State. 
That petitioner's witnesses presented a different interpre-
tation of his words and actions does not warrant setting aside 
the judgment against him. It is black letter law that the 
credibility of witnesses is the province of the fact finder. As 
the court noted in Dickenson v. The Gore,'1 assessment of the 
witnesses' demeanor is essential to determining their cred-
ibility and assigning weight to their testimony. For this 
reason, appellate courts, with resort only to written tran-
scripts, have traditionally eschewed overruling a trial court's 
findings of fact based on the credibility of witnesses offering 
conflicting versions of the facts. Nothing in this appellate 
court's organic law suggests that Congress intended this 
court to proceed otherwise. This court, therefore, ought to 
defer to the commission's tacit judgment that the government's 
witnesses were more believable than the petitioner's. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's several claims of error by the commission are 
groundless. Because the law of war would have empowered 
the commission to try Booth, a bushwhacker who killed the 
Commander in Chief and attempted to kill his successors in 
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the chain of command, the law of war empowered the com-
mission to try that bushwhacker's confederates, including 
Samuel Mudd. The U.S. Constitution, which recognizes and 
incorporates the law of war by reference, does not prohibit 
petitioner's trial by military commission, nor does it require 
the substitution of a civil court or a common law jury. That the 
Union denied secessionist state governments formal recogni-
tion as belligerent sovereigns does not dictate a contrary 
conclusion. 
Petitioner got the trial to which the law entitled him. He 
did not deserve a jury. No error resulted from the commission's 
refusal to try him apart from his co-conspirators, or from the 
omission of his wife's testimony. 
The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution 
was sufficient for even the highest burden of proof. For all 
these reasons, the United States respectfully pray that this 
court affirm the commission's conviction of Samuel A. Mudd. 
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CLERK OF THE COURT: All rise. OYEZ! OYEZ! OYEZ! All 
persons having business before the honorable United States 
Special Court of Military Appeal are admonished to draw 
nigh and give their attention for the court is now sitting. 
God save the United States and this honorable court. 
JUDGE EVERETT: We have only one matter for hearing this 
afternoon and that is United States against Mudd. Is 
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counsel ready for the appellant? As I understand it, the 
time will be divided between the two counsel for appel-
lant? 
MS. STEEL: That's correct, Your Honor. I will have fifteen 
minutes and [co ]counsel will have twenty minutes, and I 
would like to reserve ten minutes for rebuttal, if we may. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Is counsel prepared to proceed for the 
appellee? 
DEAN DOUGLASS: Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE EVERETT: We'll hear argument. 
MS. STEEL: Good afternoon. May it please the court. My 
name is Candida Ewing Steel and, with Mr. F. Lee Bailey, 
I represent Dr. Samuel Mudd who was tried by the Hunter 
Commission of acts related to the assassination of Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln. As the Court will recall, John 
Wilkes Booth stopped and received medical treatment 
from this Maryland country doctor. General Thomas 
Ewing Jr., who was trial counsel below, is unable, for 
personal and professional reasons, to prosecute this ap-
peal, and I thank the Court for allowing me, as his grand-
daughter, to appear in his stead. I will be addressing the 
question of jurisdiction (in this case) for the Hunter Com-
mission to try Dr. Mudd, and my co-counsel, Mr. F. Lee 
Bailey, will be addressing the violations of procedural 
rights guaranteed to Dr. Mudd under the Constitution 
and military law traversed by the Hunter Commission. 
It is now nearly two years after the cessation of hostilities 
between the states and the tragic assassination of our 
beloved President Lincoln. On the birthday of this Presi-
dent who will be forever honored for preserving the 
Union, it is appropriate to ponder the Constitutional foun-
dation of the Union and its relation to the circumstances 
which have brought Dr. Mudd before the Court. Mr. 
Bailey will be addressing the direct impact on Dr. Mudd of 
the decision to convene a military commission. I will, with 
the Court's permission, address the larger question of the 
jurisdiction of the military over citizens as it applies to all 
citizens in this nation. 
Your Honors, the petitioner submits that the military com-
mission did not have jurisdiction under the Constitution 
to try a civilian in the circumstances of this case and the 
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decision to impanel the commission was an unwarranted 
and unconstitutional usurpation of power by the presi-
dency. 
Petitioner Samuel Mudd was a citizen of the United States and 
lived in the Union State of Maryland, a simple physician 
and farmer, not belonging to the Army or Navy, and he 
was not in the public service. He was in the same shoes as 
any other citizen who might fall under suspicion - any 
judge, lawyer, or clergyman of the State of Maryland. His 
guilt or innocence does not affect the question of the 
competence of the tribunal by which he was judged. Mr. 
Bailey will address the questions of guilt or innocence, but 
for the purpose of my argument, the court must determine 
jurisdiction without regard to whether or not Dr. Mudd 
may have been innocent or guilty of the charges that were 
made against him. The military commission depended 
entirely on the executive will for its creation and its court. 
Had the President, in the time of war, by his own mere will 
and judgment of the emergency, the power to bring before 
the military any man or woman to be tried and punished 
whether for life or to be sentenced to death? If the Presi-
dent had this power, it must come from the Constitution, 
since the President has no power which the citizens have 
not granted him through the Constitution that they have 
specifically authorized. The President is given the execu-
tive power, the execution of those laws enacted by Con-
gress, and the authority to direct the operations of the 
military which Congress caused to be raised. If it were 
otherwise, Your Honors, in wartime, either foreign or 
domestic, the President would become a dictator. The 
theory on which the Government rests its argument is that 
the Commander in Chief may do whatever is necessary to 
promote the success of his armies, and that he is the sole 
judge of the necessity. Congress and.the courts would be 
just as subject to the whim and will of the Executive as Dr. 
Mudd and any other citizen that might be taken before a 
military court. The essential point, as I am certain Your 
Honors are aware, of the Magna Carta, which was the 
foundation of the English system which has become the 
common law of our country, was to reduce the regal to a 
legal power when imprisonment was involved, and the 
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Magna Carta was treasured and imitated by our founding 
fathers and the exemption from military rule for all but the 
military and trial by jury were very carefully preserved 
and retained. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Hasn't there been a traditional basis of 
jurisdiction under the law of war with respect even to 
civilians if, for example, they are spies or working for an 
enemy nation; and doesn't that basis of jurisdiction apply 
here? 
MS. STEEL: There is, under the law of war, certainly someone 
acting as a spy, a citizen of a foreign jurisdiction or foreign 
country- there is authority under the law of war and we 
do not ask that the court disturb that authority to try that 
person in the military court. In this case, however, Dr. 
Mudd was not in the employ of a foreign nation, was not 
in the employ of a belligerent nation. There is not suffi-
cient proof to show that he was acting as a spy; and even 
if that were to be true, because he is a citizen of the United 
States and of the State of Maryland, as the Supreme Court 
has stated this past December in Ex parte Milligan, the 
citizen has a right to be tried before a civil court, even 
without regard to whether or not he was engaged in 
rebellious activities. Milligan was a case involving very 
much the same circumstances. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Milligan, I believe, was a case involving 
martial law, and the law of war is something different. If 
you had a situation where Dr. Mudd was clearly estab-
lished to have been working, let's say, as a spy for the 
insurgents- the Southern forces- wouldn't he be sub-
ject to trial by military commission? 
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, we would submit that he would not 
for the very reason that he is a citizen, as the Supreme 
Court stated in Milligan. In that case, Lambdin Milligan 
was viewed as a spy. He in fact entered an arsenal in the 
Union State of Indiana and relieved not only prisoners of 
war but arms from this arsenal to carry secretly across the 
Indiana state line, and certainly was acting in the interest 
of the rebel side in this case. He was, in the Supreme 
Court's opinion, very clearly entitled to, and should have 
undergone, a civil trial, and that is what we ask for Dr. 
Mudd. 
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JUDGE RE: Ms. Steel, is there any allegation or any proof that 
at any time Dr. Mudd served in any capacity as a spy? 
MS. STEEL: No sir, and there is no proof in any way that he 
served as a member of any military or army or navalforces 
either. 
JUDGE RE: You would therefore conclude that whatever 
military powers would exist over a spy would not apply to 
Dr. Mudd. 
MS. STEEL: That's correct, Your Honor. With regard to the 
statement that I have just made, about the citizenship and 
requirements of Dr. Mudd, that argument was made in 
fact on December- I mean on May 10, 1865, on the same 
day that the trial opened in the Mudd case- the Hunter 
Commission trial opened. That argument was made how-
ever by Mr. Field on behalf of Mr. Milligan, and we would 
submit that our argument is entirely parallel to that of Mr. 
Milligan; and the court in Milligan stated that the military 
commission did not and would not have jurisdiction over 
Mr. Milligan. There is argument or suggestion from the 
Government that necessity overrides the right of a citizen 
to be tried by a civil court, and we would submit that, the 
courts in Indiana, as well as in Maryland and the District 
of Columbia being open, fully operational, (and, in fact, as 
Attorney General Speed conceded, the courts were open 
and operating in the District of Columbia) there was, in 
fact, no military necessity for overtaking the right of the 
civil court to try Dr. Mudd or any other person charged 
with similar crimes. 
JUDGE COX: Was there any effort by Dr. Mudd or Mr. Ewing 
to enjoin this prosecution, relying on Milligan -to these 
courts that were open and in business? 
MS. STEEL: I would urge the court to read both the arguments 
of Thomas Ewing and of Senator Reverdy Johnson, very 
thorough and very learned arguments on the jurisdic-
tional question, which were made at the outset of the 
commission and again at the close of the commission 
before the decision was rendered, and they were ... 
JUDGE COX: Was a habeas corpus petition brought in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or 
in the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme 
Court to release him? 
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MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I'm not certain- there may have 
already been a habeas petition filed but I'm not sure that a 
decision has been issued or if it has, if it can be located-
on behalf of Dr. Mudd. 
JUDGE COX: I didn't mean ... I'm aware of one that may have 
been filed subsequent to the trial, but I'm talking contem-
poraneous with the trial. 
MS. STEEL: No, I don't believe so. There were, I believe, with 
regard to other parties and ... 
JUDGE COX: Doesn't that belie your argument that the courts 
were open and in business if Dr. Mudd did not attempt to 
take advantage of these open courts to give him some 
relief? 
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, there was an attempt made by other 
parties before the court who declined to do so based on 
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ, and, as the 
courtis aware, in 1863 Congress ratified President Lincoln's 
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
JUDGE COX: But hadn't that suspension been declared 
illegal by another federal court in the Merryman case or 
some other cases of that era? 
MS. STEEL: Whether or not it had been declared illegal, the 
court, Your Honor, was not able to enforce a writ if it were 
to be issued. The court can issue a writ and it not be 
returned. 
JUDGE COX: That clearly would be an issue for us ... 
MS. STEEL: Right. 
JUDGE COX: If one had been issued and they disobeyed it. 
MS. STEEL: Right- right. 
JUDGE RE: Ms. Steel, would it have not hurt whether or not 
he took advantage of the civil courts if the commission 
that tried and convicted Dr. Mudd had no jurisdiction in 
fact over the subject matter? 
MS. STEEL: No. We would submit that it does not and that 
this court has authority at any time to take a look at the 
jurisdiction of this commission -jurisdiction is the pe-
rennial question that we hope the court will look at now. 
JUDGE COX: You urged us to read some material- what 
might be extremely helpful, I'm sure that you've read, 
would be the Petition of Mr. David Dudley Field, whose 
petition I think could have practically been used here. 
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MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I had just transposed a good portion 
of that argument before the questions began. Five of those 
paragraphs were in fact from Mr. Field's argument, be-
cause they were so clearly in support of Dr. Mudd. 
As stated by Mr. Ewing- in fact in his argument on the plea 
to the jurisdiction as well, he stated that: 
The Judge Advocate has been unable in the cases of 
Arnold and Mudd to present any evidence remotely 
approaching that prescribed by the Constitution and 
the laws as a condition of conviction. And yet I am led 
to infer that he will claim a conviction of one or both of 
them on the proof presented. What is the profession 
on this and the other side of the Atlantic to think of 
such administration of criminal jurisprudence? For 
this, the first of our state trials, will be read with 
avidity everywhere. I ask the officers of the government 
to think of this carefully now, lest two or three years 
hence they may not like to hear it named. 
We would submit that we are now two or three years hence 
from the trial of Dr. Mudd. The court can look back and 
see that the circumstances which applied at the close of the 
war - the war, which it is our position, was over at the 
time of Dr. Mudd's trial- in fact, if there was a danger in 
Washington, D.C., it was from the Union troops gathering 
in Washington, D.C. to celebrate the close of war, not a 
threat from the South. As the Milligan court stated, the 
threat must be immediate and imminent to justify any 
necessity for taking over from the courts. As the court said 
in Milligan: If Society is disturbed by civil commotion, if 
the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law 
weakened, if not disregarded, these safeguards need and 
should receive the watchful care of those entrusted with 
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other 
way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the bless-
ings of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the Revolu-
tion. 
And we would submit, Your Honors, that the fundamental 
principles upon which our nation was founded are set 
forth in the Declaration of Independence. Among the 
insufferable abuses and and usurpations of the King which 
required the dissolution of the historical band with En-
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gland the founders set forth the following: [the King] has 
obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his 
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers; he has 
made Judges dependent on his Will alone ... and he has 
affected to render the Military independent of and supe-
rior to the Civil Power. 
As stated by our late President, ours is "a government of the 
people, by the people and for the people;" to replace that 
principle with the unprincipled doctrine of military ne-
cessity would be to abandon our liberties, rendering the 
deaths of our countrymen in our great civil war truly in 
vain. And, Your Honor, we would ask that the court 
uphold the Constitution that was so carefully and pain-
fully and strugglingly achieved, defended in the Revolu-
tion, and surviving the Civil War and ask that the court 
show that this country can maintain a Constitutional 
government which has a balance of power, the tension 
between those powers providing the life to that Constitu-
tion and protecting the interests and the rights of the 
citizens of that country. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. BAILEY: If it please the court, despite the able argument 
of my distinguished colleague on the vital question of 
jurisdiction, we would not have it thought that Dr. Mudd 
seeks to escape conviction on some technicality; because 
what flowed from the perversion that was involved in 
abridging the Constitution and using a military commis-
sion is one sledge-hammer after another of corruption of 
the very things the Constitution was intended to protect, 
and it produced an unjust and inaccurate result. And I 
shall cover those points. Before doing so, I should like to 
point out respectfully to Judge Cox that the great writ-
the great protector - was totally flaccid in these times. 
Indeed Mary Surratt's last act before she was hanged was 
to invoke the great writ only to be told through the court 
that it was suspended and could not come to her aid. Now, 
in order to find out what Dr. Mudd confronted because of 
the course taken by President Johnson (which indeed 
would have offended President Lincoln very gravely as he 
was a great lawyer), start with the final argument of that 
most distinguished counsel who at the age of 34, not only 
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was a brilliant advocate and a general, but a former su-
preme court justice of the Territory of Kansas. He began 
by saying to the Commission: I don't know what I'm on 
trial here for. All I can do is argue the contingencies: If you 
are trying me for treason you lack two witnesses or an 
open court confession. If you are trying me for murder I 
was in Maryland, six hours away. If you are trying me for 
accessory before the fact, there isn't enough evidence to 
hang a titmouse on, and if you are trying me for accessory 
after the fact (obviously they weren't in view of the pun-
ishment), you don't have enough there. 
John Wilkes Booth could not have known, if it please the 
court, that he was going to catch his boot and his spur in 
a flag as he jumped from the box to the stage and break his 
leg, and therefore had no reason to line up a co-
conspiritorial doctor in the State of Maryland to whom he 
could flee for assistance. The hard evidence in this case 
shows and shows only that Dr. Mudd was a physician who 
knew Booth because he had met him once before and to 
whom he went for help before the news of the assassina-
tion or the identity of the perpetrator could possibly have 
reached Charles County; indeed, so relaxed was Booth 
about that aspect of his protection, lacking the fast com-
munications which I'm sure some day this country will 
enjoy, that he even stayed on for a period of hours after 
being treated. 
Now, when defense counsel makes his appearance one day 
before the evidence starts, there should be a great deal of 
suspicion in the mind of any appellate court about due 
process. Or if, as the prosecution seeks to persuade this 
court, due process does not apply, and reasonable doubt 
doesn't apply, they at least concede that some degree of 
fundamental fairness has its place, even in a military 
commission constituted of subordinates of the much-be-
loved victim who has just been brutally and senselessly 
assassinated and who are anything but a fair and impar-
tial tribunal. 
What in the world was the Government thinking of when it 
decided to bypass the judiciary in its zeal to quickly bring 
someone to the bridge of punishment in order to satisfy an 
outraged public? To impanel this group in the habit of 
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obedience to the Commander in Chief, whose marching 
orders were written everywhere but on the paper in front 
of him to render a fair and impartial judgment and to give 
the defendants an even shot to defend themselves made 
no sense at all. The only good that flowed from the use of 
this military commission, when there was no emergency 
and no exigency, a condition which must always exist if 
military commissions are to be used instead of juries, the 
only good to flow from that was the satisfaction of the 
monumental embarrassment for the lack of security of the 
President ofthe United States that allowed him to be killed 
by an amateur, and the ineptitude of the Army and the 
setting of his leg by my client. 
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey. 
MR. BAILEY: Yes? 
JUDGE RE: Since you have referred to the exigency which is 
very important ... 
MR. BAILEY: Yes, sir. 
JUDGE RE: To what extent would you say that this tribunal 
owes a deference to the determination of the military that 
says there is a necessity notwithstanding the cessation of 
hostilities, notwithstanding the fact that the war is physi-
cally over- do we owe a deference or may we look into 
that fact independently, as a matter of standard ofreview? 
MR. BAILEY: Deference must be carefully given from one 
branch to another; when the judiciary will allow the ex-
ecutive to take over its functions on some ground they 
boot-strap is ever a danger. So if they can prove with 
evidence a real exigency why then you can at least undo 
what they did in haste if it were done unjustly. But I do not 
believe that my distinguished colleagues have enough to 
satisfy you that they could not have tried Samuel Mudd 
before a jury, as, I hasten to point out, John Surratt (cap-
tured last November in Europe) is- going to be tried by a 
jury. Would it not look rather terrible, distinguished 
judges, if in a civilian court the prosecution is unable to 
convict John Surratt who certainly has evidence allayed 
against him far more deadly than that looked at for Dr. 
Mudd? I predict that that is exactly what will happen and 
any affirmance of these convictions will hold the military 
tribunal in even lower esteem in this country- something 
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we do not need. This case has rubbed so much lustre from 
the fledgling jurisprudence of this great country that it 
needs to be dismantled and put to rest and never used as 
precedent for anything in the future. 
JUDGE EVERETT: You know, in your catalogue of offenses 
ranging from treason through accessory after the fact, 
there was one it seemed to me that you omitted, and that's 
conspiracy. Doesn't the evidence persuasively tie to-
gether to show, even using a reasonable doubt standard, 
that there was a conspiracy and that Dr. Mudd, as one of 
the co-conspirators, is responsible for the consequences-
all of the consequences? 
MR. BAILEY: Once again, in a civilian court, had the same 
result obtained, based on the evidence submitted, one 
might have confidence that a dispassionate judgment was 
made. But when the prosecution will bring forward 
witnesses of the calibre of one Thomas (against the duty of 
bringing the truth to the court), when twenty of his neigh-
bors testified he's a congenital liar, when his stories were 
inconsistent, and use that as evidence to convict Dr. Mudd, 
then I say the evils of the Commission have visited them-
selves on the procedure and you cannot trust the findings 
of fact. 
JUDGE EVERETT: I want to see if I understand you correctly 
then. You're conceding basically- I gather- the evi-
dence would be sufficient if presented before a civilian 
jury, the jury chose to disbelieve the twenty-seven wit-
nesses in favor of the one, they would be empowered to do 
that and that an appellate court could properly affirm. 
You're saying that the evidence is insufficient because it is 
before a military tribunal, is that the position? 
MR. BAILEY: No. I'm saying that the military tribunal was 
too insensitive to perjured testimony because it wanted to 
reach a certain result no jury would. ever accept of that 
witness and, even if they had, this court, on the totality of 
the evidence, would have concluded that reasonable men 
could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that that 
evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy convic-
tion with a sentence of life hanging from it. And reason-
able doubt, if it please the court, is the Achilles heel of my 
opponent. Nowhere is it shown that that standard was 
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applied and yet it is universal in criminal cases in this 
country and can never, never be abridged. 
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, even if the proof were to be conclu· 
sive, that would in no way justify or make legal- or am 
I wrong in my belief- the conclusion that would inevita-
bly follow if your co-counsel's point is correct: that there 
was no jurisdiction to try him, and there was no jurisdic· 
tion, regardless of the crime, regardless of the nature of the 
offense, regardless of the proof. It would be non coram 
judice. Forgive the Latin, but I use that because reference 
was made to Magna Carta, which is also the Latin phrase 
there, "Per Legem Terrae," which means the law of the 
land, and under the law of the land, if this tribunal had no 
jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd -he was to be tried by the 
civil courts where the offense was allegedly committed. 
MR. BAILEY: I certainly concede the fact thatthe argument of 
my co-counsel should have mooted mine by now; how-
ever, I think it fair to point out that this is a real evil that 
flows from the use of these commissions and not a techni· 
cal evil of which we are trying to take advantage. This was 
a hurry-up, slam-dunk proceeding. Dr. Mudd should 
have stood trial alone. Had he done so, even this commis· 
sion might have not had the temerity to find him guilty. I 
say they were ... 
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, you'll have to forgive me. The only 
reason I take this view is because - a view that I must 
admit that I have arrived at that would have absolutely 
nothing to do with the total integrity and faith and loyalty 
of the officers and the others that presided. My question 
really would in no way cast any aspersion upon either 
motives or the genuine contribution made by military 
officers who believe they are carrying out their duty. Isn't 
that why we have the independent judiciary to which Ms. 
Steel refers? It's interesting. She referred to the Declara-
tion of Independence because that did nothing more than 
bring to the United States something that had happened in 
Great Britain in 1701 with the Act of Settlement that made 
the British judges independent~ something that we find 
enshrined in Article III of our Constitution. 
MR. BAILEY: Yes, sir. No attack whatsoever of an ad hominem 
nature is visited upon any member of the commission or 
Appellate Argument 65 
the prosecutors. It is the institutional evil that I attack and 
that is giving the executive the power to seek retribution 
for an insult to the executive. That's what tripartite 
government is all about: the safeguards, such as you three 
gentlemen on the bench who say, "Hold on here. Have you 
overacted? Have you too swiftly exacted your punish-
ment when this is to be a cool, calm, dispassionate and 
balanced procedure before we deprive a citizen of life or 
liberty?"- both of which have occurred here. This was 
the wrong road to take and, in retrospect, I think there are 
few arguments that can countervail that notion. 
JUDGE COX: Mr. Bailey, if I could return to the morning of 
April the 15th, l believe it was, when Dr. Mudd treated Mr. 
Booth. Had there been evidence of record that he knew of 
the assassination, and that- not because he treated him, 
but because it is alleged and evidence is there he showed 
him a secret route out of the swamp, or something of that 
nature- wouldn't a reasonable inference be drawn that 
he was aiding and abetting after the fact? 
MR. BAILEY: I would say that that would satisfy ... 
JUDGE COX: Had he expressed an opinion earlier that he 
wanted - that he had no problems with the President 
being killed and so forth, and knew Mr. Booth, and now 
knew of the assassination? 
MR. BAILEY: We overlooked the fact, perhaps historically, 
that not everyone loved President Lincoln. And he wasn't 
required to, as long as he didn't take action against him. 
Now your specific question is, of course, right on the 
money. If he knew that he was dealing with an assassin-
it didn't have to be of a President ... 
JUDGE COX: But isn't it reasonable to infer, based upon 
his prior conversations with Booth, his familiarity with 
the Surratts, and the fact that Booth was there for some 
time, that Booth would have revealed to him exactly what 
he had done? 
MR. BAILEY: No, it isn't reasonable, Your Honor, because 
Booth continued to wear his beard throughout the en-
counter, and if they were in league together, he hardly 
needed to try to disguise himself from his confederate. I 
think the evidence is that this doctor was awakened at four 
in the morning, confronted by an injured man with a 
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broken leg - there is no suggestion that assassination is 
the reason for this injury; this was no gunshot wound -
and he obeyed his Hippocratic oath, and that is what he 
has maintained ever since that event. He only learned 
after Booth was on his way- of course with his assistance 
- that the President was dead, and the name of the 
suspected assassin. You will recall from the record it is 
clear that it was first thought that an assassin, a profes-
sional named Boyle, had done the deed, and that was the 
talk in Bryantown initially and that's what Mudd would 
have heard. 
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, one thing about that, though, gives me 
concern. The doctor wakes up at 4:00a.m. He takes care 
of the patient pursuant to the Hippocratic oath; but then 
the patient says, "Can you show me a secret route?" That's 
not the ordinary patient-physician relationship. What 
sort of inference can be drawn from that- a secret route 
through a swamp? 
MR. BAILEY: I most respectfully, Your Honor, must nitpick 
your choice of one word. David Herold, not Booth, said, 
"Can you show me a short route"- not a secret route; and 
in the days before we had faster transportation, short 
routes were always to be coveted. So I think that, in and 
of itself, would not be enough to tip a man into the state of 
mens rea necessary to the conviction of a crime. 
Now, in summary, many criminal cases that look like they 
have some substance to them and, if you believe all the 
witnesses that the prosecution rousted up, despite the 
many more witnesses that said they were not believable at 
all and despite the inconsistencies in their stories, you 
might be suspicious that Samuel Mudd was something 
more than a friend of the cause of the South. Indeed, 
history shows that he attended Georgetown as did many 
Confederates; in those days it was· handy to hang people 
just for going to Georgetown. But, the fabric of any 
criminal proceeding is that which deserves the overview 
-the calm, deliberate, combined wisdom in the overview 
of an appellate court. This is simply a safeguard which the 
military has finally learned, that, when there is no need for 
immediate action- there is no battlefield requirement for 
a firing squad to stop a wave of desertions (not present 
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here) that if, in scrutiny, there is doubt on the part of the 
court that the system has been played to the melody rather 
than discord, the price is simple. The re-trial of Samuel 
Mudd before his jury, as his colleague- John Surratt- is 
about to be tried, will not disrupt the United States, bring 
it to the brink of war, or bankrupt its coffers. And if he is 
re-convicted on some definable charge, having had the 
opportunity to know the charge, prepare his case, and 
confront the charge before what this country was formed 
for - a jury of his peers - then, should the case go to 
another appellate court, they may, with somewhat greater 
comfort than I think anyone here should feel, say maybe 
indeed there is enough and Samuel Mudd is a criminal. If 
he is a criminal, the life sentence he has received- and I 
don't concede that for a minute- the life sentence he has 
received is totally disproportionate to that which was 
shown, and that is that he fixed the leg of the most 
notorious and vile assassin in the history of this country. 
If you find that he knew, or should have known- and this is 
a dangerous standard to use in criminal cases, but it 
occasionally creeps into our law -knew or should have 
known because he cannot be an ostrich- that this was an 
assassin- he gave him aid and comfort- he fulfills the 
common law elements of accessory after the fact and that 
is what he should be tried for and nothing more. I 
respectfully suggest that this record will not support such 
a conclusion and that, even if it would, the numerous 
abridgements of the very rights that the Constitution 
sought to safeguard such as trial for treason - bear in 
mind those who wrote the Constitution were very mind-
ful about that offense because they expected they might be 
tried for it, if we lost the war, and so they carefully cracked 
it out- an elaborate set of safeguards. That was their 
state of mind. If we're to give all of those up because in 
reaction to an angry populus, a successor and not terribly 
popular President and Attorney General decide to move 
swiftly in a definitive way to assure that justice will have 
someone to fry, then we have simply given up a large 
chunk of what the Revolutionary War was all about. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE EVERETT: We will pause for a moment before hear-
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ing from Appellee. 
JUDGE EVERETT: We'll hear now from the Government. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: May it please the court. I'm Colonel 
Douglass, and I am representing the Government as a 
respondent and will be assisted by Admiral Jenkins in part 
of the argument. 
On April 2, 1865, the valiant men of the Army of Northern 
Virginia withdrew from the fortifications around this city 
in which we now sit. And a few days later, on April 9th, 
their gallant leader, Robert E. Lee, surrendered his army at 
Appomattox Court House. General Lee and his army 
were treated with the honor they deserved for their coura-
geous and chivalrous struggle during the years of war. 
There remained other armies in the field. At that same 
moment, a sinister and despicable group of men and 
women, who scorned to fight in uniform, were clandes-
tinely and secretly plotting and planning to continue the 
war, not as honorable soldiers, but as assassins and kid-
nappers who strike in the night. Their plans were long 
considered. And their purpose was not to seek victory on 
the battlefield but rather to achieve their goals by treach-
ery, deceit, kidnapping and murder. Their plans were 
more than a reversal of the loss suffered by General Lee 
and his troops but were schemes for revenge. They con-
spired to destroy the very fabric of government and to 
create chaos and disorder. The conspirators acted not 
with the gallantry, the integrity, and the honor and the 
courage of Robert E. Lee and his generals, but as assassins. 
Who were these who plotted to destroy the structure? Who 
were these despicable characters who designed a blue-
print to murder the Commander in Chief? Who were these 
who schemed to kill all of those in the line of succession? 
Who were these who planned the death of the very mili-
tary commander who had granted the Army of Northern 
Virginia surrender terms with honor? Who were these 
who conspired to betray and besmirch the reputation and 
respect of the soldiers? These conspirators were John 
Wilkes Booth, Mary Surratt, John Surratt, David Herold, 
George Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, and Dr. Samuel Mudd. 
They committed no ordinary crime as it is defined in the 
brief. They instead conspired and committed an offense 
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decried by every civilized nation on the earth. They 
planned and committed an offense which placed them 
under the jurisdiction of a military commission, like thou-
sands of others who had committed similar offenses in 
violation of the law of war during the terrible years of 
conflict. 
The petitioner in his arguments to this honorable court would 
lead the court down not one but several rabbit trails in 
arguing against jurisdiction of the military commission. 
Petitioner has asserted the accused were charged with 
treason, and therefore the Constitution changes the venue 
of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that there was no state of 
war to authorize the establishment of the commission, and 
to the contrary then argues that the war had been con-
cluded. Petitioner asserts that as a citizen of Maryland, 
the petitioner could not be tried in the city of Washington. 
Petitioner argues that no overt act of the conspiracy was 
committed in Maryland and thereby separated him from 
the other conspirators. Let us not be misled. The issues 
are clear. The commission was an Article One court. This 
court before whom we stand today is an Article One court. 
The petitioner was charged with conspiracy to kill the 
Commander in Chief, his successor Vice President, the 
Secretary of State, and the General-in-Chief of the Army. 
The petitioner was tried before a military commission 
which liberally granted him rights: the right to counsel, to 
an open and speedy trial, with the right to bring compe-
tent witnesses before the tribunal, and the right to argu-
ment by counsel. And, finally, the petitioner was tried by 
a tribunal recognized by the Constitution, by the Con-
gress, by the executive and by the courts of the United 
States as the appropriate and proper tribunal for viola-
tions of the law of war committed by one not in military 
service. 
Let us begin by reminding the court that petitioner was 
charged with conspiracy. A reading of the charges and 
specifications is clear and unambiguous. In a colloquy 
between counsel for defendant and the Judge Advocate, 
the Judge Advocate was unequivocal that this was a 
charge of conspiracy. Significantly, General Ewing did 
not seek an explanation of the charge against which he 
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must defend until after he had presented his case in the 
defense of Dr. Mudd. Were General Ewing and the defen-
dant confused, surely they would have made this inquiry 
before presenting the case to the Commission. The peti-
tioner in his brief seeks to define the charge by extrapolat-
ing from the words "treacherously" and "traitorously" to 
change the charge to treason. Making this incredible leap, 
he would then insist that there are Constitutional provi-
sions for the trial of treason which are required for the trial 
of this petitioner. Manipulating the words does not change 
the charge, nor change the jurisdiction. When a con-
spiracy has been created, each of the conspirators is bound 
by the acts, declarations and crimes of each other member 
done or made in furtherance of that criminal agreement. 
The conspirators sought to destroy the leadership of the 
Union government by destroying the effectiveness of the 
Presidency and the Commander in Chief. And it was 
against that agency that the conspiracy was directed. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Let me ask you this, however. Was there 
any showing or any allegation that any of these alleged 
conspirators were acting in behalf of the rebel forces of the 
South-- the erstwhile insurgent government in the South 
-was there any allegation of a connection? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There was an allegation, yes, that 
they were acting in conjunction with numerous members 
of the government of the Confederacy. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So is it your contention they were in the 
same position as a spy would be? Is there any evidence of 
that, as for example, Major Andre who was acting in 
behalf of the British government in Revolutionary times? 
I think you cited his case as a precedent. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I would point out that there were 
two thousand cases tried by military commissions during 
the late war. They were tried for all sorts of violations of 
the laws of war, whether it was spying or whatever the 
violation of the law of war, when they were non-combat-
ants, as were these conspirators. They fit, therefore, in the 
jurisdiction of a military commission. 
JUDGE RE: Dean Douglass, you have to forgive me. I listened 
most attentively to what you have said as to the impor-
tance of facts and the period of history. Suppose, for 
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purpose of my question, I were to concede that what you 
say as to the nature of the charges- am I not correct that 
there was a surrender on April 9th - you have made 
reference to that very significant day in the history of our 
country. Is it not also true that on April 29th the President 
revoked the proclamation dealing with a blockade? Now 
that would seem to be some evidence that perhaps the war 
was over, and therefore I return to the question that was 
asked previously: What was the basis of the military trial? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The war, Sir, had not been com-
pleted. Hostilities had not ceased. During the ... the 
leadership of the Confederacy had not yet at this time ever 
conceded the surrender. It was only the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. General Kirby Smith remained 
with an army; General Hood remained with an army ... 
JUDGE RE: Excuse me then- because this to me is tremen-
dously important, and even more important than I had 
imagined when you tell me that this happened to two 
thousand others. That really requires that we read andre-
read the opinion in Ex parte Milligan as to the proper 
division of authority between the military and the civilian 
courts. What was there that you wished to bring to our 
attention that would indicate that it was not possible to 
have granted Dr. Mudd a proper trial as required by the 
Constitution before a jury at the place where the crime was 
allegedly committed - because that goes back to the 
question of the applicability of Ex parte Milligan? And you 
will forgive me for that if it is going to be covered by 
Admiral Jenkins, I do not know, however. That to me is 
the question. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There is no question that this com-
mission was convened by the highest authority of the 
Union Army- the commander in chief of that army. And 
so the jurisdiction was not limited to the city of Washing-
ton but included all the theater of operations. 
Let me talk for a moment about Ex parte Milligan. Ex parte 
Milligan was a case brought on a habeas corpus as you well 
know. The question was asked by your colleague as to 
why this was not done in the case of Dr. Mudd. It should 
be pointed out that in Ex parte Milligan the court presented 
two prongs as denying the authority of a military commis-
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sion. One, that the civil courts were open; but the other 
prong was that it not be a locale of war. Certainly the area, 
the city of Washington, even in the days of April and May 
and June of 1865 continued to be a locale of war. The very 
purpose of this conspiracy was to continue the war; to 
make it possible for the Confederacy to continue to seek 
the separation that they desired; to continue the operation 
to break up the Union. There were armies still in opera-
tion. There were sea battles still being fought as late as a 
year later. There were still fights. There were still con-
flicts. There were still battles in Texas well after the end of 
this trial. 
JUDGE RE: I'm not familiar with the situation in Texas. I 
should like to ask what were the battles and where were 
they being fought on June 28, 1865 when Dr. Mudd, a 
civilian, I would gather not a spy, not an insurgent, yet, a 
sympathizer of different point of view, was convicted and 
found guilty of charges that sound pretty much like trea-
son although you are absolutely right, it was a conspiracy. 
What can you tell us as a factual matter that would war-
rant a disruption and dislocation of the ordinary proce-
dure, namely the civil courts within the meaning and 
express language of Ex parte Milligan ? Were the courts 
operating in Washington, D.C. and in Maryland where the 
offense allegedly ... 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The courts were operating in the 
city of Washington and had operated throughout the 
period of the war. As a matter of fact, they had tried, as is 
pointed out in the brief of Dr. Mudd, that these courts 
were trying "ordinary crimes" during all this entire pe-
riod. Hostilities had not ceased throughout. There was a 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, butthere was 
not a surrender of the army of General Hood; there was 
not a surrender of the army of General Johnston; there was 
not a surrender of the army of General Kirby Smith. 
JUDGE RE: Are you telling this court that the surrender by 
General Lee did not effectively represent a surrender of 
the insurgent forces, if I may use that phrase? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: It did not end the insurrection. It 
did not end the establishment of the Confederacy. Yes, sir, 
I am telling you that it did not end the hostilities which 
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were between the South and the North in the period from 
1861 to 1865. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Would it be correct, Colonel Douglass, 
after the Confederate government left Richmond, they 
went to Greensboro, there were still operating forces in 
the Carolinas and elsewhere at that point. Was that true as 
of the time of the attempted assassination? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes. And there were battles fought 
by Union and Southern forces well into the period after 
the conclusion of this trial. 
JUDGE RE: In Maryland? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Not in Maryland. 
JUDGE RE: In the District of Columbia? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Nor in the District of Columbia. But 
there was no evidence that there would not be an attempt 
by Southern forces to attack one of the sixty forts sur-
rounding the State of Maryland. And you read the Ex parte 
Milligan, they make clear that there was never a locale of 
war in Indiana. This is not true of Maryland. This is not 
of the city of Washington. It was not a situation that 
involved ... it was not the same situation as in Ex parte 
Milligan and this particular military commission which 
tried these conspirators. 
JUDGE COX: Dean Douglass, one concern I have had through-
out this. None of the authorities that I've seen cited, or 
none of the argument, has focused on the fact that we're 
talking about a rebellion within the territory of one coun-
try. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, sir. 
JUDGE COX: We're not talking about one recognized sover-
eign at war with another recognized sovereign. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, sir. 
JUDGE COX: It would seem that these principles that we're 
grappling today would be equally applicable for a civilian 
insurrection in the city of Washington where- or any-
where- where there was no civil law functioning. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That's correct, sir. 
JUDGE COX: The leader could declare martial law. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Let me make that clear, sir. 
JUDGE COX: If that were the case, it seems that your best 
argument is that within the boundaries of what was then 
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the United States of America, the civil authorities had not 
yet been settled. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That's correct. 
JUDGE COX: And while you might have a court in the District 
of Columbia, throughout the nation as a nation, civil 
obedience still had not been restored. We were still ... and 
therefore the military commission still had a constitu-
tional place. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The danger still existed for the 
people, for the Union and its continuance during this 
period. The troops of the South had not totally surren-
dered; there was not a capitulation by all of those in-
volved. 
JUDGE EVERETT: What if the assassination had occurred, 
let's say, in July of 1865, at a time when all the effective 
opposition from Southern forces had ceased, even General 
Smith down in Texas, and there were only a few privateers 
or vessels sailing around. Would you still maintain that 
there was jurisdiction ... of a military tribunal at that 
point? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: You present to me a hypothetical 
situation, Your Honor, that I am unprepared really to 
determine, not knowing the situation which had devel-
oped that had convinced these particular conspirators to 
continue their operation and to seek to continue the hos-
tilities. What they were seeking to do was make certain 
that those Southern forces could be rejuvenated and con-
tinue the battle. This was the whole idea of the destruction 
of and the killing of the President and the Vice President. 
They were seeking not merely revenge. They weren't 
doing this for some purpose of merely killing the Presi-
dent. They were seeking to do this in order to continue the 
war ... and to continue the battles, and to continue the 
hostilities, so that their side - the side which they sup-
ported - could be continued in office. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So you would concede then, that, under 
your law of war approach, there would have to be some 
relationship of this particular activity to organized South-
ern resistance in an attempt to overthrow the Union gov-
ernment. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I don't think there's any question 
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that there has to be a continuation of the possibility of 
hostilities which would create the necessity for a continu-
ation of military service and military forces to protect the 
Union. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So the fact that President Johnson did not 
terminate martial law until some months later would 
really be irrelevant. It would be the question of how the 
defendants, the alleged conspirators, viewed themselves 
as participating in an effort to continue hostilities. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Correct. 
JUDGE RE: This would be quite independent of the honorable 
surrender by General Lee. In the minds of some this would 
cast some serious doubt as to the nature and the honor of 
the surrender. You mean, notwithstanding the surrender, 
there were still pockets that were going to keep fighting? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That is correct. 
JUDGE RE: You surely would not have us infer with the 
consent and approval of General Lee that ... 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There's no question that General 
Lee had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia, but 
he had no authority to surrender the armies of other 
commanders. He had no authority to give up the govern-
ment of the Confederacy which escaped from Richmond 
and did not continue with him, but evacuated to the 
South. 
JUDGE RE: Let me ask you this factual question, since you 
obviously know more about it than I do: As of the time of 
the trial, and as of the date of conviction of Dr. Mudd, what 
was the state ofthe public danger, as that phrase is known, 
in either Washington, D.C. or Maryland? What was the 
public danger that warranted the supplanting of the nor-
mal usual civil authority by the military forces, bringing 
about what is in fact, what might be properly called, a 
dictatorship by the military ... warranted because of the 
necessity? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We have a tendency to walk down 
another rabbit trail when we become concerned about 
"dictatorship of the military." It was the civilian President 
of the United States who ordered this military commis-
sion. It was not a military commander who ordered this. 
It was ... Under the Constitution, it was provided that the 
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Commander in Chief is a civilian and is the President. 
Now, to get back to your question, your original question 
was what was the danger of hostilities? There was consid-
erable danger that- those people in charge (the military 
forces) were concerned that- still there remained a viable 
and possible Confederate force which might attack any 
place across the country. Granted that it was not close to 
Washington at this point, but it had not been close to 
Washington when they surrounded ... two years before 
when they came up behind and attacked Gettysburg, 
which is far to the north. 
JUDGE RE: You speak of potential, my question was: What 
was there that warranted depriving this citizen, this resi-
dent of a state loyal to the Union, the rights guaranteed to 
him by the Constitution- including trial by jury? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Well, that, if I may say so, tends to 
beg the question, because first of all we have to decide 
whether he is being ... he is subject to trial by a military 
commission and then we have the question ... 
JUDGE RE: On whom does that burden fall, Colonel Douglass? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Pardon, Sir? 
JUDGE RE: On whom does that burden fall? Need he prove 
that there is no jurisdiction or may the Government prove 
that there is jurisdiction to try a civilian- not a spy, not 
any of the other things- by a military commission? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There's no question that he was a 
civilian. There's no question that he was a non-combatant. 
There is no question that he was charged with a con-
spiracy to violate the law of war. No one can argue these 
points. It seems clear. Based thereon, he is then subject to 
trial before a military commission in a time in which there 
is still a danger to the continuation of the government of 
the United States. And there was that danger because this 
was the very purpose of the conspiracy. 
JUDGE RE: I hate to repeat my question- and I do not wish 
to belabor the point, but we are used to dealing with 
burdens of proof. Need I prove myself innocent or must 
you prove me guilty? Then we go to the next question of 
by what standard? What is the case that can be made by 
the government that he could have been lawfully tried by 
a military commission, at that time and at that place? 
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COLONEL DOUGLASS: There remained an insurrection; 
there remained the fact that he was charged with a viola-
tion of the law of war; there remained the fact that hew as 
a non-combatant who sought to continue the war and to 
continue it with the aim of supporting those in insurrec-
tion. 
JUDGE RE: You say the necessity continued? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir. 
JUDGE COX: Don't the very facts of this case prove your 
point? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I thought l was saying that ... 
JUDGE COX: The military was viewing that there were 
pockets of conspirators still out to destroy the govern-
ment. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir. 
JUDGE COX: And therefore they founded their jurisdiction 
on that public danger? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir. 
JUDGE COX: Let me ask you a question. You made a very 
eloquent opening argument about the despicable nature 
of the conspirator and so forth. What evidence could a 
rational fact-finder in this case pin his or her hat on? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Pardon me, I'm sorry. 
JUDGE COX: What evidence could a rational fact-finder in 
this case say shows that Dr. Mudd was participating in a 
despicable conspiracy? Is there anyone who says he was 
there at the planning? Any evidence? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We know that the law of conspiracy 
can be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
JUDGE COX: Granted. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Those who commit a conspiracy do 
not do it in the open and provide us with the kind of open 
evidence- so we have to go on circumstantial evidence. 
We know that Dr. Mudd met with John Wilkes Booth on 
more than one occasion in Maryland. 
JUDGE COX: That was a year or so before the ... 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: No, it was only several months 
before, Sir. 
JUDGE COX: Okay. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Ah, if I may- Dr. Mudd talked to 
Mr. John Wilkes Booth in his own home. Booth came to 
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Maryland on some flimsy excuse of buying real estate for 
doing some oil exploration- the kind of thing that people 
talk about when they're seeking to hide their real purpose. 
Or. Mudd met with Mr. Booth and introduced him to John 
Surratt, another member of the conspiracy, in the city of 
Washington. 
Dr. Mudd's home, which was pointed out, is off the main 
road, was found by John Wilkes Booth and Mr. Herold at 
four o'clock in the morning as they rode through, trying to 
escape. Does one find a doctor that he never has heard of 
or met before, has no relationship to, at that time of day off 
the main road? Does one take a patient and put him 
upstairs in his upstairs bedroom and take care of him over 
night and into the next day? Does one who does not have 
any relationship with a patient point out that he should go 
across a swamp, tear down a fence, in order to move to the 
next safe haven? I say that these facts all show the 
relationship of John Wilkes Booth and the other conspira-
tors with Dr. Mudd. I think it is plainly obvious from these 
relationships that he was a part of the conspiracy. 
JUDGE COX: But if you're using circumstantial evidence and 
there is a contrary inference of innocence, to what extent 
can we use that circumstantial evidence? Where there is 
no direct evidence to corroborate any of this- there's no 
statement by Mudd that he was aware of the assassina-
tion, there's no evidence at all to tie it all back together. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We need no direct evidence to prove 
the conspiracy because the law provides that we may do 
this by circumstantial evidence, and it seems abundantly 
clear that there's much circumstantial evidence to tie Or. 
Mudd to the conspiracy. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Now, apropos the conspiracy, I gather from 
your earlier remarks, your earlier argument, that the pur-
pose of the conspiracy is material in establishing jurisdic-
tion. It has to be more than a conspiracy to exact ven-
geance; there has to be a conspiracy to interfere with the 
government and the military operations of the United 
States government. 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Sir. 
JUDGE EVERETT: All right. And that something would have 
to be established as a jurisdictional fact at trial. Would 
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that be true? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Now, what is there that shows that this 
was a conspiracy for that particular purpose, as distin-
guished from mere vengeance? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: They sought to kill the President of 
the United States. The conspirators attacked the Secretary 
of State in his bed. Another conspirator stalked the Vice 
President of the United States, and there was a plan clearly 
by one of the members to kill the General-in-Chief of the 
Armies, General Grant. This was the top leadership of the 
entire Union government in the executive branch. It was 
not simply vengeance against Abraham Lincoln. It was an 
attempt to kill President Lincoln, the Vice President, the 
Secretary of State, and the General-in-Chief of the Armies 
-all of those who could bring order out of chaos should 
only the President have been killed. 
JUDGE COX: And your contention is that Dr. Mudd's role in 
the conspiracy was to provide a safe haven for the con-
spirators? They certainly, as Mr. Bailey argues, could not 
foresee that he would break his leg. I mean, did they say: 
"If anybody gets injured, Dr. Mudd, then you will agree to 
treat him?" Is that what he did in the conspiracy? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: No. Obviously that was fortuitous. 
He could well have agreed. I don't know all of his 
participation, but once one joins a conspiracy, then he 
becomes responsible for all of the acts of any of the con-
spirators. We don't need an overt act, but, here, this case 
abounds in overt acts committed by the various conspira-
tors. And he is responsible therefore for whatever took 
place under that conspiracy. 
JUDGE COX: I agree with you that it abounds with overt acts, 
but where in the record can we point to with some com-
fort, much less beyond reasonable doubt, as to what Dr. 
Mudd's participation and agreement was in the conspiracy. 
What did he agree to do? What did he agree to contribute? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Dr. Mudd was one station on the 
route from Washington to Surrattsville to Bryantown to 
Port Tobacco to Virginia, at which place ... 
JUDGE COX: Because he was a safe haven? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: He was a safe haven. And one that 
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was easily found, apparently, by [Mr. Booth] and Mr. 
Herold as they escaped at four o'clock in the morning off 
the main road. 
JUDGE COX: What testimony proves this? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: This again is proven by the very fact 
that Booth and Herold were able to find this safe haven in 
the middle of the night when they were escaping down 
through Maryland into Virginia, and that's the way they 
were going. We know that during this whole period of the 
war this part of southern Maryland was the highway for 
those spies and for contraband from Washington into 
Virginia and into Richmond. 
JUDGE EVERETT: No indication that Dr. Mudd was involved 
in any of that, was there? With that particular route? 
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There is no indication ... there is 
nothing in this record of trial which presents Mr. Mudd as 
a part of that route or participating in it. 
Thank you, gentlemen. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: May it please the court. I am Rear 
Admiral John Jenkins, and I appear with my friend, Colo-
nel Douglass, on behalf of the United States. I wonder if 
it might be helpful for the court if, in view of some of the 
questions that have been asked, we fall back just one step 
or two and look at the issue as I see it presented to us. We 
have talked, we have answered questions on both sides 
with respect to the appropriateness, if you will, of an 
Article I military commission having heard this case as 
compared to an Article III civil court operating normally. 
I would call the court's attention to the language first of 
Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, which provides 
that there be rules made for the government of the land 
and naval forces. It also provides in Section 8 a reference 
to the law of nations. Article I stands for the proposition 
that the executive can create a system of courts, tribunals, 
commissions- call them what you will- when Article I 
is applicable with respect to, for instance, a situation 
involving martial law. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Let's just pause for a second, Admiral 
Jenkins. That Article I, Section 8 provision requires, as I 
recall, an action by Congress, doesn't it? And what is the 
Congressional action that would be the basis for this 
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particular court, and to whatever extent you are invoking 
law of war jurisdiction? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: In this case, and I think the authors and 
the treatises in the early 30s and 40s - 1830 - 1840 -
would stand for this proposition. Indeed Congress did 
enact the Articles for the Government of the Navy and the 
Articles of War, but there is a common law of military law 
which applies here. And if the court will look back, for 
instance, to the British tradition, the British court martial 
system came from the Crown as the Commander in Chief. 
The British judicial system came from the Crown as the 
fount of grace and mercy. So there were two tracks, even 
in the British system. One, the military track, the sover-
eign as commander-in-chief. The other, the track to the 
courts, as the fount of grace and mercy. And that applies 
in our situation here. 
JUDGE EVERETT: There is no federal common law of crime, 
at least in the Article III courts, is that correct? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would agree with that. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So you're contending that even though in 
Article I, Section 8, clause 10, there's a provision for 
Congress to make provision for offenses against the law of 
nations, and even though I gather there's no specific 
reference thereto in either the Articles of War or the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy, you're saying 
that, in some way, there exists this common law for which 
there is no provision in the U.S. Constitution which gives 
jurisdiction to a military court. Is that the argument? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I am suggesting to the court that, in 
addition to the statutory law, there is a common law of 
military tradition which supports the proposition that 
there be commissions and indeed expands the law in the 
area of martial law. The court will note that martial law 
can be declared in the event, for instance, of a hurricane, 
or a major flood. It doesn't necessarily require a state of 
war. So martial law, the law of nations, and military law 
all merge together to provide a basis under Article I of our 
Constitution for something such as the military commis-
sion. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, I think we need to separate these out. 
The military law would apply only to a military person, 
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which this defendant was not. Martial law, as I under-
stand the Milligan case, is a law of necessity. And to 
establish that, wouldn't you have to show that the civilian 
courts were not functioning - that it was necessary to 
proceed in this way? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Not totally, Your Honor. There is 
language in Milligan which suggests that, for ordinary 
crimes, we look to the issue of the functioning of civilian 
courts. We submit, for the matter concerned here, we're 
not dealing with an ordinary crime. We know that during 
the entire period of hostilities between the states, the civil 
courts in the District of Columbia were functioning for 
certain purposes. We also know that during that entire 
time, there was modified martial law in the District of 
Columbia. So I submit that it is not solely a question of one 
or the other, but there are situations where both can apply 
at the same time. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, let me ask you this, then. Martial law 
can mean many things. It can mean the authority to take 
people into custody, but maybe would not require their 
being tried. Were there trials of civilians going on under 
martial law in the District of Columbia during the recent 
war? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: There were, as we have heard from co-
counsel, over two thousand trials by military commission. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Not in the District of Columbia though? 
Let me be more specific. Was there a single trial that you're 
aware of in the District of Columbia predicated on martial 
law or the rule of necessity? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: History tells me yes. There were some 
simple trials with respect to drunkenness, and disrespect, 
which were based on martial law. 
JUDGE RE: And those persons were deprived of the Consti-
tutional protections set forth in the Constitution? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: They were tried by Article I institutions 
to which the panoply of protections with respect to Article 
III do not necessarily apply. 
JUDGE RE: So Article I, Section 8, which sets forth the powers 
of the Congress were used to deprive ... You're telling us 
that that provision of the Constitution was used to deprive 
American citizens, civilians, of Constitutionally protected 
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rights, such as a trial by jury, civilian courts with all the 
protections that were ... 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: ... opinion of the Attorney General of 
the United States with respect to these Article I courts. 
They are simply an instrumentality for the more efficient 
execution of the war powers. Congress has generally left 
it to the President and the military commanders to employ 
the commission for investigation and punishments of the 
law of war. 
JUDGE RE: Well, you know the opinion of Milligan also says 
that the Constitution applies in time of war as well, and 
you merely indicate how important this case is, so, if it is 
part of the war powers, I ask again the question I asked 
before: What was the war going on in Maryland and in 
Washington, D.C. at that time? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I submit that it was a question off act for 
the tribunal to establish jurisdiction by ascertaining, as a 
matter of fact, those indicia which support the Article I 
military commission having jurisdiction over the case, 
and I submit on the record that the tribunal did consider 
enough matters to conclude that it had appropriate Article 
I jurisdiction. We know, for instance, that there were still 
naval actions taking place. 
JUDGE RE: Where? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Throughout the Atlantic, there were ... 
JUDGE RE: Dr. Mudd was not tried throughout the Atlantic. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: For the purpose of the commission 
determining that it had jurisdiction, its jurisdiction flow-
ing from the law of nations and the law of war, it is not 
unreasonable for the commission to consider the fact that 
there are still naval elements deployed at sea; that there 
are still Union army elements deployed in battle forma-
tion against the insurrectionists, and therefore the com-
mission could conclude under the law of nations and the 
law of war that there were the kinds of facts available to 
them to support the conclusion of jurisdiction. 
JUDGE RE: Well, Admiral Jenkins, it was precisely for that 
reason that I asked earlier upon whpm is the burden of 
proof as to the question of necessity which would warrant 
-and we admit that the necessity exists, no one questions 
the existence of the power to declare martial law, and we 
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also concede the applicability of the law of nations and the 
laws of war- the question is, did that apply here, or were 
there, in this case, what in the Milligan case are called 
distractions, such as the emotions of the moment, the 
clamor of the moment, and for that reason the Constitu-
tion guarantees to civilians the safe haven of independent 
judiciary? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would say to the court that any 
tribunal does have the responsibility of making a conclu-
sion with respect to the application of its jurisdiction and 
I would submit to the court that the tribunal below did 
make such a conclusion. 
JUDGE RE: And what is the standard of review? Because that 
of course was my first question. The second inevitably 
flows, what is the standard of proof? To what extent do we 
defer is the question I asked. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Let me first address His Honor's ques-
tion with respect to the standard of review. Again, I think 
we can look to the collection of Anglo-American common 
law on this issue, as we question the standard of review in 
a case such as this. I will borrow His Honor's Latin, and 
say that we might look at a court's approach, admittedly 
in the civil side, to a judgment non obstante veredicto. What 
would a trial judge do with respect to examining a verdict 
and changing that verdict? The test seems to be that we 
would ask ourselves whether any rational jury can come 
up with the finding. And I submit that that is the test that 
ought to be applied on appeal of the Article I commission 
to this Article I appeal court. 
JUDGE RE: Admiral Jenkins, you would apply that on the 
question of jurisdiction? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would apply that on your review of 
the finding of the law. 
JUDGE RE: But our review of whether there was jurisdiction 
... could, since you use Latin, I'd like to have you tell me 
whether or not this standard ought not to be de novo? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: No, it should not. 
JUDGE RE: And whether there was a basis for the exercise of 
the jurisdiction by a military commission over a civilian at 
the time and place in question. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: It should not, Your Honor, because the 
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court below had to find sufficient facts to conclude it has 
jurisdiction. I think it is inappropriate for this court of 
appeals to evaluate those facts ... 
JUDGE RE: There ought to be a deference? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: There ought to be a deference. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Admiral Jenkins, I am disturbed about one 
distinction you seem to draw. You seem to distinguish 
Milligan with the ordinary crimes and then some category 
of extraordinary crimes. Wasn't Milligan a fairly extraor-
dinary case itself? They gave him a death sentence, as I 
recall. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I think Milligan was extraordinary in 
terms of the death sentence, but I don't think the crime in 
Milligan can be compared to the crime here in terms of the 
parties involved -that is, the Commander in Chief, the 
Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the General of 
the Armies- and indeed I don't think in Milligan you had 
the potential for the continuation of hostilities and the 
disruption of the state of the Union if the four parties 
involved in this conspiracy had been killed. So, I use 
ordinary crime in the sense of the crime qua crime and not 
the punishment, as compared to the extraordinary crime, 
conspiracy to kill the Commander in Chief, the Vice Presi-
dent, and the other parties involved. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So you think of extraordinary conse-
quences for the national security, then? 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Yes, Sir. 
JUDGE EVERETT: I see. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: And I think thatthat is the kind ofthing 
that has to be taken into consideration as a decision is 
made with respect to the appropriateness of a military 
commission as compared to the appropriateness of trial in 
an Article III court. All of those things combined to 
provide the commission with jurisdiction and the extraor-
dinary nature of the crime in this case is of some signifi-
cance. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Proceed. 
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I thank the court. 
• • • 
JUDGE EVERETT: Ms. Steel. 
MS. STEEL: Thank you. Your Honor, first of all, I would state 
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to Judge Re that I think it certainly must be review de novo. 
Jurisdiction must be raised or can be raised at any point in 
the proceedings and for such an essential and elementary 
function of a court, the court should have the full range of 
ability to review the question; and for specific reference 
for Your Honor, Matter of Egan addresses the question of 
the burden of proof of the necessity that must be shown by 
the military if it chooses to take jurisdiction over this kind 
of a crime, and, as the court there stated, "this necessity 
must be shown affirmatively by the party assuming to 
exercise this extraordinary and irregular power over the 
lives, liberty and property of the citizens whenever called 
into question." 
JUDGE EVERETT: Let me ask you this, though. President 
Johnson, the President of the United States, was the one 
that established this court by his proclamation. Isn't there 
some presumption of correctness? Isn't there some defer-
ence that has to be given to the determination of the 
President of the United States that such a military tribunal 
should be assembled? Wouldn't it be inappropriate on 
our part to make a de novo determination as to the neces-
sity for this type of tribunal, given the determination by 
President Johnson? 
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, the President is elected and serves 
to execute the laws of Congress. He is not placed as Regent 
or King to determine the law or the effects on the citizenry 
itself. The President has a specific range of obligations 
and responsibilities, and it is our position that he has 
overstepped that bound by impaneling [the Hunter Com-
mission]. His Attorney General recommended that he do 
so, and I would think that the argument presented by 
Attorney General Speed, particularly in the Milligan case, 
is quite shocking to legal scholars of the establishment of 
the Constitution in this country. The President has limits. 
If he did not, we would have a despot for president, and as 
my co-counsel has stated, we presume that President 
Lincoln would have been horrified at the action taken by 
President Johnson. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, President Lincoln suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus on his own initiative, before Con-
gress gave approval. Do you really think he would have 
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been shocked by an attempt to establish a tribunal to 
provide swift justice to a group of conspirators who had 
tried to overturn the national war effort- who had tried 
to, in effect, continue a disastrous war of rebellion that had 
gone on for four dismal years? Do you think President 
Lincoln would have been shocked by that, Ms. Steel? 
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, yes, in light of the fact that the war, 
in fact, was now over; that we had accepted the surrender 
of Lee; that the blockade had been lifted by Andrew 
Johnson. There was no longer a war. In fact, there had not 
been a war declared and this was argued with regard to 
the law of war that belligerent rights have ascribed in this 
case and therefore the law of war would apply. 
JUDGE EVERETT: WhatwasthedatewhenPresidentJohnson 
issued the proclamation establishing the court? 
MS. STEEL: I believe it was sometime the end of April or the 
first week of May; the end of April -and within a week 
or so -May 1st. 
JUDGE EVERETT: So we have to look at the situation as of 
that time, don't we? 
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I believe he was at that moment 
preparing to bring Union troops into Washington for 
celebration. 
JUDGE EVERETT: And yet, on the other hand, wasn't there 
a large Southern force still operating under General Smith 
in Texas, to the west of the Mississippi? 
MS. STEEL: Which I imagine would have taken many, many 
days to get from Texas to the city of Washington, D.C. in 
1865. 
JUDGE EVERETT: But don't we still have to consider the fact 
that there was this continuing effort, that President Johnson 
took this into account when he established the [commis-
sion]? 
MS. STEEL: I'm certain that he took it into account, Your 
Honor. It's our position that he was wrong in doing so. 
With regard to belligerent rights, I just want to quickly 
answer the issue of whether or not, under the laws of war, 
Dr. Mudd could be tried. Belligerent status is not appli-
cable in this case. There has never been a declaration that 
there was war by the Congress in this instance. 
JUDGE EVERETT: But didn't, in 1862, our Supreme Court say 
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in The Prize Cases that there is the phenomenon of imper-
fect war, that you do not have to have a declared war? For 
example, for seizures? 
MS. STEEL: We would submit that this case is quite distin· 
guishable from The Prize Cases. In The Prize Cases, there 
was property at stake, and the courts have held quite 
differently in cases such as this where lives are stake, Your 
Honor, and I would like to give time now to my co-counsel 
to complete this rebuttal. 
JUDGE COX: May I just ask one question? 
MS. STEEL: Certainly. 
JUDGE COX: In a rebellion, as opposed to dealing with a 
recognized foreign nation, is there any difference between 
the rebel soldier who is wearing the uniform, and the rebel 
civilian who is on his own adventure? 
MS. STEEL: Yes, Your Honor. And the court has said ... 
JUDGE COX: How could that be? If we don't recognize the 
rights of rebellion to begin with? We don't recognize him 
as a soldier, do we? 
MS. STEEL: Belligerent rights are ascribed for the purpose of 
decency in war. 
JUDGE COX: If you say it's one who's carrying a gun and 
shooting, then John Wilkes Booth fit that definition. 
MS. STEEL: Yes, but Dr. Mudd was not carrying a gun nor 
shooting, and he was a victim and not a rebel. Your 
Honors, I would simply finish with saying that the court 
stated that the laws of war cannot be applied to citizens in 
states which have upheld the authority of the government 
and the State of Maryland as a Union state. 
Thank you, Your Honors. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Mr. Bailey. 
MR. BAILEY: If it please the court, I should like to most 
respectfully suggest that the court give deep thought to 
giving deference to a President who claims jurisdiction 
and thereby satisfies his burden. We are greatly disturbed 
about the fact that a President might, by using the power 
of pardon, shut down the investigation to protect himself. 
Should we not be much more disturbed about the notion 
of a President granting jurisdiction in order to get the 
result he desires? Now, ... 
JUDGE EVERETT: We are concerned there, too, but yet he is 
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the premier magistrate of the country. We have to give 
respect to him. 
MR. BAILEY: Give him a little respect, but make him prove 
he's got the jurisdiction. When a towering tower of advo-
cacy like my distinguished colleague Douglass is in heavy 
weather on the central question, I find great comfort; and 
the central question is, once you go by jurisdiction, and 
you cannot go by it but you can look at the other aspects 
of the case, what was it that should uphold this conviction 
of conspiracy to commit murder? 
The decision to commit murder by the testimony of the 
prosecution witness Chester on May 12, the second day of 
trial, was made on Friday, April 7th. The decision prior to 
that was to kidnap the President and swap him for prison-
ers in gray uniforms. Dr. Mudd was never in contact with 
any ofthe alleged conspirators between April 7th and 14th 
on any of the evidence. And he can at best have known 
nothing about a plan to kill the President until it was done 
-he cannot be guilty of that conspiracy. Furthermore, it 
is suggested that the oil deal was a scam; and yet the 
prosecution's own witness said, "Booth backed off the oil 
deal because his colleagues lost interest." It was a very 
real deal. Same witness, Mr. Chester. Mr. Ewing said to 
that tribunal, "You say you are trying this person under 
the common law of war." There is no common law of war. 
I have looked for it in the books- it's not there. We all 
know it's not there. What you're saying is, the law is what 
you say it is even though you won't tell me so I can 
disprove the allegations. That flaw in this case is so telling 
and so penetrating that it cannot and should not survive. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Mr. Bailey, I have one question I want to 
ask you. 
MR. BAILEY: Yes. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Suppose John Wilkes Booth had himself 
been seized and had been brought before a military tribu-
nal for trial after the assassination of President Lincoln. 
Would you be here making the same argument to us? 
MR. BAILEY: Absolutely. Because absent the exigency ... 
absent the exigency, the only thing that can ever justify 
transferring judicial power to the executive, John Wilkes 
Booth should have been tried and would have been con-
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victed and hung by a jury of his peers . 
Thank you. 
JUDGE EVERETT: The court's going to take this matter under 
advisement, since it deals with a number of very serious 
issues with great implications. We do, however, plan to 
render our opinions today and make a decision, so if 
counsel are willing, we would request that they stand by 
and we will attempt to announce our decision in the 
immediate future. 
• • • 
CLERK OF THE COURT: The United States Special Court of 
Military Appeal is back in session. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Each of the judges has a brief opinion. 
Before we announce the d ecision, I'm going to call first on 
Judge Re to express his opinion on the merits of this case. 
JUDGE RE: I should like to make an informal statement at this 
time, and a formal opinion w ill follow, and I know it will 
become part of the proceedin gs of this case. Before I do so, 
I should like to state the tremendous privilege of sitting 
w ith a dear friend and colleague of many, many years, 
Judge Everett, and Judge Cox, and I should like to set forth 
my great admiration for the remarkable argument that has 
been made by all counsel. I deemed it a great p rivilege to 
have heard the wonderful arguments, the splendid argu-
ments that have been made. 
I explain a t the outset that the facts were known and need not 
be recited, and proceeding to the power of this court, I 
have no difficulty in saying that we have the power to not 
only look into the guilt or innocence, but also the question 
of jurisdiction. It' s true that we have been appointed by 
the President, but clearly our mandate is to do justice, 
however swift, and, therefore, if doing that justice brings 
us to a conclusion that the court that tried Dr. Mudd had 
no jurisdiction, it is our duty to say so. And there is no 
deference to be sh own under circumstances where the 
Government has not and cannot succeed in showin g the 
necessity which would warrant a displacement of the civil 
court and the civil authorities under the circumstances of 
the case of Dr. Mudd. 
Proceeding to the actual merits of the jurisdictional question, 
it is my firm opinion that the military commission had no 
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jurisdiction to try a civilian at the time and place that he 
was tried. Therefore, I would hold that all of the proceed-
ings of the commission were a nullity. And this would be 
regardless of the nature of the offense. And the reason is 
because we start with a fundamental postulate that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Article VI 
says so expressly, and the importance of the Constitution 
being paramount was set forth in the tremendously im-
portant opinion- the seminal opinion- of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. So in the words of 
Madison, the fundamental and paramount rule of the na-
tion is our Constitution. 
Commencing with that I must express that our determination 
really is determined by what is said in the holding of Ex 
parte Milligan. Ex parte Milligan, were we to read it with the 
care that it deserves, is a great landmark for the expansion 
of human freedom and liberties in our nation. It shows 
that, unless there is the necessity that warrants a declara-
tion of martial law, martial law is extraordinary, and 
cannot be applied. During the able argument, reference 
was made to the fact that President Lincoln declared 
martial law and that it applied in Indiana- it's true. But 
Ex parte Milligan said thatitwas a nullity and that the writ 
of habeas corpus freed Milligan. The petitions in that case 
could very well have been used here, because whether or 
not a military commission could have tried a conspirator 
or anyone else in Texas or anyone else was not before this 
court. The question was, could Dr. Mudd, a civilian, not 
a spy, not coming within any of the categories over whom 
the military courts would have had jurisdiction, could he 
have been tried in Maryland, where the alleged offense 
took place, because as I understand the basic facts of this 
case, it all stems from some services he rendered as a 
physician -he set the leg of a patient. 
Whether he was a conspirator or not really is not the question 
that I should like to address. The question is, did you have 
jurisdiction to try the individual? If there is no jurisdic-
tion, again, you are not a court. The Latin phrase, non 
coram judice- you are not a judge - and indeed if there 
is no jurisdiction there's a very serious question as to 
whether these judges themselves have any judicial immu-
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nity. So l find that the Milligan case determines the 
outcome of this case and, on jurisdictional grounds, l 
would hold that the proceedings below were a nullity. I 
do not address the guilt or innocence of the individual 
because, regardless of the nature of the offense, the Con-
stitutional provisions say that he is entitled to a trial by 
jury and there are other protections set forth in our amend-
ments, all of which ... and the authorities for my state-
ments will be set forth in an opinion that I will submit in 
due course. 
Having determined that there wasn't jurisdiction, it follows 
that Dr. Mudd should be released forthwith, which was 
the order issued by Chief Justice Chase on May 3rd, 1865 
in the Milligan case, and you remember that, in that case, 
the opinion followed on December 17, 1865. The reasons 
were set forth much later. So having said that, it would be 
dicta for me to comment on all of the evidentary questions 
that have been raised. Nonetheless, I cannot resist the 
temptation of saying that I have serious doubts as to 
whether an impartial mind, removed from what in the 
Milligan case I refer to as distractions of the moment -
tempers ... feelings ... emotions ... clamor - whether on 
the evidence presented, and I say this with great deference 
because I could not help but be moved indeed by the 
remarkable argument by Colonel Douglass and Admiral 
Jenkins. This still is a very tenuous reed to do away with 
all of the civil rights that flow from that great document 
which attempted to give legal status to the ideals of our 
Declaration of Independence. It is all but forgotten that in 
our Declaration of Independence we speak of such lofty 
ideals but they did not become principles of law until our 
Constitution was enacted. And that speaks of we the 
people who want to form a more perfect union. It is more 
relevant for us today to say that the next two words are 
"establish justice." So I considered my mandate not only 
to hear this case but also to do justice because I assume that 
is precisely what the President would wish. So, in dicta, 
I would say that applying an appropriate standard of 
proof and in view of the nature of the charges, I would 
have no hesitation in venturing the additional dicta that 
there would have to be guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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For that not to be so, we would be doing an injustice to the 
thousands of courts martial and military commissions 
that have properly exercised their jurisdiction and have 
performed valuable service. However, if the necessity 
doesn't exist, if the public danger doesn't exist, our system 
requires that, when the courts are open and functioning, 
trials should be before the civil courts, with trial by jury, 
and with all of the protections guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. 
JUDGE EVERETT: Judge Re, thank you. Judge Cox, would 
you lend us your opinion? 
JUDGE COX: Thank you, Chief Judge Everett. 
I do not concur in the opinion, albeit the scholarly opinion, of 
my brother, Judge Re, that Ex parte Milligan is dispositive 
of this case. You know, one of the great ironies of this case 
is that the war that was going on at this time in our history 
was being fought, as I understand it, to preserve and 
protect the very Constitution of the United States that we 
are now dealing with. It was armed resurrection through-
out the land, pitting brother against brother and sister 
against sister, and so on and so forth, and as I understand 
the law and believe it to be, that one must look at the state 
of insurrection, the state of war, because we were not at 
war with a foreign power. We were at war among our-
selves. And given that state of insurrection, which was 
going on throughout the South, and indeed if the facts of 
this case as they have been argued by the Government are 
like they are, it was still being continued by conspirators 
in the State of Maryland and throughout the District of 
Columbia. And given that state of affairs, I do not believe 
that it was an unreasonable exercise of the powers of the 
President to call in to [being] a military commission to hear 
the evidence and decide the case before us. Therefore I 
would not set aside this case for a lack of jurisdiction. 
Which leads me inevitably to the next question, and that is 
whether the Government has maintained its burden of 
proof. 
Now, what is the standard of review that this court should 
apply to the facts of this case? I believe that this court must 
give every reasonable inference that can be drawn from 
the evidence on behalf of the Government to the Govern-
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ment. I likewise, like Judge Re, agree that fundamental 
norms of due process in this country, whether it be a 
Constitutional court such as the Article III courts, or 
whether it be a military tribunal, such as this Commission, 
the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I think that is the fundamental underpinning of 
due process in this country. So therefore I look to the 
charge in this case to try to determine what it was that the 
Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Now Mr. Bailey, in his argument, suggested, and I believe that 
I agree with him, that the charge, at the outset at any rate, 
suggested the possibility that Dr. Mudd was guilty of 
treason; that Dr. Mudd was guilty of becoming an acces-
sory before the fact to the homicide of President Lincoln; 
that Dr. Mudd was indeed the killer of President Lincoln; 
or that Dr. Mudd became an accessory after the fact and 
gave aid and comfort knowing that Booth had been the 
assassin; and lastly, as the Government argues, that this 
was a sinister conspiracy among Dr. Mudd and the other 
defendants to wipe out the leadership of the United States 
at that time. 
Having said that, though, I turn to the evidence and say what 
evidence is here to prove what Dr. Mudd did in further-
ance of this awesome conspiracy that Colonel Douglass 
has painted for the court? And I find from the evidence 
taken in light most favorable to the Government suggests 
the following: That Dr. Mudd was acquainted - ac-
quainted is the word I believe best describes it - with 
John Wilkes Booth at some time prior to the night in 
question. I find that, in light most favorable to the Govern-
ment, that at the time Dr. Mudd treated John Wilkes Booth 
he knew who he was, notwithstanding his disguise, and 
notwithstanding some hearsay evidence denying that. 
However, I must say that I find nothing in this evidence 
which suggests that Dr. Samuel Mudd agreed, partici-
pated in, or aided and comforted in the assassination of 
President Lincoln. I just don't find that proof in the 
record. As the Government suggests, perhaps you could 
find that he was providing a safe haven along a spy route. 
But were that the case, I think he nevertheless would have 
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to understand that he was providing a safe haven for an 
assassin of President Lincoln to be found guilty of that 
conspiracy, and I can't find that in the record. Accord-
ingly, I would reverse this case and order a new trial. I do 
think that, as a matter of law, on this day the necessity is 
over, that a reasonable tribunal could not find military 
necessity and so any trial would have to be in a civilian 
tribunal. That's what I would hold. Again, an opinion will 
be rendered in due course. 
JUDGE EVERETT: I have focused on the jurisdictional issue 
because, if in fact there was no jurisdiction on the part of 
the military commission, then the disposition of the case is 
rather obvious in light of the view taken by Judge Re. 
It seems to me clearly to be the fact that there was no jurisdic-
tion predicated on a theory of martial law. Martial law is 
a doctrine of necessity as the Supreme Court has recently 
reiterated in the Milligan case and there really was no 
necessity to use a military tribunal under these circum-
stances. There was opportunity to try Dr. Mudd in a 
civilian court. 
There is, however, another rationale for jurisdiction which 
deserves attention. I think this was the one that was being 
expounded with particular vigor and conviction by Colo-
nel Douglass. And that is the jurisdiction predicated on 
the law of war. This is a doctrine that has been affirmed 
over the years by our jurisprudence. It goes back, for 
example, to the trial of Major Andre and admittedly that 
was prior to the Constitution. But nevertheless, it evolves 
as principle that a spy or certain other types of individu-
als, be they of foreign nationality or American, be they 
military or civilian, can be tried by military tribunal. That 
ground of jurisdiction was used by our courts, by Ameri-
can authorities, during the Mexican war. It has apparently 
been used in some two thousand cases, I infer from what 
Colonel Douglass said, and have little doubt it would 
sustain the trials in those two thousand cases. 
However, given the circumstances of this particular case, it 
seems that the law of war rationale ,was not sufficiently 
articulated in the pleadings nor sufficiently established by 
proof, and that it is too tenuous a basis on that theory. 
Given the time, the circumstances, I'm really not con-
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cerned by the fact that hostilities were concluded because 
I think it would be true that under certain circumstances 
jurisdiction can be exercised by a military tribunal, even 
though hostilities have come to an end. But looking at all 
the circumstances it seems to me that here that basis of 
jurisdiction also fails and therefore I coine to the same 
conclusion that Judge Redid - namely, that jurisdiction 
of the military commission was lacking. That being the 
case, there is no need for me to deal with the issues of 
sufficiency of the evidence that Judge Cox discussed. I 
think dearly the standard would be one of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, whether a military tribunal is involved 
or a civilian tribunal. That's certainly a well-accepted, 
well-established premise of American jurisprudence. I 
think the law of conspiracy has many aspects and it can be 
persuasively argt1~d that even if Dr. Mudd did not know 
all the purposes of the conspiracy, if he engaged in the 
conspiracy and if a particular act was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the conspiracy, then he would be 
responsible for that act. So I think there is at least very 
substantial basis for the argument that was presented by 
Colonel Douglass. But, as I indicated, I need not make a 
determination in that regard because I do conclude that 
the military tribunal had no jurisdiction. 
That being the case, although two of us have one rationale and 
one has a third, the members of the court have unani-
mously come to the conviction that Dr. Mudd's conviction 
by the mibtary tribunal must be set aside and the corollary 
of that is that an order must be entered at this time that he 
forthwith be discharged from custody. 
There being no other matter to come before the court today, 
the court is now adjourned. 
CLERK OF THE COURT: All rise. 
The Judgment and 
Opinions by the Court 
OPINION 
EDWARD D. RE, Judge:* 
At the outset I should like to note the great pleasure of 
sitting with a dear friend and colleague of many years, Judge 
Robinson 0. Everett, and with my esteemed colleague, Judge 
Walter T. Cox. I should like also to express my appreciation 
and admiration for the extremely helpful arguments that 
have been made by the distinguished and able counsel who 
represented Dr. Mudd and the Government. I deem it a great 
privilege to have heard the splendid arguments that have 
been made in the course of this appeal. 
The salient facts surrounding this case are well known, 
and need not be recited at length. Before this court, Samuel A. 
Mudd of Charles County, Maryland appeals his conviction by 
a military commission of conspiracy to murder the President 
of the United States, the Vice President, the Secretaries of 
State and War, and the General commanding the Union Army. 
Although John Wilkes Booth, the person said to have shot 
President Lincoln, died resisting arrest, Mudd and seven 
others were apprehended. On May 1, 1865, President Johnson 
* ChiefJudgeEmeritus, U.S. Courtoflnternational Trade; Distinguished Professor 
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ordered their trial by a military commission. The trial began 
on May 9 and ended on June 30. Mudd was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and that sentence was approved by the Presi-
dent on July 5. Before this court, Dr. Mudd challenges both 
the military commission's jurisdiction to try him and the 
sufficiency of the Army's evidence against him. 
I commence by stating that I have no difficulty in finding 
that we have the power not only to look into the soundness of 
the commission's findings regarding the appellant's guilt or 
innocence, but also into the question of the commission's 
jurisdiction. It is true that we are not an Article III court, but 
an Article I court, having been appointed by the President at 
the direction of the Congress. Clearly, however, our mandate 
is to do justice. What else could we presume the President and 
Congress to have wished or intended in establishing this 
court? If doing justice brings us to a firm conclusion that the 
Army tribunal that tried Dr. Mudd had no jurisdiction, it is 
our duty to so declare, and to order the error corrected. 
Moreover, the question of a tribunal's jurisdiction is one of 
law, in this case, Constitutional Law. Hence, as to such a 
question, we need pay no deference to either the prior deci-
sion of the tribunal, or to the present opinion of the United 
States as appellee. 
Proceeding to the actual merits of the jurisdictional ques-
tion, it is my firm opinion that the military commission had no 
jurisdiction to try a civilian like Mudd at the time and place 
that he was tried. Because I conclude that there was no 
military jurisdiction over the defendant, I need not address 
appellant's other constitutional objections. 
At trial, Dr. Mudd's counsel objected to a trial by a military 
commission because his client was a civilian resident of a free 
state, over whom a military tribunal could not exercise juris-
diction without violating the Constitution. Counsel for Dr. 
Mudd renew that objection before this court. There is evi-
dence in the record, introduced by the United States, which 
shows that Mudd was a physician and a planter, residing 
outside Bryantown in Charles County, Maryland. On the 
other hand, there is no evidence that Dr. Mudd enlisted in the 
armed forces of the insurgent states, or that he otherwise took 
up arms against the Union. On such a record, the issue is 
whether the Army may try a civilian resident of a loyal state 
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for the offenses of which Dr. Mudd was accused. 
On the record before us, I hold that all of the proceedings 
of the commission were a nullity, and this conclusion would 
apply regardless of the nature of the offense or offenses. I start 
with the fundamental postulate that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. Article VI says so expressly, and the 
paramount importance and supremacy of the Constitution 
was subsequently confirmed in the tremendously significant 
opinion- the seminal opinion- of Chief Justice Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison. 1 
In the words of the great Chief Justice for a unanimous 
Court in Marbury, "those who have framed written constitu-
tions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation,"' and the "constitution is to be 
considered, in court, as a paramount law."3 Therefore, I must 
reject any assertion or contention that a rule or principle 
derived from international law, or, more precisely, the law of 
war, could disturb the legal order established by the Consti-
tution. What remains for us to determine is the extent or limits 
of military jurisdiction over civilians that is permitted by the 
Constitution. 
In the basic document, the Framers were silent as to the 
propriety of military jurisdiction over persons or crimes. In 
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10, Congress is authorized to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations. This provision 
may reasonably be interpreted as authorization to define and 
punish offenses against that subdivision of the law of nations 
called the law of war. Appellant, however, has not called into 
question Congress' power to define and punish but, rather, 
has challenged the Army's power to adjudicate. On the power 
to adjudicate, the Constitutional provisions are found in 
Article III which declares that the judicial power of the United 
States is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior 
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish. This article also provides that the judges, both of the 
Supreme Court and the inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
during good behavior. 
In this case, the appellant was tried by a military commis-
sion known as the Hunter Commission. The commission was 
established by order of the Commander in Chief, not by Act of 
the Congress, and the commission's members, general and 
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field grade officers on active service with the Army, did not 
hold their offices as commission members during good be-
havior, but only pro ilia vice ("for that turn"). As these 
commissioners cannot be said to have held their offices in 
accordance with Article III, they may not be regarded as 
having had jurisdiction described in Article III. 
The Bill of Rights reveals that the First Congress contem-
plated different adjudicative treatment for crimes of a mili-
tary nature, but it falls far short of validating military jurisdic-
tion over a civilian as in this case. The Fifth Amendment 
guarantees that no person may be held to answer for a capital 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless upon presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, "except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war 
or public danger ... . "4 Thus, the Fifth Amendment permits a 
criminal conviction without the involvement of a Grand Jury 
only for crimes arising in the armed forces. Here, the specific 
exception of the Fifth Amendment cannot apply, for, as the 
government must concede, Mudd was neither a soldier nor a 
militiaman. 
In the face of the one exception for military crimes explic-
itly set forth in the Fifth Amendment, I am loathe to assume 
that the Constitution contains or permits any other exception 
which its Framers failed to articulate. On this point I am 
guided by a firmly established tradition of interpretation 
summarized in the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. 
Hence, no implicit exception ought to be read into either the 
federal jurisdiction set forth in Article III, or the guarantee of 
a jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, as provided in Article III and in the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
This brings me to the recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan.' In light of the over-
whelming persuasiveness of that decision, I have no doubt 
regarding its proper influence in this case. Indeed, I believe 
our decision today is really determined by the reasoning and 
holding of that case. I venture to add that if Ex parte Milligan 
were to be read with the care it deserves, it would be viewed 
as a great landmark for the expansion of human freedom and 
liberties in our nation. Even though that decision admits that 
the military, in exceptional circumstances, may adjudicate 
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offenses by civilians, it limits the exercise of that power to 
cases arising out of true and absolute national necessity, and 
not merely for the Army's convenience. 
Ex parte Milligan indicates clearly that, unless there exists 
that "public danger" or necessity that warrants a declaration 
of martial law, martial law can neither be declared nor ap-
plied to empower a military commission to judge civilians. Ex 
parte Milligan also teaches that a finding by the executive of 
the prerequisites for imposing martial law is not controlling 
upon the judiciary in determining whether the necessity war-
ranted the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians. 
Whether a military commission could have tried one of 
these conspirators, or anyone else, within the territory of a 
secessionist state is not before this court. The events which 
led to the trial of Dr. Mudd and his co-defendants occurred in 
the District of Columbia and in the State of Maryland, areas 
which stayed with the Union and remained loyal to its lawful 
government. 
During the oral argument before us, able counsel for the 
government noted that President Lincoln declared martial 
law and that it applied in Indiana, the state in which Lambdin 
Milligan resided and in which his offenses were committed; 
that much is true. But Ex parte Milligan held that the declara-
tion by the President was a nullity, and that the writ of habeas 
corpus was available to free Milligan, a civilian resident of a 
loyal state. The Supreme Court concluded that, as long as the 
courts of the State of Indiana were open and operating, the 
military courts of the United States Army could not usurp 
their jurisdiction over civilian defendants. 
Consequently, as long as the courts of Maryland were 
open and operating, the Hunter Commission could not try 
Samuel A. Mudd, a civilian. 
While the record of the Hunter Commission, completed 
before Ex parte Milligan was decided, is justifiably barren of 
evidence on this essential matter, I find sufficient proof in the 
Maryland Reports that the courts of that state were open and 
operating at the time of Dr. Mudd's arrest. Indeed, I find 
particularly compelling evidence that Maryland's courts were 
capable of hearing and properly deciding his case in the 
reported decision in Anderson v. Baker, 6 heard and decided by 
the Court of Appeals during its October Term in 1865. In that 
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case, Maryland's highest court affirmed a judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County denying a petition for a 
writ of mandamus which had been requested by persons 
refused registration as voters in accordance with Maryland's 
registration law because they had been in "armed hostility to 
the United States."7 Clearly, the courts of Maryland were 
open, operating, and loyal to the Union. 
The specific question presented is whether the Hunter 
Commission had jurisdiction to try the appellant. If there was 
no jurisdiction, the commission was not properly a court, and 
could not try the appellant. The Latin phrase coram non judice, 
before one not a judge, expresses the principle and signals the 
consequence - that any decision such a simulacrum may 
render is null and void. Indeed, if there is no jurisdiction, 
there is a very serious question as to whether the judges 
themselves enjoy any judicial immunity. I have concluded 
that the Milligan case determines the outcome of this case and, 
on jurisdictional grounds, I hold that the proceedings below 
were a nullity. It follows that Dr. Mudd should be released 
forthwith, which was the order issued by Chief Justice Chase, 
on April3, 1866, in the Milligan case. 
As I understand the crucial facts of this case, the charges 
against Dr. Mudd stem from services that he rendered as a 
physician- when he set the leg of a patient. Whether he was 
a co-conspirator in the assassination is not a question that 
needs to be addressed. Having concluded that the military 
commission over which this court has supervisory authority 
acted without jurisdiction in passing on the appellant's guilt, 
I need not pass on what persuaded the commission in its 
judgment. Nonetheless, from a study of the entire record, I 
have serious doubts as to whether an impartial mind, re-
moved from what might be called the distractions of the 
moment (i.e., the tempers, feelings, emotions, and clamor 
surrounding this case), applying an appropriate standard of 
proof as to the evidence presented, and in view of the nature 
of the charges, could conclude that there was guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
It is my decision that the military commission that tried 
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd had no jurisdiction to try him, that the 
proceedings before that commission were a nullity, and that 
Dr. Mudd should be released forthwith. 
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ROBINSON 0. EVERETT, Chief Judge** (concurring): 
If it were necessary for me to decide as to the sufficiency 
of the evidence, I might be persuaded by the incisive argu-
ments and briefs on behalf of the Government that Samuel 
Mudd's guilt of some crime had been established. Even if 
Booth's slaying of the President were outside the scope of any 
plot in which Mudd might have been involved, there is 
evidence suggesting that he was an accessory after the fact. 
However, I need not reach the issue of evidentiary sufficiency 
because - for the reasons ably set out by my esteemed 
brother Judge Edward D. Re-I also am convinced that the 
military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd. 
Three bases of military jurisdiction are consistent with the 
Constitution. The first is derived from Art. I, Sec. 8, which 
authorizes Congress to "make rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Clearly this provi-
sion of the Constitution- under which Congress has enacted 
the Articles of War- is inapplicable. In no sense can Samuel 
Mudd be considered a member of the "land and naval Forces." 
A second possible basis for military jurisdiction is martial 
law, which was unsuccessfully relied upon by the Govern-
ment in Ex parte Milligan 8 As the principal opinion in that 
case makes clear, martial law- which is nowhere specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution- is predicated on necessity. 
Absent necessity, no basis exists in martial law for trying a 
civilian by a military commission or other military tribunal. 
Because the civil courts were open in Indiana where Milligan 
was tried, the Supreme Court ruled that the military commis-
sion there lacked jurisdiction to try him and to impose a death 
sentence. Even though martial law still applied in Washing-
ton when President Lincoln was assassinated and later when 
the Hunter Commission tried Dr. Mudd, it seems undeniable 
that the civil courts were open and that, if Federal authorities 
had been so inclined, Dr. Mudd could have been tried in a civil 
court by a jury upon an indictment rendered by a grand jury. 
Any argument for military jurisdiction based on martial 
law would be stronger if the trial of Samuel Mudd by a 
military commission had been specifically authorized by 
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Congress- just as the Congress has created our Special Court 
and authorized it to review Mudd's conviction. However, in 
my view, even a legislative mandate would not be sufficient 
to establish military jurisdiction based on martial law. 
That leaves only an argument based on Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10, 
which confers on Congress the power to "define and punish 
... Offenses against the law of nations." In my view, neither 
the accessibility of civil courts nor Mudd's American citizen-
ship is decisive as to the legality of any exercise of military 
jurisdiction pursuant to Clause 10. However, because trial by 
a military tribunal deprives an accused of many safeguards, 
such as indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury, 
Clause 10 should not be given a novel or extraordinarily 
broad construction. Moreover, I am troubled because it is 
unclear that Congress has attempted to exercise the power 
granted it by Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10. Nonetheless, I shall proceed 
on the premise that, in some way, Congress did authorize 
military authorities to utilize whatever power might stem 
from this clause. 
A question also may be raised as to whether the law of war 
- within the "law of nations" - justifies trial by military 
commission for acts which took place in Maryland on April 
14, 1865. The Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered on 
April 10, 1865. General Johnston was about to surrender to 
General Sherman in North Carolina. However, a sufficient 
residue of military operations at the time of the assassination 
permits the law of war to punish Mudd and the other alleged 
conspirators. Moreover, as to conduct punishable by a mili-
tary tribunal under the authority of Art. I, Sec. 8, it probably 
makes no difference whether hostilities abate after the offense 
is committed and prior to trial or the execution of a sentence. 
Even so, I conclude that the military commission lacked 
jurisdiction. Had the conduct of Mudd and the other alleged 
co-conspirators occurred in one of the States which had at-
tempted to secede and join the Confederacy, a different result 
might be called for. The use of military tribunals to maintain 
order in occupied countries appears to be well-accepted' and 
I would draw no distinction between the power of American 
military commanders to establish courts in the occupied ter-
ritory of a foreign government- such as Mexico two decades 
ago - and their power to establish military commissions to 
I 
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administer justice in the occupied territory ofrebellious States. 
Admittedly, at the outset of the recent conflict, Maryland, 
where Samuel Mudd resided, exhibited secessionist tenden-
cies. However, even though some military operations took 
place within the State, its constituted authorities never under-
took to withdraw from the Union. Washington, where the 
assassination was carried out, always remained under Fed-
eral control. Furthermore, no evidence has been offered that 
the assassination plot was encouraged, organized, or con-
doned by the persons in charge of military operations for the 
secessionist States. 
No one can minimize the gravity of the crimes committed 
by those who were responsible in any way for the slaying of 
President Lincoln and thereafter for shielding the assassin. 
Indeed, those involved may have been guilty of treason. 
However, even that most aggravated of offenses is not subject 
to summary trial by a military tribunal; to the contrary, the 
Constitution at Art. III, Sec. 3 provides special safeguards to 
assure that a person accused of treason is protected against 
conviction on the basis of hearsay and innuendo. With this in 
mind, I cannot subscribe to the proposition that the exigencies 
of the situation created by the assassination of the President 
authorized trial in a forum where the usual safeguards for 
trial of a civilian would be absent10 
The conclusion I have reached seems most consistent with 
the language and spirit of our Constitution. Moreover, it 
precludes a rush to judgment before a tribunal whose unfa-
miliar procedures and rules of evidence will inevitably result 
later in claims of arbitrariness, bias, and hysteria. Thus I join 
Judge Re in holding that the military commission sitting in 
Washington lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Samuel Mudd -a 
citizen of Maryland, a State which remained with the Union 
- for any misconduct on his part in connection with the 
assassination of President Lincoln or with the harboring and 
assisting of those who perpetrated this dastardly crime. 
WALTER T. COX, III, Judge' (concurring in the judgment): 
My learned colleagues make compelling arguments that 
t Judge of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals; former Judge of the lOth Judicial 
Circuit of South Carolina. 
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the military commission was without jurisdiction to try Dr. 
Samuel Mudd for the crimes arising out of the assassination of 
President Abraham Lincoln and the assault on Secretary of 
State William H. Seward, rei ying on the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Ex parte Milligan. 11 I respectfully disagree. 
However, for the reasons set forth, I agree that the judgment 
of guilty must be reversed. 
In reaching these conclusions, I first ask whether Milligan 
stands for the proposition that a civilian may never be tried by 
a military commission- or does that case merely establish 
those essential elements which must be present in order for a 
military tribunal to require a civilian to answer to criminal 
charges before such a body? I read Milligan as permitting 
jurisdiction over civilians under certain circumstances. I do 
not read it as an absolute bar to jurisdiction. 
It is true that no civilian may be tried by a military tribunal 
absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Milligan 
makes it clear that a civilian cannot be tried for ordinary 
offenses arising out of state or federal laws if the civil govern-
ment is functioning and in control, and if the civil courts are 
open and capable of doing justice. Likewise, Milligan makes 
it clear that the exercise of jurisdiction by a military tribunal 
is a corollary to martial law. Furthermore, martial law must 
exist out of "necessity actual and present, the invasion real, 
such as actually closes down the courts and deposes the civil 
administration. "12 
These are seductive words which, if taken literally, belie 
the truth. I view our duty as an appellate court in a much 
broader sense than one which merely asks if the doors to the 
local courthouse are physically open. We must look beyond 
that simple fact to the true state of affairs. We, as an appellate 
tribunal, must resolve the question of jurisdiction, as we must 
in every case, as a question of law- certainly one mixed with 
facts, but nevertheless a question of law. 
When we examine the jurisdiction of a military tribunal, 
we are not hidebound to the traditional questions of criminal 
jurisdiction, albeit they remain important. In addition to the 
traditional questions - Did the tribunal have jurisdiction 
over the subject matter? Did the tribunal have jurisdiction 
over the person? Where was the situs of the crime?-we must 
also examine the time, place, and circumstances pertaining to 
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the alleged offenses. We must likewise look at the offenses to 
determine if they are against military order and discipline or 
against the common citizenry. In other words, necessity is a 
much broader concept than an open civil courthouse. 
This broader view of jurisdiction is alien to our normal 
view thereof. Normally, all we ask is: (a) Whether the crime 
occurred in the county or district? (b) Do the charges allege an 
offense? (c) Was the defendant properly before the court by 
information or arraignment? and (d) Was the indictment 
returned a true bill by the grand jury? These questions are 
fairly routine and easy to answer. Necessity as an element of 
jurisdiction presents quite another question. 
In my view, when we peel away the constitutional plati-
tudes surrounding the debate over the issue of jurisdiction in 
this case, resolution of the question boils down to consider-
ation of the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the 
crime and trial. 
Unlike my colleagues, I find that an examination of the 
record of the proceedings supports a finding of jurisdiction. 
As recited in the Charge and Specification, Washington was a 
city "fortified and intrenched." The offense occurred on the 
night of Apri114, 1865. The intended victims were Abraham 
Lincoln, President of the United States and Commander in 
Chief of the military forces of the United States; Andrew 
Johnson, Vice President of the United States; William H. 
Seward, Secretary of State; and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. 
Grant, then in command of the Armies of the United States. 
Martial law had been previously declared in the city of Wash-
ington, D.C. Habeas corpus, which had been suspended, was 
not restored until February 1867, long after the trial in ques-
tion. 
A very important fact supporting jurisdiction is that the 
war between the Union and the Confederacy was not over. It 
is true, as Petitioners argue, that GenerarRobert E. Lee had 
surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia in early April 
1865, but hostilities continued throughout the South. Rebel-
lious renegade groups flourished and Jefferson Davis, Presi-
dent of the Confederate States of America, was eluding cap-
ture. Indeed, he was not captured until May 10, 1865, the day 
after this trial commenced. 
The most important factor demonstrating the appropri-
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ateness of this military commission can be found in the very 
facts of the case. The offenses themselves demonstrate the 
very grand and immediate danger to the military leadership 
in the District of Columbia. Prompt investigation of the 
charges, swift trial of those believed to be involved, and 
speedy rendering of punishment were unquestionably neces-
sary to convince the local populace of the avowed determina-
tion of the military to instill discipline and control in the 
community. That is the purpose of martial law and military 
tribunals, to maintain control and order when the civilian 
populace is in disarray. 
It is easy to look backward to find some evidence that the 
courts of Maryland or the District of Columbia were open. 
However, given the time, place, and circumstances of this 
case, it is my view that the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
military commission was justified and proper, in order to 
ensure the safety of the military leadership and peace and 
harmony within the District of Columbia and, indeed, the 
nation. A military force must, as a matter of common sense 
and necessity, be capable of protecting itself and its leaders 
from such heinous crimes against it. In my judgment, that is 
the necessity required by Ex parte Milligan and the Constitu-
tion in order for a military tribunal to exercise jurisdiction 
over civilians. Accordingly, I am ofthe opinion that Dr. Mudd 
was subject to the jurisdiction of the commission. 
Whether or not the verdict of guilty against Dr. Mudd, for 
conspiring to murder the President and others, should stand 
is quite another question. Petitioner questions whether the 
evidence against him supports a finding of guilty as charged. 
I conclude that the evidence is insufficient, and, therefore, I 
would reverse his conviction on this basis. 
I agree with the Petitioner as to the burden of proof. It is 
a fundamental principle in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
that no man shall be punished for a crime unless the state (or, 
in this case, the United States) shall prove the defendant 
guilty by legal and competent evidence which shall prove 
each and every element of the criminal offense beyond any 
reasonable doubt. 
The legal test is, the sufficiency of the evidence to 
satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury. 
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On the one hand, absolute, metaphysical and 
demonstrative certainty, is not essential to proof by 
circumstances. It is sufficient if they produce moral 
certainty, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. Even 
direct and positive evidence does not afford grounds 
of belief of a higher or superior nature. The rule, even 
in a capital case is, that should circumstances be 
sufficient to convince the mind and remove every rational 
doubt, the jury is bound to place as much reliance in 
such circumstances as on direct and positive proof. 13 
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Thus, an appellate tribunal reviewing a record of trial 
regarding a claim of insufficient evidence must ask itself two 
questions: 
1. Is the evidence of record legal and competent? Evi-
dence erroneously admitted into the trial cannot be consid-
ered. 
2. Does the evidence of record, if true, offer proof of each 
and every element of the charged offense? 
Of course, an appellate court must view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the Government, unless the appellate 
court is convinced that no reasonable juror would do so. After 
all, even appellate courts are not bound by absurd, arbitrary, 
or capricious views of evidence. Furthermore, unlike histori-
ans and even legal scholars, an appellate court is bound by the 
record of trial before it and the laws and precedents pertain-
ing to the case; it may not consider evidence developed 
outside the record. 
My starting point for review of this record is, therefore, 
the charge against Petitioner. It is clear from the Charge and 
Specification that the prosecution's theory regarding Dr. 
Mudd's role in the case was two-fold. First, Dr. Mudd was an 
active conspirator in the plot to assassinate the President, Vice 
President, Secretary of State, and Lieutenant General Grant. 
Second, in support of that murderous compact, Dr. Mudd 
gave aid, safe harbor, and comfort to the injured assassin, 
John Wilkes Booth; and he assisted Booth and his colleague to 
escape from Maryland into Virginia. 
It is certainly an inescapable conclusion that Dr. Mudd did 
indeed aid, comfort, and assist John Wilkes Booth in his flight 
from Washington, D.C., to Virginia. Such conduct may well 
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have constituted some offense against the United States, in 
the same manner as providing food and shelter to retreating 
Confederate soldiers or escaped prisoners of war. But such is 
not the nature of the crime for which Dr. Mudd stands con-
victed. 
Rather, he stands convicted for willfully, knowingly agree-
ing to kill and murder the President of the United States, for 
assaulting the Secretary of State, and for knowingly provid-
ing aid and comfort to the President's actual killer. In my 
view, the record is entirely void of any evidence from which 
a finder of fact, honestly seeking the truth, could conclude 
that Dr. Samuel Mudd conspired to murder the President. 
Viewing the evidence presented to the military commis-
sion in May 1865, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
I find the following: 
1. Dr. Mudd knew the assassin, John Wilkes Booth, prior 
to April15, 1865, and recognized him on the morning that he 
treated his leg. 
2. Between November 1864, and March 1865, John Wilkes 
Booth and others conspired to kidnap President Lincoln, Vice 
President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and Lieutenant 
General Grant. 
3. In early March 1865, Booth and certain of his fellow 
conspirators modified the plot and decided, instead, to assas-
sinate the victims. 
4. The witness Weichmann observed Dr. Mudd meeting 
with Booth and others in a Washington hotel on January 15, 
1865, and he saw them discussing a map. 
5. Dr. Mudd was seen in Washington on March 3, 1865, 
looking for Booth. 
6. Dr. Mudd was sympathetic to the cause of the Confed-
erate States of America, and he operated a safe house for anti-
Union operatives at his farm in southern Maryland. 
7. President Lincoln was killed by John Wilkes Booth on 
April14, 1865, and Secretary of State Seward was assaulted on 
the same night by a fellow conspirator of Booth. 
8. Dr. Mudd provided aid and comfort to Booth and his 
companion during the daylight hours of April15, 1865. 
9. When Dr. Mudd was given the opportunity to explain 
the presence of Booth at his farm to Lieutenant Lovett, a 
Union Army officer investigating the case, he denied having 
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recognized Booth. 
These are powerful items of circumstantial evidence that 
Dr. Mudd was involved in a conspiracy, his particular role 
being to cover and assist in the escape of the perpetrators to 
the South. However, it is the following lack of evidence, 
rather than the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that causes 
me to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet its legal 
burden-that is, to prove every element of the offense charged: 
a. Even assuming Dr. Mudd participated in the original 
conspiracy to kidnap the President and others, it is clear that 
the plot later was fundamentally changed. There is no evi-
dence of record showing that Dr. Mudd agreed to kill the 
President and others or to be a part of such a plot. 
b. There is als·o no evidence of record to indicate that, at 
the time Dr. Mudd aided Booth, he knew that Booth had killed 
the President. In fact, there is no evidence that even Booth 
knew the President was dead at that point, only that he had 
fired a shot at him. Based upon the prosecution's evidence, it 
was not established that Dr. Mudd learned of the assassina-
tion of the President until April16, 1865, one day after Booth 
made his escape. 
I know of no rule of law that would hold a conspirator 
vicariously liable for crimes which are independently com-
mitted by a principal and outside the foreseeable scope of the 
conspiracy. For example, if two men conspire to steal a 
farmer's horse- one to commit the theft, the other to aid and 
abet in the thief's escape- and the thief changes his mind and 
decides to rape the farmer's daughter instead of stealing the 
horse, the rape is without the conspiracy, and the actor alone 
must suffer the punishment. On the other hand, if the farmer 
were killed in an attempt to stop the thief from taking his 
horse, the co-conspirator would be liable for the homicide. 
When two or more persons set out on a criminal enterprise, 
each is liable for the acts of the other, for it is true that the 
"hand of one is the hand of all." 13 
As to aiding and abetting the escape in general, the 
Government's case is considerably stronger. Certainly, given 
Dr. Mudd's sympathetic views of the Confederacy, his previ-
ous acquaintance with Booth, and the fact that Booth was 
attempting to go covertly in the middle of the night to the 
South, a reasonable, prudent man would realize that he was 
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aiding and abetting some endeavor, perhaps even an illicit 
one. However, there is still no evidence which proves, di-
rectly or indirectly, that Dr. Mudd knew of the murder at the 
time he rendered aid. 
Be that as it may, Dr. Mudd wasnotcharged with being an 
accessory after the fact. His conviction must be based upon 
evidence of his knowing participation in the plot to murder 
the President, not upon his political views or his willingness 
to provide comfort and aid to travelers along the covert route 
to the South. The proof fails as to the charged offense. 
In retrospect, the complete record before us shows that the 
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln was an extraor-
dinary and sensational crime, committed by a well-known 
actor and southern sympathizer, John Wilkes Booth. The 
murder was obviously part and parcel of a grander scheme, 
which included the murder of other important officials of the 
United States, a fact well proved by the simultaneous assault 
on Secretary of State Seward and the attempts on others. 
There was most certainly probable cause to believe that 
Dr. Mudd was an active conspirator. Nevertheless, based 
upon the evidence presented to the military commission, 
stripped of speculation and conjecture rising out of the heat 
and passions inflamed by the death of the President, the 
prosecution failed to prove that Dr. Mudd ever conspired to 
commit the offense charged. 
Accordingly, with due respect to the members of the 
military commission, I would reverse Petitioner's conviction 
and order him released forthwith from his confinement. 
The findings of guilty and the 
sentence are set aside. 
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Part Two 
Commentary 

His Name Was Mudd 
Frederick Bernays Wiener* 
INTRODUCTION 
At about 9:30p.m. on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, John 
Wilkes Booth fatally shot President Abraham Lincoln in the 
head. The shooting took place in Ford's Theater, located on 
lOth Street, N. W., in Washington, D.C. Jumping out ofthe box 
in which the President, Mrs. Lincoln, and two others sat, 
Booth caught the spur on his left boot in a decorative flag, with 
the result that he broke his left leg as he landed on the theater's 
stage. 
Early on the next day, Booth and his companion David E. 
Herold rode up to the home of Samuel A. Mudd, M.D., near 
Bryantown in Charles County, Maryland, some thirty miles 
from Washington. Booth had earlier visited Charles County 
and had been with Dr. Mudd there and in Washington; Mudd 
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would later admit that he recognized Booth when the assassin 
appeared at his home on April 15. 
Dr. Mudd cut the boot from Booth's broken leg, set the 
break, and furnished the injured man with crutches. Mudd 
also provided food and shelter for both visitors. The next day, 
after trying to find a carriage that would have facilitated 
Booth's travel, Mudd directed Booth and Herold across Zekiah 
Swamp to the Potomac River and Virginia. He also gave them 
a map of Virginia's Northern Neck. 
Eleven days later, on the Garrett farm beyond Port Royal, 
Virginia, Booth died, whether by his own hand or by that of 
one of the Union soldiers who surrounded Garrett's tobacco 
barn, still remains unclear to this day. 
Mudd and seven others linked with Booth were then 
placed on trial before a military commission comprised of 
nine field -grade and general officers of which the senior and 
president was Major General David Hunter. The eight in the 
dock were charged with conspiring to murder President Lin-
coln, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and 
Lieutenant General Grant. 
Originally, some time in 1864, Booth had planned only to 
abduct the President and to hold him as ransom for the return 
of the thousands of Confederate prisoners then in Union 
hands, thus making possible a peace on Confederate terms. 
But after Lee's surrender, this was no longer possible. Ac-
cordingly, Booth turned to a mass killing that would paralyze 
the victorious Union government. He would kill the Presi-
dent, George A. Atzerodtwas to do in the Vice President, and 
Lewis Payne would kill the Secretary of State, next in succes-
sion under the law then in force. General Grant (with his wife 
scheduled to be the Lincolns' guests that night at Ford's 
Theater) would also be disposed of because he was the highest 
ranking officer in the Union Army. 
The specification under the general charge that was solely 
applicable to Mudd alleged that he advised, encouraged, 
received, entertained, harbored and concealed Booth and 
aided the other conspirators in escaping from justice. 
After a trial that lasted from May 9 to June 30, 1865, and 
deliberations for two more days, the Hunter Commission 
found Mudd guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment at 
Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, Florida. While imprisoned 
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there, he sought three writs of habeas corpus, all of which were 
denied. But, because of his medical assistance to other prison-
ers during a yellow fever epidemic, Mudd was pardoned by 
President Johnson on March 1, 1869, just before the latter's 
term came to an end. 
Dr. Mudd's oft asserted innocence became a cause that has 
been pursued over the years with virtually theological fervor. 
Finally, in 1991, a grandson of Dr. Mudd applied to the Army 
Board for Correction of Military Records to set aside his 
grandfather's conviction. That Board, on January 22, 1992, 
recommended that this be done, on the sole ground that the 
military commission that convicted Dr. Mudd lacked jurisdic-
tion to try him in the first place.1 
Exactly six months later, however, the Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Army rejected the Board's recommendation 
and denied the Mudd family's application, on the ground that 
it was not the Board's role to settle historical disputes by 
rewriting history, even though the matter might have been 
decided differently today. 2 Thereafter, on February 12, 1993, 
a three-judge "Special Court of Military Appeal" presided 
over a moot court hearing at which were debated the ques-
tions deemed by the Secretary to be beyond the reach of the 
Board. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS FREQUENTLY OVERLOOKED 
A. Incompetence of the Accused as Witnesses 
Before the Board and again before the Special Court, Dr. 
Mudd's family and their counsel attacked the Hunter 
Commission's refusal to permit any of the accused to take the 
stand in his or her own defense. Indeed, the Board formally 
found that "Dr. Mudd and the other defendants were not 
permitted to testify in their own behalf,"' as if this constituted 
a denial of due process on the part of the Hunter Commission. 
Actually this finding reflected simple ignorance on the part of 
the Board, because, at the time of Mudd's trial, in May and 
June 1865, no one accused of a crime before any tribunal of the 
United States, civil or military, was legally entitled to testify. 
That disqualification was not removed until1878, when it was 
also provided that the accused's "failure to make such request 
shall not create any presumption against him."' Some States 
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permitted the prosecution to make adverse comments on the 
accused's failure to testify, and that course was originally 
upheld.' But both decisions were overruled in Malloy v. 
Hogan,' decided in 1964 during the rewriting of the Constitu-
tion of the United States tempore Warren, C.J-7 
Two other preliminary matters also need to be noted. 
Reading a record is inadequate to determine which of two 
conflicting witnesses is the one to be believed, because "[One] 
cannot now recreate his tone of voice or the gloss that person-
ality puts upon speech."' 
Second, even uncontradicted testimony must be ignored 
when it runs counter to settled rules of law. Thus, when 
Herold told Willie Jett, "We are the assassinators of the 
President,"' and when Booth immediately afterwards said of 
Herold, "I declare before my Maker that this man here is 
innocent of any crime whatever,"10 it is plain that Booth knew 
nothing either of the law of conspiracy or of the law governing 
accessories. Similarly, while it has been suggested that the 
shift in Booth's plan from abduction to assassination meant 
that there were two separate conspiracies, one to abduct and 
the other to kill, 11 this distinction will simply not stand. For it 
is the law that, so long as the original objective is unchanged, 
there is still only a single conspiracy as long as the purpose of 
both plans is to inflict an unlawful deed upon the victim." 
B. Strength of Secessionist Sentiment in Maryland 
Only good fortune and ruthless action kept Maryland 
from joining the Confederacy. Maryland's complete military 
subjection by northern troops, not the sentiment of its native 
people, kept the state in the Union. Maryland, particularly its 
southern counties, was territory hostile to the Lincoln admin-
istration and to the Union Army that occupied it. 
In the 1860 election, Maryland gave the Republican ticket 
of Lincoln and Hamlin less than 3,000 votes, and some coun-
ties did not deliver a single vote to that slate." The Demo-
cratic party was split in 1860. Stephen A. Douglas and Herschel 
V. Johnson, representing the more moderate pro-slavery 
group, received 1,376,957 votes in the nation, but received 
only twelve in the Electoral College. Vice President John C. 
Breckinridge and Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon, represent-
ing the more extreme pro-slavery views, received only 849,781 
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popular votes, but secured seventy-two electoral votes. The 
latter number included Maryland's. 14 
When, in April 1861, Fort Sumter was fired on and soon 
surrendered, President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops to put 
down the insurrection. Among the first regiments to head 
south for the defense of the Union was the 6th Massachusetts. 
It was cheered in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, but 
received a quite different welcome in Baltimore. 
In that city, the railway depot for the track from the north 
was one and one half miles away from that for the track to 
Washington. Military planners had taken note of the strong 
pro-Secessionist feeling in Baltimore. To reduce the disorder 
certain to ensue when the regiment moved from one depot to 
the other on April19, the troops were carried between the two 
depots in horse cars. Nevertheless, an attack was mounted on 
the Massachusetts troops which escalated into a city-wide riot 
that left sixteen dead: twelve civilian and four military. 15 
Maryland's Governor and Baltimore's Mayor both begged 
President Lincoln not to send any more troops through the 
city, the Mayor saying that while he did not believe in seces-
sion, he did believe in the right of revolution on the part of the 
oppressed people of the South. Soon, Baltimore effectively 
seceded from the Union. All available units of the State militia 
were called out, all telegraphic communication with the North 
was cut off, and all bridges connecting the city with the North 
were destroyed. 16 One of those bridges, connecting the city 
with Pennsylvania, was destroyed by members of the Balti-
more County Horse Guards, commanded by Lieutenant John 
Merryman.17 We shall hear more of him later. 
Obviously, by April 20, the Union was in dire straits. 
Washington, the national capital, could not communicate by 
wire or by rail with the loyal states. If the secessionists of 
Virginia south of the Potomac were joined by those of Mary-
land north of the river, their troops could easily surround and 
conquer the District of Columbia that lay between the two. 
Fortunately, this "worst case" contingency never material-
ized. Union troops reached Annapolis by sea and soon 
branched out to occupy the area around Baltimore. Track 
repairs were effective, and, by midday April25, "just six days 
after the Battle of Baltimore, the first trainloads of troops 
reached Washington. The road from the north had been 
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reopened." 18 Soon General Winfield Scott formulated a plan 
for the capture of Baltimore, which "was no longer that 
ferocious tiger that had deliberately baited the Union .... For 
Baltimore, in cutting the rail line to Washington, had suc-
ceeded only in cutting its own jugular vein."19 
Baltimore rejoined the Union. The militia, after a showy 
parade, soon disbanded. The 6th Massachusetts reentered the 
city where it had been so violently attacked; vast quantities of 
arms were seized by the Union forces; and, by way of sum-
m<~ry, "[a] combination of political, economic and military 
factors very quickly wrenched control of Maryland from the 
secessionists and turned the state back into the arms of the 
Union."20 
We return now to John Merryman, the Baltimore militia 
officer who had destroyed the railway bridge between Mary-
land and Pennsylvania. On April27, the President suspended 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus along "the military 
line ... used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of 
Washington."21 Nearly a month later, at 2:00a.m. on May 25, 
in consequence of an order from the commander of the Penn-
sylvania troops along the railroad line between Harrisburg 
and Baltimore, Merryman was arrested and taken from his 
home near Cockeysville to Fort McHenry in Baltimore. 
He sought his release by applying for a writ of habeas 
corpus, an application that came before Chief Justice Roger B. 
Taney in the United States Circuit Court in Baltimore. Taney, 
then 84, had written the Dred Scott v. Sanford" decision which 
had denied Congress authority to outlaw slavery in the terri-
tories. He was a strong believer in states' rights and favored 
"a peaceful separation" of North and South.23 
Justice Taney issued the writ, requiring General 
Cadwalader to produce Merryman in court. When the Gen-
eral politely replied that he had been authorized by the 
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public 
safety, the Chief Justice ordered that an attachment issue 
against the General for contempt. When the marshal went to 
Fort McHenry, he was told that there was no answer. The 
Chief Justice then concluded that, since the power refusing 
obedience was far superior to any posse the marshal could 
summon, the marshal was excused from doing more. 
The opinion later filed holds that the President, under the 
His Name Was Mudd 123 
Constitution, cannot suspend or authorize suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, that a military officer has no right to 
arrest or detain a person not subject to the Articles of War, and 
that if the military authority makes an arrest, it is its duty 
immediately to deliver the prisoner to the civil authorities, to 
be dealt with according to law. Merryman was therefore 
entitled to be set at liberty. 24 
The opinion concluded: 
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, 
with my opinion, to be filed and recorded in the circuit 
court of the United States for the district of Maryland, 
and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to 
the president of the United States. It will then remain 
for that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, to determine what measures he will take to 
cause the civil process of the United States to be 
respected and enforced.25 
Inasmuch as the Constitution's provision on habeas corpus 
26 appears in Article I, relating to Congress, rather than in 
Article II, dealing with the President, the latter officer lacked 
power to effect suspension on his own; it was a legislative 
function. Modern views accordingly concur with the Chief 
Justice on this point." 
More than half a century ago, the late Professor Fairman 
noted that "[i]t hasbecome something of an article of liberal 
faith to regard this opinion as a great classic of liberty."" 
Indeed, Taney's latest biographer has rung the changes on 
that theme. 29 
But, in fact, the Merryman decision was worse than wrong; 
it was wrong-headed, and had it been obeyed it might well 
have been calamitous. As was observed by a contemporary 
pro-Union commentator, Professor Joel Parker of the Harvard 
Law School: "If the marshal had summoned the posse, the 
Secessionists would have had a better chance to capture the 
fort by volunteering under his banner thi\n they are likely to 
have under any military commander."30 
Fortified by a sensible opinion by Attorney General Ed-
ward Bates,31 President Lincoln never admitted that he had 
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acted unconstitutionally. Indeed, he told the Congress that, 
"[T]he whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully 
executed were being resisted and failing of execution in 
nearly one-third of the States .... Are all the laws but one to go 
unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that 
one be violated?"32 
Following the disastrous defeat of Union forces at Bull 
Run in July 1861, secessionist sentiment in Maryland became 
stronger, and anti-Union riots and disorders multiplied." 
Secretary of State William E. Seward directed widespread 
military arrests of those who publicly sympathized with the 
South or criticized President Lincoln and his cabinet.34 Both 
houses of the Maryland legislature passed a resolution con-
demning such actions and then adjourned to meet at Frederick 
on September 17, 1861. The President's response was to make 
it impossible for such a meeting to take place. Orders went 
out to Major General John A. Dix in Baltimore and to Major 
General Nathaniel P. Banks in western Maryland to arrest all 
non-Union members of the Maryland legislature. There fol-
lowed the suppression of pro-secession newspapers and the 
imprisonment of their editors. Journalists joined lawmakers 
as inmates at Fort McHenry. The pro-secession resolutions 
earlier passed by the Legislature and multiplied to the extent 
of 25,000 copies, were simply burned." 
By the time that Generals Dix and Banks had carried out 
their orders, virtually all of the leaders of the Peace Party in 
Maryland were in prison, the newspapers supporting them 
had been suppressed, and their editors were also in captiv-
ity.36 More military arrests preceded the regular elections for 
members of the Legislature in November 1861. Election 
officials were warned by General Dix not to allow the ballot 
boxes to be "polluted by treasonable votes."37 This, of course, 
was not a free election, because, in 1861, instead of secret 
ballots each party offered a ballot with its own distinctive 
color. As a consequence, every legislative seat in Baltimore 
was won by the Unionists, and the Unionist candidate for 
Governor won the city with a margin of about five to one:38 
It was in Maryland that the orgy of suppression reached 
its apex. For here were pitted two irreconcilable forces, 
the historically mercurial temperament of a Southern 
His Name Was Mudd 
city, and the absolute necessity for survival of the 
federal government. Temporarily the insurrectionary 
audacity of Baltimore had been triumphant, and during 
this phase the blockade of Washington had been 
complete. But in time, the overwhelming resources 
available to the North overcame this lone city and the 
ultimate subjugation of Baltimore was as complete as 
the blockade had been. As a result, Maryland was to 
stand through the war as a symbol of oppression, and 
its martyrs were to provide unlimited ammunition to 
those who criticized President Lincoln for his 'tyranny' 
and his Administration for its abuse of freedom. 39 
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Finally, President Lincoln's general amnesty in February 
1862 brought about the release of most of the Maryland 
prisoners who still remained in custody. Some prisoners 
refused to accept a parole on the ground that it would imply 
their guilt. Indeed, two were not freed until they had served 
seventeen months in detention. 40 
In short, in Maryland as well as in Kentucky and Missouri, 
the one step that kept three slave states from seceding with 
their eleven neighbors, was their effective military occupa-
tion by the Union Army.41 As a practical matter, Maryland 
was hostile territory, militarily occupied. 
C. Strength of Secessionist Sentiment in Charles County 
Nowhere in Maryland were secessionist sympathies stron-
ger than in Dr. Mudd's home county. Not by chance did Booth 
recruit many of his conspirators from that rural county, 
planned his escape across it to the Potomac, and avoided a 
massive Union manhunt for nine days through the conniv-
ance of Mudd's seditious and disloyal neighbors. 
Charles County, Maryland, named for Charles Calvert, 
the third Lord Baltimore," was in the middle of the 19th 
century an agricultural area with a tobacco economy founded 
on slavery. At a meeting in December 1860, those who had 
supported the Republican ticket were deemed to have com-
mitted an indiscretion, but one individual, Nathan Burnham, 
who had been" a Black Republican emissary," was given until 
the first of the new year to leave the county, and that in default 
thereof a designated committee of four would" expel him viet 
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armis from our county. "43 Some ten thousand to twelve 
thousand Union troops were sent into Charles County. At 
Port Tobacco, their commander reported that most inhabit-
ants were secessionists and that the post office was the me-
dium through which contact with the South was conducted. 
Indeed, at his residence at Pope's Creek, Thomas A. Jones 
helped boat loads of people illegally passing to the South. He 
was arrested in September 1861 and confined for six months. 
However, returning home after his release, he agreed to act as 
Chief Signal Agent for the Confederacy north of the Potomac. 
After the war, he asserted that he had never lost a letter or a 
paper.44 
As is reasonably well known, it was Booth's original plan 
to kidnap the President, and to hold him hostage for the 
release of all Confederate prisoners of war in Union hands. 
He changed his plan to assassination only after Richmond fell 
on April 3, 1865, and Lee surrendered on April 9.45 Indeed, 
according to Booth's diary, he did not change his mind until 
the very day of the murder.46 
Most of Booth's co-conspirators in both aspects were resi-
dents of Charles County. Dr. Mudd lived there, and the 
county was Mrs. Surratt's home also. Indeed, what is now 
Clinton, Maryland, was known in 1865 as Surrattville. The 
tavern in Surrattville was owned by Mrs. Surratt and leased to 
John M. Lloyd. The day before the assassination, she left at the 
tavern for Booth's future use, a set of field glasses and told 
Lloyd to have ready two carbines left in his care previously by 
her son, Herold, and Atzerodt.47 
Atzerodt lived at Port Tobacco in Charles County, where 
he had often ferried Confederate spies and contraband across 
the Potomac to Virginia. He signed a hotel register on April 
14 giving his address as Charles County, Maryland 48 
After Dr. Mudd set Booth's leg and put him up as a house 
guest, he tried to procure a carriage for him. Failing to find 
one, he gave Booth a chart of the Zekiah swamp and a map of 
Virginia's Northern Neck. Booth and Herold then rode off, 
eventually killing their horses lest one should neigh and 
disclose their location to patrolling Union soldiers 49 Herold 
then found a black man to guide them to the home of Captain 
Cox, whose Southern sympathies were well known. 50 
Next to Cox's house was that of his brother-in-law, Tho-
1 
1 
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mas A. Jones, who as already indicated was the Confederacy's 
Chief Signal Agent. Cox hid the two men in a thicket until he 
could arrange for Jones to take them across the Potomac. 50 
Actually, although the area wasvirtuallycrawlingwith Union 
cavalry, Booth and Herold went undiscovered for some nine 
The escape route traveled by John Wilkes 
Booth and David Herold. 
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days. When Jones went to Port Tobacco, then the county seat, 
he heard one detective in the barroom of the Brawner Hotel 
say that he would give a $100,000 reward for information 
leading to Booth's capture. 52 A week after the assassination, 
when new rumors sent the federals hurrying into St. Mary's 
County, Jones decided that the time had come to move his 
guests. He then led Booth and Herold to a rowboat he had 
hidden at Dent's Meadow about a mile north of Pope's Creek 
on the Potomac. 53 
On the night of April 21, Booth was helped into Jones' 
rowboat with Herold at the oars. By morning they had not 
reached the Virginia shore. They put in at a creek on the 
Maryland side during daylight and when night came they 
pushed off again and finally made the Virginia shore. There 
they found a guide to the home of Dr. Richard H. Stuart, the 
richest man in King George County and a relative of General 
Robert E. Lee. However, Dr. Stuart wanted no part of these 
visitors. He gave them a meal in the kitchen, "where they ate 
in the fashion of a tramp given a handout,"" and then had 
them put up for the night in a black man's cabin. Dr. Stuart 
declined to attend to Booth's swollen and blackened leg. 55 
When the two fugitives reached Port Conway, they learned 
that the ferry to Port Royal would not come until the tide rose. 
Meanwhile, three young Confederate soldiers rode up, where-
upon Herold identified himself and Booth: "We are the 
assassinators of the President."56 
Across the Rappahannock, in Port Royal, the two Peyton 
sisters at first agreed to take in the fugitives, but then declined 
and suggested that Booth and Herold move on to the farm of 
Richard Garrett, who might take them in. 57 
While Booth and Herold were guests at the Garrett prop-
erty, Mr. Garrett said at the family's dinner that he did not 
believe the assassination story. But a son, just back from 
Appomattox, knew the facts from a Richmond paper. "One 
hundred thousand dollars reward! That man had better not 
come this way, for I would like to make $100,000 just now!"58 
Whereupon his father asked, "Would you do such a thing? 
Betray him?"" 
Sentiment in Caroline County, Virginia was identical with 
thatin Charles County, Maryland: no one in either area would 
betray the assassin. But the pursuers, Colonel Everton J. 
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Conger and a detachment from the 16th New York Cavalry 
under the command of Captain Edward Doherty, neverthe-
less soon acquired information that led them to the Garrett 
property. There they found Booth and Herold. Herold was 
taken alive; whether the former was shot by himself or by 
Sergeant Boston Corbett has never been determined.60 
II. FACTS BEARING ON MUDD'S GUILT 
A. The Accusation 
The charge against all eight of the alleged conspirators 
whose trial commenced on May 9, 1865, was that they con-
spired with a number of others to kill and murder President 
Abraham Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, Secretary 
of State William E. Seward, and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. 
Grant within the fortified and entrenched lines of the Military 
Department of Washington.61 
The specification pertaining to Mudd alone alleged that 
Mudd, at Washington City and within those military lines, 
did, between March 6 and April 20, "advise, encourage, 
receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid and assist"62 Booth 
and the others63 with knowledge of the conspiracy and with 
the intent to aid, abet, and assist them in the execution thereof, 
and in escaping from justice after the murder of the President 
in pursuance of said conspiracy." 
All the accused pleaded not guilty to both the charge and 
the specifications involving them. Afterwards all the accused 
moved for a severance, which was properly denied,65 since it 
is fundamentallaw that a single individual cannot be guilty of 
being a conspirator. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said for the 
Supreme Court in a later case, "It is impossible in the nature 
of things for a man to conspire for himself .... In California as 
elsewhere conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between 
not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each."66 
In the end, Mudd was convicted -except for the allega-
tion of receiving, entertaining, harboring and concealing 
Payne, John Surratt, Mrs. Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzenrodt, and 
Arnold. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 67 
B. Mudd's Earlier Relations with Booth and the Surratts 
Dr. Mudd first met Booth in November 1864 through one 
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Thompson, when Booth was in Charles County ostensibly to 
buy land and a horse. He did purchase a horse.68 Actually, 
Booth was touring both to familiarize himself with escape 
routes and to find a suitable mount, in connection with his 
plan to kidnap President Lincoln. 
Mudd and Booth met again, this time in Washington, in 
the spring of 1865, although the precise date was disputed. It 
was then that, at Booth's request, Mudd introduced him to 
John H. Surratt, the professional spy. Booth and Surratt had 
many private conversations afterwards." Surratt had fre-
quently visited the Mudds in the summer of 1864, and Con-
federate soldiers in gray uniforms had frequently been seen 
on the Mudd property.70 
As mentioned above, John's mother, Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, 
owned a tavern in Surrattsville. After her husband died, she 
established a boarding house at H Street, N.W., in Washing-
ton and leased the tavern to John M. Lloyd. Five or six weeks 
before the assassination, Herold, Atzerodt, and John Surratt 
visited the tavern and left two carbines, which Lloyd con-
cealed under the joists of the main building's second floor.'1 
On the Tuesday before the assassination, Mrs. Surratt 
came to the tavern and asked about the "shooting irons." 
When Lloyd replied that they were hidden, she told him to get 
them ready, that they would be needed soon. OnApril14, she 
returned to tell Lloyd: 
[T]o get those shooting irons ready that night, there 
would be some parties who would call for them. She 
gave [him] something wrapped in a piece of paper, 
which ... [he] found to be a field glass. She told [him] 
to get two bottles of whiskey ready, and that those 
things were to be called for that night.72 
About midnight on April 14, Herold came to the tavern 
and said, "Lloyd, for God's sake, make haste and get those 
things."" Lloyd then gave Herold the carbines, whiskey, and 
field glass. 
Herold arrived at the tavern that night with a man Lloyd 
did not know, who remained mounted on a large horse. The 
man accepted a bottle of whiskey from Herold but declined 
one of the carbines, saying he could not carry it because his leg 
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was broken. As they were leaving Herold told Lloyd, "I am 
pretty certain that we have assassinated the President and 
Secretary Seward."" Herold gave Lloyd a single dollar bill 
"which just about paid for the bottle of liquor they had just 
pretty nearly drank."75 
C. Mudd's Knowledge of Booth's Identity on April15 
When questioned later about the identity of the man 
whose leg he had treated on April15, Dr. Mudd's replies were 
contradictory and evasive. He seemed frightened, anxious, 
uneasy, worried, and very much excited.76 At first, Mudd told 
investigators that his two visitors were strangers. It was only 
later, after Mrs. Mudd had produced Booth's initialed boot 
that her husband admitted an acquaintance with Booth, but 
still he denied recognizing his patient.77 Other interviews 
with Dr. Mudd indicated that he was concealing facts in the 
case. 78 
After trial, on his way to Fort Jefferson to serve his life 
sentence, Dr. Mudd finally admitted 
that he knew Booth when he came to his house with 
Herold, on the morning after the assassination of the 
President; that he had known Booth for some time, but 
he was afraid to tell of his having been at his house on 
the 15th of April, fearing that his own and the lives of 
his family would be endangered thereby.79 
Not a single witness before the Army Board for Correction of 
Military Records in 1991, one of whom specifically said that 
he was familiar with the Pitman edition of the trial proceed-
ings,'0 ever mentioned that confession. 
D. The Irrelevance of Mudd's Duty as a Physician 
Much has been made of the assertion that all Mudd did 
was perform his duty as a physician when faced with an 
injured patient who came for help. The record of trial sets out 
the scope of the assistance that Mudd gave Booth. The doctor 
set Booth's leg, supplied him with a razor to shave off his 
moustache81 (Booth on arrival had also worn a false beard82), 
supplied him with food, lodging83 and a pair of crutches, 84 
tried to get him a carriage,85 showed Booth how to cross the 
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swamp, and gave him a map of the Northern Neck of Vir-
ginia." 
The normal measure of a medical doctor's duty is of 
course the Hippocratic Oath.87 But the text of that commit-
ment does not justify all the steps that Mudd took for Booth's 
benefit. Setting his leg, providing him with crutches, and even 
seeking to provide a carriage to ease matters for one whose 
further travel on horseback would necessarily be painful, can 
all be deemed medical obligations. But assisting his caller to 
disguise his normal appearance, providing the fugitive with 
directions on how to avoid the roads by passing through the 
Zekiah swamp, and giving him a map suitable for an illegal 
crossing into hostile Virginia, can only be characterized as 
aiding and abetting, as being an accessory after the fact, and 
as tending to prove participation in the earlier conspiracy to 
harm the President. 
Moreover, Mudd had, at Booth's request, already intro-
duced him to John Surratt,BB who was known to be a Confed-
erate spy,89 and who had frequently been a guest at Mudd's 
home,90 in an area much frequented by Confederate desert-
ers.91 
Consequently, Mudd's conduct, far from justified by the 
Hippocratic Oath, shows he had actually forsworn it. Indeed, 
that solemn pledge directs the new physician to "practice 
your art in uprightness and honor ... holding yourselves far 
aloof from wrong, from corruption."" 
Mudd and his partisans have long insisted the doctor did 
no more than his profession required for any injured stranger. 
That might be true if Mudd had never before seen the man 
whose leg was broken; it might also be true if the doctor had 
recognized his patient only as John Wilkes Booth, the well-
known actor and not John Wilkes Booth, the hunted assassin. 
But why did Mudd lie to questioners, saying that he never 
recognized the supplicant? What was there about Booth on 
the early morning of AprillS that induced Mudd to prevari-
cate? The only logical inference is that Mudd lied because he 
knew Booth had just assassinated the President. Only Booth's 
admission of his acts could have led to Mudd's fear that, if he 
admitted knowing Booth's identity, his own and his family's 
lives would be in danger. 
Mudd's repeated denials prove Mudd knowingly shielded 
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the assassin Booth and his henchman Herold from capture. 
The only conflict with a physician's oath came therefore from 
the physician's own criminal conduct, and the Hippocratic 
Oath cannot- even morally- justify Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, 
the prevaricator, the accessory, the co-conspirator." 
III. CREATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND JURISDICTION 
OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION 
A. Original Creation During the Mexican War 
Shortly after arriving in Mexico as commander of all 
American troops then engaged in the war with that country, 
Major General Winfield Scott (as he then was) issued his 
"Martial Law" order, which had two objectives. First, he 
found it necessary to punish the ill-behaved volunteers who 
were actually completely out of control once they crossed the 
Rio Grande. Second, he recognized the need for protecting his 
own forces against offenses committed by the local popula-
tion. Accordingly, first at Tampico and later at other places, 
he created the military commission to deal with both classes 
of incidents.94 
Scott had been educated as a lawyer, and practiced his 
profession for a few years.95 But as hostilities with Britain 
over the impressment of American seamen loomed ever nearer, 
Scott became more interested in a military career, and after a 
meeting with President Jefferson, he was commissioned as a 
captain of light artillery." 
It is therefore safe to conclude that Scott's creation of the 
military commission97 reflected, not what he had read and 
learned from Professor St. George Tucker at the College of 
William and Mary nor in the law office of David Robertson at 
Petersburg, but from his experiences and from his wide read-
ing on military matters in his nearly forty years of service as 
a commissioned officer in the United States Army.98 
B. Reappearance of the Commission in the Civil War 
When the Civil War began, the Army's senior officers 
looked for guidance back to their Mexican War experiences 
and procedures. Accordingly, on January 1,1862, Major Gen-
eral Henry W. Halleck, commanding the Department of Mis-
souri, declared in General Orders No. 1 of that headquarters 
134 Frederick Be mays Wiener 
that the many offenses which, in time of peace, are civil 
offenses, became, in time of war, military offenses, and were 
to be tried by a military tribunal, even in places where civil 
tribunals existed." 
General Halleck had been Secretary of State in the military 
government established for the Mexican territories that even-
tually became California. Thus, he was thoroughly familiar 
with General Scott's practice, pursuant to which numerous 
offenders had been tried by military commissions. Finding 
civilians in Missouri quite as obstreperous as the former 
Mexican civilians had been, Halleck also concluded that the 
courts of Missouri were equally ineffective. Accordingly, he 
ordered trial by military commission for any person sus-
pected of aiding the Confederacy. 100 
But, when the record of trial by military commission at 
General Halleck's direction of Colonel Ebenezer Magoffin, 
C.S.A., reached the War Department, it came to the desk of the 
Judge Advocate of the Army, Brevet Major John Fitzgerald 
Lee, who had been appointed to the office created by Con-
gress in 1849,'01 and he held that military commissions were 
without authority and illegal. 102 
Obviously this would not do. By July 1862, General Halleck 
was ordered to Washington as General-in-Chief, vice the 
overly timorous McClellan. Shortly thereafter, Congress leg-
islated Major J.F. Lee out of office by substituting for his 
position as Judge Advocate of the Army that of Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army, with rank, pay and allowances of a 
colonel of cavalry.103 
C. Judge Advocate General Holt and the Development of 
the Military Commission 
To the new post the President appointed Joseph Holt of 
Kentucky, effective September 3, 1862, and on September 4, 
Major John Fitzgerald Lee, a Virginian and 1834 graduate of 
the United States Military Academy, resigned from the 
Army.Io4 
Holt, a Democrat, was sufficiently prominent in his pro-
fession and in his party to be thrice appointed to high office by 
President Buchanan, first as Commissioner of Patents, next as 
Postmaster General, and finally, from January 18 to March 5, 
1861, as Secretary of War. Once South Carolina's Ordinance 
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of Secession was passed, he became a firm Unionist of inflex-
ible belief in the righteousness of the Union cause. Thus he 
was then an all too rare specimen, a convinced War Democrat, 
and one who contributed substantially to persuading Ken-
tucky to shift from neutrality to support of the Union. 105 
It was Holt who truly developed the military commission 
into an instrumentality that enabled military authorities to 
arrest, try, convict, and keep confined many persons who 
would otherwise have been released by the civil courts. 
In the War Department's General Orders No. 100, pub-
lished on April23, 1863, "Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field" (which were prima-
rily composed by Dr. Francis Lieber), the military commission 
was formally recognized as the proper tribunal under the 
laws of war to deal with cases that were not covered by the 
Articles of War but that were derived from the common law 
of war. 106 
Holt was legislatively promoted to brigadier general and 
to head of the newly established Bureau of Military Justice in 
mid-1864 and eventually, on "the bloody 13th of March, 
1865," brevetted major general"for faithful, meritorious and 
distinguished service in the Bureau of Military Justice during 
the war." 107 
General Holt not only headed the Bureau of Military 
Justice during the Civil War, but also presided at the trial of 
Major General Fitz-John Porter, charged with disobedience of 
orders at the second Battle of Bull Run, in consequence of 
which the accused was cashiered (sentenced never again to 
serve in any military capacity). 108 Likewise, Holt was judge 
advocate of the military commission that tried the eight con-
spirators in the Lincoln Assassination, while helped in that 
task by two assistant judge advocates. 109 
D. Conflicting Contemporary Opinions on the Power of a 
Military Commission to try the Lincoln Assassination 
Conspirators"" 
The military commission's trial of the Lincoln assassina-
tion conspirators began on May 9, 1865, and concluded on 
June 30 of the same year with the announcement of its find-
ings and sentences. 111 On July 5, President Johnson approved 
all of them, directing that the four sentenced to hang -
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Atzerodt, Herold, Payne and Mrs. Surratt- be executed on 
July 7. 112 
Earlier on that last day, there was filed on behalf of Mrs. 
Surratt a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, an application that 
was denied by a judge of the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia because of the President's suspension of the writ. 113 
Accordingly, the executions were duly carried out as or-
dered.114 
On April 3, 1866, the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced the result in Ex parte Milligan, 115 after which, on 
December 14, 1866, both the opinions of the Court and that of 
the four concurring justices were deliveredY6 
After Booth's co-conspirators had been rounded up, At-
torney General James Speed on April 28, 1865, sent this one 
sentence opinion to President Johnson: "I am of opinion that 
the persons charged with the murder of the President of the 
United States can rightfully be tried by a military court."117 
Although containing no reasoningwhatever, and the short-
est formal opinion ever written by any Attorney General, 118 
this sufficed for President Johnson to direct the trial of the 
eight conspirators by military commission. 119 
Of course the jurisdiction of the military commission was 
questioned at the trial, and, needless to state, was sustained 
by that tribunal.!'' Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, 
representing Mrs. Surratt at the trial, made one of the argu-
ments attacking jurisdiction, 121 while Thomas Ewing, Jr., rep-
resenting Dr. Mudd,l22 made another. 123 
Inasmuch as Ewing had, while serving as a brigadier 
general in the Union Army, issued the notorious General 
Orders No. 11, under which some 20,000 refugees were ex-
pelled from four Missouri counties which were said to have 
sustained the notorious Confederate guerrilla band com-
manded by William C. Quantrill,l24 it was indeed an ironic 
touch for him to attack military jurisdiction. This point was 
made to the commission by the special judge advocate, John 
A. Bingham, Esquire, who delivered the closing argument for 
the prosecution.125 
After the four conspirators sentenced to death had been 
hanged on July 7, Attorney General Speed produced a second 
opinion, dated July 1865 (without mention of any particular 
day)Y6 In that essentially ex post facto expression he said: 
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At the time of the assassination the Civil War was 
flagrant, the city of Washington was defended by 
fortifications regularly and constantly manned, the 
principal police of the city was by Federal soldiers, 
public offices and property in the city were all guarded 
by soldiers, and the President's House and person 
were, or should have been, under the guard of soldiers. 
Martial law had been declared in the District of 
Columbia, but the civil courts were open and transacted 
business as in times of peace. 127 
137 
Ben Perley Poore wrote, in the introduction to his own 
edition of the evidence as given at the trial, words that 
reflected the bitter community feelings against the conspira-
tors in language only slightly paraphrasing the Attorney 
General's second opinion: 
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was a military 
crime. While actually in command of the national 
forces, he was killed in a city which was his head-
quarters, strongly fortified and garrisoned, with a 
military governor, and a provost-marshal whose 
patrols were abroad day and night arresting all persons 
found violating the rules and articles of war. Not only 
was the murdered commander-in-chief, to use the 
words of the Constitution, 'in actual service in time of 
war,' but it was a time of 'public danger,' in which the 
assassins were excluded from any right to trial in the 
civil courts. 128 
There was nothing at all imaginary about the city of 
Washington's closeness to the war. Only nine months prior to 
the assassination, in mid-July of 1864, a substantial Confeder-
ate force under Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early had left the 
Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, captured Frederick, Mary-
land, and reached Fort Stevens, near the Soldiers' Horne and 
so far inside the District of Columbia that the Capitol's dome 
was visible. 129 
But Washington in July of 1864 was vastly different from 
the same community in May of 1865. While rebel troops had 
penetrated the defenses of the Union capital the year before, 
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a Union army now occupied Richmond. Lee had surrendered 
at Appomattox, Johnston in North Carolina was about to do 
the same, and the end of the Confederate forces west of the 
Mississippi was simply a matter of mopping up. 
In those changed circumstances the most serious criti-
cisms of Speed's opinions and of the military trial of the 
assassin-conspirators came from Speed's predecessor as At-
torney General of the United States, Edward Bates. Here are 
excerpts from his wartime diary: "[My] successor ... has been 
wheedled out of an opinion to the effect that such a trial [by 
military commission] is lawful. ... [He] must have known 
better. Such a trial is not only unlawful, but it is a great 
blunder ofpolicy."130 And when Mr. Bates saw Speed's July 
1865 opinion, he used five and one half pages of print, dated 
August 21, for a point-by-point rebuttal of what his predeces-
sor had written. 131 
Edward Bates was not alone in entertaining an unfavor-
able view of Speed's legal talents. Mr. Justice Miller of the 
Supreme Court, on the day before the arguments in the 
Milligan case (in which Speed was to participate) had begun, 
wrote in a private letter about Speed: "[T]he session of the 
Court has developed his utter want of ability as a lawyer -
[h]e is certainly one of the feeblest men who has addressed the 
Court this term." 132 
Senator Thomas Ewing, Sr. advised President Johnson to 
the same effect on March 15, 1866: 
It is of the utmost importance that you have a stronger 
man in that place- It is due to yourself and also to the 
Court, for Mr. Speed is not a competent legal adviser 
especially on the present critical condition of affairs-
I know that the Court does not rely on him. 133 
The precise number of trials by military commissions 
during the Civil War remains unclear. Winthrop, whose 
service as a judge advocate commenced on July 28, 1864,'34 
estimated there had been upwards of 2,000 such trials during 
that period; a later author, writing nearly a century after-
wards, fixed the figure at 4,271, more than half of which took 
place in the strife-torn border states of Missouri, Kentucky, 
and Maryland. 135 There the matter must rest for the moment. 
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IV. THE MILLIGAN CASE 
Shortly after the Hunter Commission's trial of the Lincoln 
assassination co-conspirators, the United States Supreme Court 
was presented an opportunity to pass on the legality of 
another well-publicized case in which civilian citizens of a 
free state were convicted and condemned to death by a mili-
tary commission. The Court's stinging rebuke of this use of 
military tribunals, coming so quickly on the heels of the 
Hunter Commission's verdicts, was, then and since, bran-
dished as another sign of the illegality of Dr. Mudd's trial. 
However, a careful look at the Court's opinion in Ex parte 
Milligan 136 shows that its bombast outweighs its persuasion. 
A. Who Were the Copperheads? 
Copperheads were almost exclusively Democrats who 
were willing to let the Confederate States leave the Union and 
hence sought the end of hostilities. "The stealthiest, most 
venomous serpent of the prairies ... lay in hiding, struck 
without warning, and his sting was death. The anti-slavery 
men and other ardent Unionists employed the title of the 
reptile to denounce the enemies they deemed traitors. " 137 But 
the men so designated "regarded themselves as lovers of 
liberty. They were determined to cut the Liberty head out of 
the penny, affix a pin to it, and wear the copper Liberty head 
on lapel or shirt as a badge of true respect for the Constitution 
and the Union." 138 
The military portion of the Copperheads was known as 
the Order of American Knights. Its members wished to form 
a Northwest Confederacy, to ally itself with that of the South. 
They planned to attack all Union installations that held Con-
federate prisoners of war, and collected arms for that pur-
pose. They were particularly strong in the area of the old 
Northwest Territory: Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. But in that 
latter state they encountered Governor Oliver P. Morton, who 
was truly the dictator of Indiana. 139 
The critical year, according to George Fort Milton, was 
1864, and his narrative makes it easy to follow the Northwest 
Conspiracy and the means that the procUnion forces used, 
first to infiltrate the O.A.K. ranks, and then to nullify their 
planned attacks. What Union agents discovered led to the 
Indiana treason trials and, ultimately, to Ex parte Milligan 
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which freed the three conspirators whom the military com-
mission had sentenced to hang. Those three were Lambdin P. 
Milligan, Dr. William A. Bowles, and Stephen Horsey. 
B. Trial of Milligan et a!. by Military Commission 
The full text of their trial by military commission was 
published in 1865 by Benn Pitman,140 the same who later 
reported the trial of the Lincoln Conspirators, and was after-
wards reprinted verbatim in Samuel Klaus' The Milligan Case 
in 1929. 141 As has been seen, Mr. Milton condensed the 
proceedings into narrative form, with considerable emphasis 
on the reactions of the accused when a number of their closest 
associates, who were actually secret Union agents, suddenly 
appeared as vital prosecution witnesses against them. There 
were five charges against Milliganet al.: (1) conspiracy against 
the government of the United States, four specifications; (2) 
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of 
the United States, three specifications; (3) inciting insurrec-
tion, two specifications; ( 4) disloyal practices, five specifica-
tions; and (5) violations of the laws of war, two specifica-
tions.'" 
After examining the testimony, Mr. Klaus concluded that 
"the men were guilty of the charges made there can be little 
room for dispute, nor that there was in fact ground for a civil 
indictment for treason." 143 
True enough, but the fact that Indiana was up to its neck 
in Copperheads meant that, if the accused had been tried in a 
civil court, a single individual on a jury could block convic-
tion. And, if any one troubles to read the 1864 case of Griffin 
v. Wilcox,'" an opinion emanating from Indiana's Supreme 
Court, he will find that Copperhead sentiments were well 
reflected among the members of that state's highest judicial 
tribunal. 
In Indiana, therefore, only a military tribunal, from which 
Copperheads were certain to be excluded, would be able to 
ascertain objectively the guilt or innocence of this collection of 
accused individuals. 
Appeals for clemency were discussed with President Lin-
coln even before any sentences had been adjudged, but after 
his assassination, President Johnson approved the three death 
sentences and ordered them executed on May 11, 1865.145 
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Meanwhile, counsel for Milligan et al. sought a writ of habeas 
corpus from the United States Circuit Court in Indianapolis 
and pressed further appeals for clemency to President Johnson. 
He was persuaded to commute all three sentences to life 
imprisonment.146 
In the circuit court, action on the petitions for the writ 
went forward. After the close of the hearing, Justice Davis and 
District Judge McDonald certified that they differed in opin-
ion, and this under the law then in force automatically brought 
the case to the Supreme Court on writ of error. 147 Here were 
the questions presented: First, on the facts set out, viz., the 
entire record before the military trial, should the writ be 
issued? Second, ought Milligan et a!. be discharged? Third, 
did the military commission have jurisdiction legally to try 
Milligan and his fellows? 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
Here we come to the Supreme Court's ultimate determina-
tion, and we see once again the mischief that can result from 
wholly unnecessary dicta, some of which were still in every 
lawyer's recollection when the Milligan case was filed in the 
Supreme Court on December 27, 1865. 148 
Every lawyer recollected the notorious Dred Scott case/49 
which could have been decided solely on the footing that, 
since Dred Scott as a Negro could not become a citizen, his suit 
was not within the diversity jurisdiction of the circuit court. 
Instead, the Supreme Court undertook in that case to settle the 
slavery question judicially, affirming the liberty of a slave-
owning citizen to bring his slave into any territory of the 
United Statesiso 
The Milligan case, likewise, could also have been disposed 
of without unwarranted excursions into hypothetical areas 
had the Court rested its determination on a statute of which 
all of its members were fully aware, and which clearly pointed 
the way to a result identical with the one actually reached. 
Sections two and three of the Habeas Corpus Act of March 
3, 1863,151 provided in substance that, when a citizen of a state 
where the courts are open is arrested or confined by order of 
the President or of the Secretaries of State or War, those 
officers are directed to furnish the United States courts in such 
states with lists of the persons held as prisoners because ofthe 
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commission of crimes against the United States, and when the 
grand juries in such districts have terminated their sessions 
without finding an indictment, such persons shall within 
twenty days be released from custody upon taking an oath of 
allegiance to the government of the United States, and to 
support the Constitution thereof, and that he or she will not 
hereafter in any way encourage or give aid and comfort to the 
present rebellion or to the supporters thereof. 152 
Accordingly, deference to the Habeas Corpus Act would 
have sufficed to dispose of the cases of Milligan, Bowles, and 
Horsey; all else that was said on both sides of the 5-4 decision 
was dictum elaborated into emotional stump speeches. That 
conclusion is not in any sense a revisionist evaluation formu-
lated a century and a quarter after the event; it represented 
contemporary professional opinion of the most thoughtful 
character. Indeed, that was the view of the new American Law 
Review, edited by John Chipman Gray and John C. Ropes of 
Boston.153 
Where the two Supreme Court opinions in the Milligan 
case differed was on the issue of whether Congress could ever 
authorize trial of crime by military commission. But, as 
Professor Fairman wrote, "[I]t was Executive action against 
which Milligan sought relief: yet the opinion managed to rule 
against Congress in respect of pending matters about which 
Congress felt most concerned and most sensitive,"154 namely 
the need to protect freedmen against homicide or other vio-
lence in the former Confederate state courts and whether the 
only foreseeable remedy for the existing situation would be 
the enactment of legislation to authorize a full-blown Recon-
struction regime. 
Justice Davis had consistently opposed military trial of 
civilians by military tribunals and their military arrest and the 
suppression of newspapers, making those views available to 
President Lincoln. 155 Now, however, he had an unlimited 
audience, and was able to speak from the very highest seat of 
authority: 
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the 
times did not allow that calmness in deliberation and 
discussion so necessary to a correct cone! us ion of a 
purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety 
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were mingled with the exercise of power; such feelings 
and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. 
Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as 
well as all others, can be discussed and decided without 
passion or the admixture of any element not required 
to form a legal judgment. We approach the 
investigation of this case, fully sensible of the 
magnitude of the inquiry and the necessity of full and 
cautious deliberation.156 
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In due course, Justice Davis warmed up to his subject, in 
language that has been regularly repeated ever since: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers 
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers 
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever 
intended by the wit of man than that any of its 
provisions can be suspended during any of the great 
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads 
directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of 
necessity on which it based is false; for the government, 
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to 
it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has 
been happily proved by the result of the great effort to 
throw off its just authority. 157 
Chief Justice Chase for the minority agreed with the re-
sult, but disagreed that Congress lacked power ever to autho-
rize trial by military commission. He said: 
We cannot doubt that, in such a time of public danger, 
Congress had power, under the Constitution, to 
provide for the organization of a military commission, 
and for the trial by that commission of persons engaged 
in this conspiracy. The fact that the Federal courts 
were open was regarded by Congress as a sufficient 
reason for not exercising the power; but that fact could 
not deprive Congress of the right to exercise it. Those 
courts might be open and undisturbed in the execution 
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of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert 
threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate 
prornptihtde and certainty, the guilty conspirators.158 
*** 
We have no apprehension that this power, under our 
American system of government, in which all offiCial 
authority is derived from the people, and exercised 
under direct responsibility to the people, is more likely 
to be abused than the power to regulate commerce, or 
the power to borrow money. And we are unwilling to 
give our assent by silence to expressions of opinion 
which seem to us calculated, though not intended, to 
cripple the constitutional powers of the government, 
and to augment the public dangers in times of invasion 
and rebellion.159 
From 1866 to 1940, military-legal opinion differed sharply 
on which of the two conflicting sets of dicta correctly ex-
pressed the state of the law. Colonel Winthrop was certain 
that the better reason lay with the minority.160 His chief, Judge 
Advocate General G. Norman Lieber (son of the Dr. Francis 
Lieber who framed General Orders No. 100),161 was equally 
positive that only the majority had expressed sound constitu-
tional doctrine.162 Chief Justice Hughes, in the interim be-
tween his two terms of service on the Court, said in 1917, 
"Certainly the test should not be a mere physical one, nor 
should substance be sacrificed to form." 163 And back in 1940, 
the present author published a work that, it is believed , 
correctly set out the state of the law at that time.164 
Seventy years ago, Charles Warren, an earlier historian of 
the Supreme Court, called Davis' words an "immortal opin-
ion," "one of the bulwarks of American history," and " the 
palladium of the rights of the individual."165 
Fairman himself calls Davis' s tatement" as fine a sentence 
as can be found anywhere in the United States Reports ."166 
D. Milligan Does Not Accurately Portray Today's Law 
Unhappily Justice Davis' emotional stem-winder about 
the Constitution being always the same in war and peace is 
demonstrably not the law in the 1990s- nor has it been for 
more than three-quarters of a century. It seems appropriate to 
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append a list. 
1. In the fall of 1916, Congress hastily passed a railroad 
eight-hour work law to avert a nationwide railroad strike. 
This was at a time when trucks and planes were not yet 
available to transport people or products. The Court sus-
tained the act as being within the congressional power to 
regulate commerce in Wilson v. New. 167 What is notable about 
the decision is that the dissenters quoted David Davis' 
dithyramb about the irrelevance of emergencies. 
2. The year 1934 brought up the Minnesota mortgage 
moratorium law in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisde/1.168 
That legislation was upheld five to four, on the footing that, 
"while emergency does not create power, emergency may 
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. "169 The minor-
ity of four who believed that Minnesota lacked the power to 
relieve mortgagors quoted the immortal passage from Justice 
Davis' Milligan opinion- immortal but quite unavailing. 
Indeed, once wartime cases are examined, some from the 
First World War but most of them from the Second, it will be 
found that much is authorized in time of war that is wholly 
impermissible in time of peace, notably in the area of eco-
nomic regulation. 
Here are a baker's dozen of cases that wholly contradict 
"as fine a sentence that can be found anywhere in the United 
States Reports." 170 
(a) Rent and price control. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 
(1921); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 
U.S. 503 (1944); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 
(1948). 
(b) Renegotiation of contracts. Lichter v. United States, 334 
u.s. 742 (1948). 
(c) Wartime prohibition. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries 
& Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919); Ruppertv. Caffey, 251 U.S. 
264 (1920). 
(d) Seizure of enemy property. Miller v. United States, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); 
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); Silesian 
American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947). 
(e) Suppression of houses of ill-fame within the States. 
McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (although this 
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would impinge on what would otherwise be exclusively the 
subject of state police power. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 
138 (1909)). 
Mention has already been made of the German saboteurs' 
case, Ex parte Quirin, decided in 1942.'71 There, it should be 
noted, what they did was not in violation of any United States 
statute for which they could have been indicted by a federal 
grand jury. In Quirin, the Supreme Court held Milligan 
"inapplicable to the case presented by the present record," 
and specifically overruled a passage therein that it deemed 
too exuberant. 172 
All ofthe foregoing decisions antedate Mr. King's biogra-
phy of Justice Davis, which was published in 1960, and which 
actually cites Ex parte Quirin. 173 
Instead, Mr. King continues his erroneous hagiography of 
Ex parte Milligan: 
In subsequent wars, the administration has again and 
again urged the Supreme Court to repudiate the 
Milligan case, but it still stands in all the grandeur of its 
original utterance. 174 
*** 
Davis' great contribution to constitutional law was the 
Milligan decision that ended military trials of civilians 
in theN orth. He maneuvered to get the case before the 
Supreme Court and then delivered the opinion that 
forever put an end to such trials. 'The Constitution of 
the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally 
in war and in peace.' Those nineteen words and the 
eternal place in history of the friend he made President 
must remain the Judge's monument. 175 
At this point it should also be noted that even Chief Justice 
Chase's minority opinion now requires amendment. 176 He 
recited three recognized heads of military jurisdiction: 
(a) Military law, the code governing the armed forces 
(e.g., Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1 (1957); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Solorio v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987)). 
(b) Military government, where the military occupant in 
time of war supersedes the local government (e.g., United 
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States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 (1819), through a host of decisions 
arising out of the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish Wars, down to 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), involving occupied 
Germany after World War II). 
(c) Martial law (or, more accurately, martial rule), involv-
ing the temporary suspension of civil rule by military author-
ity when required by necessity (e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)). 
Now there must be added a fourth head of military juris-
diction- the international law of war -long recognized, but 
never considered by American civil courts until during and 
after World War Two (e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); 
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Homma v. Patterson, 327 
U.S. 759 (1946); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). 
Contemporaneously, however, Lambdin P. Milligan did 
recover when he sued for damages the officer who had ap-
pointed the military commission that tried him and sentenced 
him to be hanged. He was ultimately successful, but hardly 
satisfied: the jury only awarded him five dollars. 177 
Perhaps a note should be included here, simply for the 
sake of completeness, about the post-Milligan trials by mili-
tary commission under the Reconstruction Acts. It is esti-
mated that, from the end of April 1866 to January 1, 1869, 
another 1,435 trials by military commission took place, taper-
ing off as time passed; in 1869 and 1870, they occurred only in 
Texas and Mississippi. 178 
When the legality of such military trials under the Recon-
struction Acts179 might have come again before the Supreme 
Court for decision/80 adjudication was forestalled, in one 
instance by a legislative withdrawal of appellate jurisdic-
tion, lB1 in the other by a release of the petitioner from the 
challenged custody. In effect, the second case was settled after 
the readmission of Mississippi to representation in Congress. 182 
E. Deciding Wartime Cases After Cessation of Hostilities 
By 1866, when Ex parte Milligan reached the Supreme 
Court, the Civil War was over. At least some of the bitterness 
associated with four years of all-out war had diminished, and 
the way seemed clear for the highest court in the land to 
determine once and for all the powers of military tribunals to 
try and to punish persons who were not members of the 
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armed forces or individuals accused of spying. 
As we have seen, much that was said in both Milligan 
opinions has not withstood the test of time. But in Milligan the 
government had no choice but to defend what had been done. 
It was otherwise in Duncan v. Kahanamoku and its companion 
case, White v. Steer, argued on Pearl Harbor Day in 1945, and 
decided on February 25, 1946.183 Both cases involved trials of 
civilians by military courts in the territory of Hawaii, which 
was under martial law pursuant to the Hawaiian Organic Act 
of 1900."4 
White was a civilian stockbroker found guilty of that 
occupational disease, embezzling a client's funds. He was 
tried and convicted by a military provost court on August 25, 
1942, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Duncan was 
a civilian ship-fitter who quarreled with two armed marine 
sentries at the gate of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. On March 
3, 1944, he was brought before a provost court and sentenced 
to six months' confinement in the Honolulu County jail for the 
offense of assault and battery against military personnel. 
The writ of habeas corpus had been suspended on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, by the Territorial governor acting with authority 
delegated by Congress in the Organic Act. 185 Believing the 
suspension to have been lifted by the governor on February 8, 
1943, the district court entertained petitions for the Great Writ 
filed on behalfofboth White and Duncan. The court went on 
to order both released on the ground that military jurisdiction 
over civilians was no longer warranted by the provost court 
by the time of their trials.186 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, en banc,187 assuming without decid-
ing that the writ suspension had been lifted, but disagreeing 
with the court below over the propriety of military jurisdic-
tion over civilians at the time White and Duncan were brought 
to trial. 
Before V-J Day could come, marking the end of hostilities, 
the Supreme Court granted both White's and Duncan's peti-
tions for writ of certiorari. At this point, the government had 
a five judge Ninth Circuit decision in its favor. Had it then 
remitted the remaining sentences of the two petitioners, their 
contentions would have been moot, as had been Yerger's 
contention in 1870.188 Unhappily, however, the Government's 
position was, "We've gotto back up the theater commander."189 
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Result? They backed him right into the rapidly revolving 
buzz-saw of a stunning reversal, written by Justice Black for 
the Court. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result, being 
of the opinion that, on the facts presented, there was no 
adequate showing of necessity to support a military trial. 
Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented190 Their reasons 
were thatthe result would have been wholly differentif on the 
days that the two petitioners had been tried, in 1942 and 1944, 
the Supreme Court had been asked on proper pleadings to 
oust the two military courts of their claimed jurisdiction.191 
V. EFFORTS AFTER 1865 TO SET ASIDE MUDD'S 
CONVICTION 
A. Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
Four of the Lincoln assassination conspirators - Mrs. 
Surratt, Atzerodt, Herold, and Payne -were hanged. The 
other four - Mudd, O'Laughlin, Spangler and Arnold -
were sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor: Arnold for six 
years, the other three for life, ultimately in the military prison 
at Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, Florida.~'' Those four 
were advised of their destination on July 22, 1865.193 
A few days before December 19,1866, after the announce-
ment of the Milligan decision, but before the opinions had 
been made public, Mudd, represented by Reverdy Johnson 
and the latter's son-in-law, made application for a writ of 
habeas corpus to Mr. Justice Wayne, whose circuit included 
Florida, the place of confinement. Failing there/" counsel 
turned to Chief Justice Chase, whose circuit did not cover that 
state. Argument was heard, whereupon the Chief Justice 
denied the application, on the view that "he had no power 
himself to issue such a writ to be executed outside his own 
circuit. "195 
Dr. Mudd accordingly stayed at Fort Jefferson, where 
presently he rendered heroic service during an epidemic of 
yellow fever that carried off many soldiers and also 
O'Laughlin, a co-conspirator, who died on September 23, 
1867.196 
On July 4, 1868, President Johnson extended amnesty to all 
those who had participated in the late rebellion, whereupon 
Mudd applied to District Judge Thomas J. Boynton of the 
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Southern District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. So did 
his remaining co-conspirators, Arnold and Spangler.197 
Judge Boynton's opinion, dated September 1868, makes 
three substantive points. First, he held Mudd's offense to be 
a military one for these reasons: 
I do not think that Ex parte Milligan is a case in point 
here. There is nothing in the opinion of the Court in 
that case, nor in the third article of the Constitution, 
nor in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, to lead to the 
conclusion that if an army had been encamped in the 
State of Indiana, (whether in the immediate presence 
of the enemy or not), and any person, a resident of 
Indiana or any other state (enlisted Soldier or not) had, 
not from any private animosity, but from public 
reasons, made his way within the Army lines and 
assassinated the Commanding General, such a person 
could not have been legally tried for his military offense 
by a military tribunal and legally convicted and 
sentenced. 
*** 
The President was assassinated not from private 
animosity nor any other reason than a desire to impair 
the effectiveness of military operations and enable the 
rebellion to establish itself into a Government; the act 
was committed in a fortified city, which had been 
invaded during the war, and to the northward as well 
as the southward of which battles had many times 
been fought, which was the headquarters of all the 
armies of the United States, from which daily and 
hourly went military orders. The President is the 
Commander in Chief of the Army, and the President 
who was killed had many times made distinct military 
orders under his own hand, without the formality of 
employing the Secretary of War or Commanding 
General. It was not Mr. Lincoln who was assassinated 
but the Commander in Chief of the Army, for military 
reasons. I find no difficulty, therefore, in classing the 
offense as a military one and with this opinion arrive 
at the necessary conclusion that the proper tribunal for 
the trial of those engaged in it was a military one. 198 
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Actually, the foregoing rationale is far more convincing 
than anything ever written by Attorney General Speed.199 
Secondly, Judge Boynton held that the three petitioners 
were not comprehended within the President's amnesty and 
pardon of July 4, 1868: 
[T]hat proclamation plainly excludes all persons 
standing in the position of these petitioners, whether 
they have been convicted or not. It pardons the crime 
of treason; that is, it pardons persons who have levied 
war against the United States, or given aid and comfort 
to their enemies, within the laws and usages of war; 
but it pardons no person who has transgressed the 
laws of war, no spy, no assassin, no person who has 
been guilty of barbarous treatment of prisoners. Let us 
bring out the point by a supposed case. Two soldiers 
or officers fight side by side in the same battle; their 
forces remain masters of the field. After the battle, one 
conducts himself in an unimportant manner, and the 
other sabres the wounded or prisoners. They are both 
guilty of treason, but one is guilty of treason with an 
important plus-sign added. It is the opinion of the 
Court that the proclamation of the President reaches 
one of these cases and not the other. 
*** 
I think it is clear that the President, wishing no longer 
to make other than necessary exceptions, and to pardon 
all who were only guilty of participating in the 
rebellion, purposely chose this language to effect his 
purpose, and no other one. I do not see that under it a 
person who transgressed the laws of war, who was 
guilty not only of treason but of additional military 
crimes, may not still be tried for additional crimes 200 
And, finally, Judge Boynton found that the petitioners' 
contentions based on insufficiency of evidence were beyond 
the scope of any relief available in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. 2m 
Later, on February 9 and 12, 1869, counsel for the three 
unsuccessful petitioners before Judge Boynton sought and 
obtained leave to file petitions for habeas corpus on the Su-
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preme Court. The Court's order invited argument on the 
question whether its jurisdiction in respect of the writ of 
habeas corpus was original or appellate. 202 
We may pass by both the latter procedural questions fairly 
presented when the cases were argued on February 26, 1869, 
as well as the substantive question of the military commission's 
jurisdiction in the trial of the assassination conspirators, be-
cause, in actuality, no decision was ever reached. On March 
1, 1869, just before leaving office, President Johnson par-
doned all of the petitioners then before the Court. When their 
counsel brought this fact to the Court's attention, their peti-
tions were dismissed, as none of them still remained in cus-
tody.zo3 
B. Application to the Army Board for the Correction of 
Military Records 
After the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the 
Army's General Counsel had both ruled that the Army Board 
for Correction of Military Records could entertain an applica-
tion to correct Dr. Mudd's record by setting aside his convic-
tion, such an application (No. AC91-05511), asking that Dr. 
Mudd be declared innocent, was filed in 1991 by a grandson, 
Dr. Richard Dyer Mudd, himself a nonagenarian.204 
A hearing before the Board was held on January 22, 
1992.205 In the course of that hearing, the applicant said: 
I always think that Dr. Mudd had three strikes against 
him, and I might have to be really excused for saying 
this. He was first a slave owner. Secondly he was a 
Catholic at a time when the Pope was accused of 
causing the Lincoln assassination, and three of the 
conspirators had attended Georgetown University, a 
Catholic school including my grandfather; and of 
course, Mrs. Surratt was a Catholic .. And the third 
thing is, his name was Mudd. That was the worst. 206 
Six months after the conclusion of the hearing, the board 
held that, while it was not authorized to consider the guilt or 
innocence of Dr. Mudd, it could, looking to Ex parte Milligan, 
determine whether the military commission that tried Dr. 
Mudd had jurisdiction to do so. 
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Nothing in the Board's conclusions indicated the slightest 
awareness on its part that the actual Milligan opinion rested 
on sections 2 and 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 
1863;207 or that what was said about the jurisdiction vel non of 
the tribunal was purest dictum;208 or that what the Court's 
opinion had announced in its flowing language was no longer 
law in 1992.209 
Again, there is nothing in what counsel told the Board or 
in anything that the Board wrote to reflect the slightest famil-
iarity with Judge Boynton's opinion in Ex parte Mudd, the only 
judicial opinion directly on point. 210 Nonetheless, the Board 
concluded that Dr. Mudd's trial by military commission" con-
stituted such a gross infringement of his constitutionally 
protected rights that his conviction should be set aside" -
and that was its recommendation.211 
Six months later, on July 22, 1992, the Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Army rejected that recommendation, and 
denied the application for relief. Said the Secretary: 
I note at the outset that the ABCMR did not consider the 
guilt or innocence of Dr. Mudd, and that its 
recommendation does not speak to the question of his 
guilt or innocence. 
The ABCMR concluded that the military commission 
which tried Dr. Mudd did not have jurisdiction over 
civilians and recommended that Dr. Mudd's conviction 
be set aside on that basis. 
Accordingly, my denial of that recommendation should 
not be taken as a determination of either the guilt or the 
innocence of Dr. Mudd. It is not the role of ABCMR to 
attempt to settle historical disputes. Neither is the 
ABCMR an appellate court. The precise issue which 
the ABCMR proposes to decide, the jurisdiction of the 
military commission over Dr. Mudd, was specifically 
addressed at the time in two separate habeas corpus 
proceedings, one before the Chief Justice of the United 
States, the other before a U.S. District Court.212 There 
also was an opinion by the Attorney General of the 
United States. 
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The effect of the action recommended by the ABCMR 
would be to overrule all those determinations. Even if 
the issue might be decided differently today, it is inap-
propriate for a nonjudicial body, such as the ABCMR, 
to declare that the law 127 years ago was contrary to 
what was determined contemporaneously by 
prominent legal authorities. 213 
It should be remembered that, on March 1, 1869, Dr. Mudd 
received a full and unconditional presidential pardon.214 Does 
not that act adequately set aside Dr. Mudd's conviction?215 
Or, to ask the same question in somewhat altered phraseol-
ogy, if an individual has been pardoned during his lifetime, is 
he also further entitled as a matter of right to a second, 
posthumous pardon more than a century after his death? 216 
It was not unti11938 that Congress granted any remedy to 
persons erroneously convicted in courts of the United States, 
and that enactment provided that a subsequent pardon was 
proof of innocence only if the stated ground for the pardon 
was innocence and unjust conviction, and even then recovery 
was limited to $5,000. Obviously Mudd's pardon did not 
meet the statutory condition, and, equally obvious, the 1938 
statute cannot be deemed retroactive so as to reach a convic-
tion that took place in 1865.217 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Preservation of the Union 
The struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
that marked the debates from 1787 to 1789 over the ratification 
of the Constitution did not end on April 30, 1789, when 
Washington was inaugurated as our first President; indeed, 
those differences led to the Civil War and did not wholly 
terminate with Appomattox. 
And, although it is surely heresy even to think as much in 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, it is a fact that Thomas 
Jefferson, a much revered son of the Commonwealth, has 
never been a truly qualified guide to the meaning of the 
document composed at Independence Hall in Philadelphia 
during the summer of 1787. 
To begin, he was not there; he was in Paris, serving as 
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American Minister to France. 218 And within the first decade of 
the new nation's existence under its Constitution, he authored 
and/ or influenced the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
that supported the power of individual states to override 
measures of the general government.219 Soon afterwards, 
elected President himself, Thomas Jefferson declared the fol-
lowing in his first Inaugural on March 4, 1801: 
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve 
the Union or to change its republican form, let them 
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with 
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason 
is left free to combat it. 220 
It is therefore completely accurate to conclude that the 
spiritual godfather of both nullification and secession was the 
presently greatly revered Thomas Jefferson. 
Indeed, it was not in the South that the first serious 
advocacy of secession appeared. That was a consequence of 
Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase, a step that led extremist Fed-
eralists to propose the secession oft he northeastern portion of 
the nation, because the acquisition of that vast tract of trans-
Mississippi territory was certain to diminish the national 
influence that New England wielded prior to 1803- and also 
because the War of 1812 was violently unpopular there. The 
high-water mark of this New England secessionist surge was 
the infamous Hartford Convention; that sentiment died sud-
denly, however, when Andrew Jackson overwhelmingly de-
feated the British at New Orleans on January 8, 1815, and 
when, simultaneously, news of the December 24, 1814 Peace 
of Ghent reached the United States.221 At that point there also 
died the Federalist Party. 
There was relative quiet thereafter until, in the 1830s, 
South Carolina undertook to nullify federal revenue legisla-
tion. Then the moving spirit was John C. Calhoun. But when 
this happened, Andrew Jackson was President. The victor of 
New Orleans thundered forth, "The Federal Union shall and 
will be preserved," took appropriate steps to that end, and the 
result was that South Carolina, Jackson's state of birth, backed 
down as best it could. 222 
A generation or so later, in 1860, the new Republican Party 
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had become home to New England's abolitionists, and the 
Democratic Party, supporting slavery, was split only over the 
degree of its support of the "peculiar institution." Stephen A. 
Douglas led the moderates; Jefferson Davis insisted on the 
more extreme view. A third group- the National Constitu-
tional Union- sought a compromise that got nowhere, and 
in the end Abraham Lincoln led the Republicans to both 
popular and electoral victory 223 
South Carolina reacted by formally seceding from the 
Union on December 20, 1860, and six other states followed 
before March 4, 1861.224 
President James Buchanan, whosetimiditywasaccurately 
reflected on his countenance, inquired whether he could 
legally use force to return the seceded states to the Union. A 
technically competent but equally irresolute Attorney Gen-
eral, Jeremiah S. Black, advised in the negative. 225 Matters 
rocked along for six weeks without much except discussion 
until April15, 1861, when South Carolina opened fire on Fort 
Sumter, forcing the fairly prompt surrender of that unre-
lieved and unsupplied Union post. When President Lincoln 
then called for troops to oppose the rebellion, four more states 
seceded, and the Civil War, or the War of the Rebellion, or the 
War Between the States, was on. 226 
For Lincoln, the sole object of the conflict at its outset was 
the restoration of the Union, regardless of what happened to 
slavery. It was only later that emancipation became an addi-
tional and equally vital objective227 
Nothing whatsoever was permitted to stand in the way of 
the primary objective. Arbitrary arrests became common-
place early in the war; anti-administration newspapers were 
suppressed and their editors were imprisoned; thousands of 
offenders were tried by military commissions; and the Bill of 
Rights was jettisoned. Opposition was minimal, as the bulk of 
those dissatisfied with these measures were opposed to con-
tinuation of the war and perfectly satisfied to let the seceding 
States depart in peace. 
Lincoln deeply regretted the hardships that such a pro-
gram necessarily imposed, and he ameliorated them to the 
greatest extent possible consistent with his primary objective. 
Accordingly, in mid-February 1862, he issued Executive Or-
der No. 1, which declared a general amnesty for political 
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prisoners and brought the deliberate policy of repression to a 
halt. 228 Thus, as a careful historian has noted, "the North was 
spared the omnipresent shadow of Fort Lafayette,"229 that 
formidable structure on Governor's Island in New York Har-
bor, which had housed so many of the disloyal. 
Once the war was over, the struggle turned to the need for 
a Fourteenth Amendment to effectuate the Thirteenth, and to 
the regime of Reconstruction where the opposing viewpoints 
were fought out. But secession was dead. 230 
Today we are still struggling with the problem of where to 
draw the line between violence on the one hand and free 
speech on the other, the identical problem with which Abraham 
Lincoln had to deal throughout the Civil War. Zeroing in on 
that precise issue, we find, just forty-five years back, this 
expression in the United States Reports. Unhappily, that 
quotation comes from a dissent in a five-to-four case: 
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine 
that civil liberty means the removal of all restraints 
from these crowds and that all local attempts to 
maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the 
citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It 
is between liberty with order and anarchy without 
either. There is danger that, if the Court does not 
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical 
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights 
into a suicide pact. 231 
B. Was the Tribunal that Tried the Assassin Conspirators 
Lawfully Constituted? 
Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder,'32 whom Jus-
tice Frankfurter deemed "one of the best professional brains 
I've encountered in life,"233 characterized Colonel William 
Winthrop as "the Blackstone of military law."234 
Colonel Winthrop quite properly deserves such an honor-
ific, and his views on the legality of trying the Lincoln assas-
sination conspirators ought to be considered with a deference 
withheld from less luminous commentators. The virtue of 
applying Winthrop's views on the constitutionality of mili-
tary trial of civilians in this case is best demonstrated by 
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recounting the history of two closely related jurisdictional 
issues: military trial of civilians for crimes committed in 
previous military service and military trial of civilians accom-
panying the army abroad in peacetime. In both instances, 
Winthrop's position that such jurisdiction was unconstitu-
tional was repeatedly rejected. But, while the Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States said in April 1956 that "the world 
about which Colonel Winthrop wrote no longer exists,"235 the 
nation would ultimately learn, within a short few years, that 
the Blackstone of military law had correctly discerned the 
limits that the Constitution of the United States laid down 
respecting military jurisdiction. 
If Winthrop was right about military jurisdiction over 
former service members and civilians with the army overseas, 
then he was very likely right about jurisdiction over civilian 
fifth columnists in wartime. Having argued against the tide 
of popular and legal opinion that jurisdiction could not attach 
to the first two classes, no matter what Congress legislated at 
the Army's behest, he nevertheless declined, when presented 
the opportunity, to fault the assertion of military jurisdiction 
by the Hunter Commission. 
When Winthrop in 1895 published both volumes of the 
second edition of his ultimately classic Military Law and Prece-
dents, he did not believe that any general revision of the 
Articles of War, then in force as R.S. § 1342, was either 
necessary or desirable. But he did recommend that the last 
clause of the Sixtieth Article, making officers and soldiers 
amenable to military trial after they had become civilians, 
should be deleted. 236 
Trials of former military personnel were supported as 
constitutional, however, by Professor Edmund M. Morgan, 237 
later draftsman of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; by 
Colonel L.K. Underhill of the U.S. Army;238 and, following the 
reasoning of his erstwhile teacher and of his subsequent 
military superior, by the present author239 - this on the view 
that the "cases arising in the land and naval forces" clause of 
the Fifth Amendment authorized military jurisdiction over all 
such cases regardless of the accused's personal status. 
The Articles for the Government of the Navy included no 
such continuing jurisdiction clause, with the result that in the 
case of a U.S. Naval prisoner of war who had been convicted 
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of mistreating fellow prisoners during a previous enlistment, 
the Supreme Court held that he could not be tried by court-
martial after re-enlisting: an honorable discharge terminated 
all criminal liability for anything done in the prior enlist-
ment.z4o 
In order to plug this loophole, Congress provided in 
Article 3(a) of the new Uniform Code of Military Justice that, 
subject to the applicable statute of limitations, 
[A]ny person charged with having committed, while 
in a status in which he was subject to this Code, 
punishable by confinement of five years or more, and 
for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the 
United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the 
District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from 
amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the 
termination of said status.241 
This new provision would soon be tested in Toth v. 
Quarles. 242 Toth, an airman, received an honorable discharge 
after service in Korea. Afterward, evidence came to light that 
he had participated in the premeditated murder of a Korean 
civilian, a murder for which both of his accomplices had 
already been tried and punished.243 The first question in 
Toth's case was whether he could be returned to Korea for 
trial by a U.S military court. 
Undoubtedly, Toth's case was one "arising in the land and 
naval forces" within the exception written into the Fifth 
Amendment. But it was Winthrop's view that this "Amend-
ment, in the particular indicated, is rather a declaratory recog-
nition and sanction of an existing military jurisdiction rather 
than an original proposition initiating such a jurisdiction."244 
(After all, the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to limit the 
powers of the newly created general government, not to 
enhance them.) Accordingly, Winthrop deemed such a recap-
ture clause "necessarily ... unconstitutional."245 
The Supreme Court disagreed with Professor Morgan and 
agreed with Colonel Winthrop, holding that Article3(a) of the 
Uniform Code was indeed unconstitutional.246 
At this point it is necessary to backtrack and to re-examine 
the 1919 controversy over the Army's court-martial system, 
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which unfortunately degenerated into an ugly personal dis-
pute between former Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, 
Acting Judge Advocate General during most of World War I 
and that officer's sponsor and benefactor, Major General 
Crowder, who as Provost Marshal General operated the draft, 
and whose characterization of Colonel Winthrop has already 
been quoted.247 Full details appear in a 1,400-page booklet, 
about a third of it in fine print, which the present author has 
read in full on four separate occasions. 248 As a matter of 
contemporary psychiatry, former General Ansell's conduct 
can be expertly diagnosed as an adjustment disorder; in 
Victorian terms of disesteemed behavior, as unforgivable 
disloyalty. 249 
The issue significant here is that, throughout the World 
War I court-martial dispute, Professor Morgan was fully on 
General Ansell's side, and, with the tenacity of a mountaineer 
feudist who has outlived all of his earlier opponents, adhered 
for thirty years more to the views he had then formulated. 250 
Accordingly, Professor Morgan agreed with General 
Ansell's statement that "Colonel Winthrop was first a mili-
tary man, and he accepted easily and advocated the view that 
courts-martial are not courts, but are simply the right hand of 
the military commander,"251 a view fully concurred in by 
Professor Morgan252 Yet Morgan, following Ansell, entirely 
overlooked Winthrop's insistence, just seven pages further 
along in his treatise, that a court-martial was indeed "a court 
of law and justice."253 In this unjustifiable omission, Morgan 
was simply repeating Ansell's earlier inaccuracy.'" Still be-
lieving that the constitutional basis for military jurisdiction 
lay in the "cases arising in the land and navalforces" clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, Professor Morgan carried into the 
Uniform Code in Articles 2 (11) and 2 (12) the provision in the 
Second Article ofthe 1916, 1920, and 1948 Articles of War that 
granted military jurisdiction over all persons serving with, 
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the 
United States. 
It was Colonel Winthrop's view that "a statute cannot be 
framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to 
military jurisdiction in time of peace."255 
Who was correct, Professor Morgan or Colonel Winthrop? 
The bitterly fought issue was before the Supreme Court in six 
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cases over a period extending from February 17, 1956, when 
the first case was filed/56 to January 18, 1960, when the last 
four cases were decided.257 
At first that tribunal sustained the right of the armed 
forces to try by court-martial an Air Force sergeant's wife who 
had accompanied her husband to an airbase in England (Reid 
v. Covert)'" and an Army colonel's wife staying with her 
husband in Japan (Kinsella v. Krueger). 259 But, on rehearing 
both appeals, the Court diametrically altered its holdings; on 
further reflection, it held that there could be no military 
jurisdiction in time of peace over military dependent wives 
charged with capital offenses and ordered its earlier opinions, 
rendered just 364 days earlier, "withdrawn."260 According to 
the Court, such jurisdiction could be sustained only in time of 
war, as provided in Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code.261 
Two and a half years later, these new restrictions were 
widened. Military jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace 
was denied in the case of a dependent wife charged with a 
non-capital offense/62 over a civilian employee of the Army 
charged with a capital offense, 263 and over civilian employees 
of the armed forces charged with non-capital crimes.264 
Accordingly, in both areas of military jurisdiction- ex-
servicemen and accompanying dependents or employees-
the crowning paradox was that, whereas Professor 
Morgan had mordantly decried Colonel Winthrop's 
concept of a court-martial as intolerable, an author 
whom he had earlier denigrated as 'first a military 
man,' in the end it was that career officer's perception 
of the Constitution's limitations on military power 
that ultimately prevailed over the rejection of those 
limitations by the lifetime professor of law. 265 
The world about which Colonel Winthrop had written, far 
from being moribund, was authoritatively shown to be lead-
ing a very healthy and active existence. 
We now turn, in the light of the foregoing modern deci-
sions, to our ultimate legal question: Was the tribunal that 
tried Mudd et al. legally constituted? 
At this point we can, for two reasons, overlook the infirmi-
ties of Ex parte Milligan,'66 first because Winthrop disagreed 
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with the dicta in the majority opinion, deeming the views of 
the dissenters more sound;267 and, second, because Judge 
Boynton of the Southern District of Florida, whose opinion 
denied Dr. Mudd a writ of habeas corpus, distinguished Milligan 
on the ground that Mudd's crime was indeed a war offense. 268 
Richmond, the Confederacy's capital, had fallen on April 
3, 1865, and Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on April 9. 
President Lincoln was shot on April14 and died the next day. 
It was only after this that Johnston offered his surrender to 
Sherman on April18, but that offer lay unaccepted until April 
26, because the assassination had so greatly curdled Northern 
sensibilities. All other Confederate forces laid down their 
arms by May 26. And it was not until May 29 that President 
Johnson's proclamation of amnesty officially ended the Civil 
War.269 
Thus Lincoln's assassination took place more than a full 
month before all the shooting stopped. True, no one can be 
tried by a military tribunal for spying once a war has ended, 270 
but those charged with other war crimes are still subject to 
both trial and punishment once hostilities cease and before 
peace is formally declared. That proposition is demonstrated 
by the trial of Captain Henry Wirz, commandant of the infa-
mous Andersonville prison where so many Union prisoners 
of war died of mistreatment and neglect, 271 and by post-World 
War II war criminal trials held at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
How then does Winthrop treat what in his treatise he 
designates as "the Assassination Conspirators Trial?" He 
mentions it on seven occasions to illustrate procedural de-
tails. 272 But nowhere in all1,596 pages of the second and last 
edition of his Military Law and Precedents does Winthrop say a 
single word about the legality of that proceeding; on that 
central issue the silence of the Blackstone of military law is 
positively deafening. The only inference possible is that 
Colonel Winthrop, like all contemporary military lawyers a 
century later, deemed utterly illegal the trial of the Assassina-
tion Conspirators by military commission. 273 
What then did Winthrop think of Judge Boynton's deci-
sion? We know that, on occasion, he cited unreported deci-
sions in his treatise.274 But it can easily be established that 
Winthrop never saw what Judge Boynton had written in the 
only judicial opinion considering (and upholding) the juris-
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diction of the tribunal that had tried Mudd and the others. 
We know that the Winthrop treatise does not cite Ex parte 
Mudd; it is not in his table of cases and trials. We also know 
that the reference to Mudd's case in the Federal Cases states, 
"Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible." Finally, we 
know that one copy of that opinion was printed in a Washing-
ton daily newspaper, and that another can be seen in a Library 
of Congress scrapbook. 275 
Broadening our search, we find in 1895 four significant 
dates, three of them dealing directly with Winthrop. On 
January 3, he was promoted to Colonel and Assistant Judge 
Advocate General.276 On August 3, he was retired for age by 
operation of law.277 And, on November 1, he signed the 
Preface to the second edition of his treatise. 278 Finally, during 
the same year, without the exact date anywhere shown, there 
was published Volume 17 of the Federal Cases series, at page 
954 of which there appears the reference to Ex parte Mudd, Fed. 
Case No. 9899. 
On the basis of using and relying on Winthrop's Military 
Law and Precedents for almost 50 years, often on a daily basis, 
the present author firmly believes that, even if the Assistant 
Judge Advocate General of the Army had ever seen the 
Boynton opinion- which, it clearly appears, he never in fact 
did - it would not have changed his views. He did so 
inferentially, no doubt because he did not wish to declare 
publicly his disagreement with his erstwhile chief, General 
Holt. But his silence on the merits of the trial make it crystal 
clear that, in his opinion, the military trial of the assassination 
conspirators was a precedent that should never be followed. 
This necessarily leads to the conclusion that what the 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army ultimately deter-
mined in 1992, namely, that the legality of the trial was, by 
those in authority in the late 1860s, regarded differently than 
it would be regarded in the 1990s, more than a century and a 
quarter later. Or, otherwise stated, the aim of Dr. Mudd's 
descendants before the Army Board for the Correction of 
Records was not only a request to set aside a conviction for 
which their ancestor had already been pardoned, but also one 
to rewrite history. Therefore the Army Secretariat correctly 
disposed of Dr. Mudd's case. 
We are however left with the inquiry whether, in the light 
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of all the facts and circumstances, Samuel A. Mudd, M.D. was 
done an injustice. 
Bear in mind that Mudd lied about his not recognizing 
Booth throughout his being questioned on that point, and that 
he was afraid to tell of [Booth's] having been at his house on 
the 15th of April, "fearing that his own and the lives of his 
family would be endangered thereby."'" 
Thus, Mudd was not innocent; he knew that Booth was a 
fugitive from justice who had shot the President- why else 
the fear for his and his family's lives? - and yet he aided 
Booth in several non-medical ways, and took significant steps 
to facilitate Booth's escape. Mudd was, at the very least, an 
accessory after the fact, conduct for which his actual confine-
ment for somewhat less than four years was surely not exces-
sive punishment. 
The Secretary of the Army was in consequence fully cor-
rect, 127 years afterward in 1992, in refusing to alter, and thus 
refusing to falsify, the record of Dr. Mudd's conviction for 
substantially assisting the murderer of Abraham Lincoln to 
elude capture, even if only for an additional eleven days. 
Intensive study of the record of trial and of every relevant 
background factor inevitably lead to this clear conclusion: Dr. 
Samuel A. Mudd was, beyond any reasonable doubt, guilty of 
the charge against him, and suffered no injustice whatever in 
the ultimately attenuated sentence that he so deservedly 
served. 
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1 Samuel A. Mudd, M.D., ABCMR Docket No. AC91-0511 (Jan. 22, 1992) 
[hereinafter cited simply as ABCMR]. See Appendix B infra pp. 259-71. 
1 See Appendix C infra pp. 273~ 75. Here are the basic sources relied upon 
in what fo11ows. First, there is Benn Pitman's The Assassination of President 
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The Curious Case 
of Dr. Mudd 
Forest J. Bowman* 
It was about 4:00 on the morning of April 15, 1865, when 
John Wilkes Booth and David E. Herold turned their horses 
onto the narrow, rutted lane which led to the home of Dr. 
Samuel A. Mudd, a quarter of a mile off the main road to 
Bryantown, in southern Maryland's Charles County. After a 
few minutes the riders could make out the doctor's plain, two-
story clapboard house silhouetted against the sky at the top of 
a long rise. They stopped at the edge of the lawn and Herold, 
who had ridden ahead of Booth, dismounted and pounded on 
the door while Booth sat hunched on his horse, the very image 
of misery and discomfort. 
The doctor and his wife were asleep in a back room on the 
first floor of the house and they were startled by the heavy 
pounding on their door. Dr. Mudd had not been feeling well 
so he asked his wife to answer the door. But the loud banging 
frightened Mrs. Mudd and she told her husband, "I would 
rather you would go and see for yourself."' So the 31-year-old 
doctor rose and trudged wearily to the door in his nightshirt, 
curious who should be knocking so loudly at that hour. 
Without opening the door he asked who was there and was 
told - or so he always insisted - that his callers were two 
*The Hale J. Posten Professor of Law, West Virginia University, Morgantown, 
West Virginia 26506. 
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"strangers" on their way to Washington. One of their horses 
had fallen, the voice said, and the rider believed his leg had 
been sprained or fractured.' Dr. Mudd opened the door and 
helped the dismounted rider bring the injured man into the 
parlor where they laid him on a sofa. Trouble -big trouble 
- had descended on the little household of Dr. Samuel A. 
Mudd. 
With the possible exception of Mrs. Surratt, no other 
person punished for complicity in the Lincoln plot has been so 
steadfastly and vociferously defended as an innocent victim 
of the federal government's thirst for vengeance as has Dr. 
Mudd. He has had a school named after him, historical 
pageants have been presented in honor of his memory, and 
his plight has been publicized in radio and television pro-
grams. 
In 1936, Twentieth Century-Fox released a film, Prisoner of 
Shark Island, which portrayed the doctor's imprisonment.' 
That same year, Congressman Jennings Randolph, Democrat 
of West Virginia, introduced a resolution to place a tablet in 
the ruins of Fort Jefferson in recognition of Dr. Mudd's "inno-
cence of a crime for which he was held prisoner for four 
years."4 In 1973, the Michigan Legislature, atthe urging of Dr. 
Richard Mudd, who has spent a lifetime trying to clear his 
grandfather's name, adopted a resolution stating that Dr. 
Samuel A. Mudd "was innocent of any complicity in the 
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln," that "[h]istory 
has subsequently revealed that Dr. Samuel A. Mudd acted 
only as a physician and not as a conspirator," and that he had 
been unjustly convicted.' In 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
declared his personal belief in Dr. Mudd's innocence.' 
He is remembered as a kind and gentle country doctor 
who was sucked into the whirlwind of violence by his inno-
cent ministrations to an injured nighttime visitor who, unbe-
knownst to him, had shot the President of the United States a 
few hours earlier. Dr. Mudd, his supporters maintain, was the 
American Dreyfus, an innocent man convicted and sent to 
prison for a crime he did not commit, by an unconstitutional 
military commission comprised of second-rate officers who 
were on a government-sanctioned blood quest. Even his 
place of confinement- Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas-
smacks of Devil' s Island. 
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I. JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION 
Dr. Mudd's conviction by a military tribunal, instead of a 
trial before a civil court, has been one of the most persistent 
complaints of his supporters. And, since a civil jury failed to 
convict John H. Surratt Jr. in 1867, this view has strongly 
reinforced the doctor's supporters in their belief that the 
military commission was a "hanging court." F. Lee Bailey, co-
counsel for Dr. Mudd in the Mudd appeal, "predicted" that 
Surratt would not be convicted by civil jury and used that 
possibility to attack the military tribunal? 
However, to argue that the same evidence was brought 
out in the military commission and John Surratt's civil trial 
and use this circumstance to criticize the military tribunal is 
unreasonable. Given the inflamed conditions of 1865 it ap-
pears that a civil trial would have dealt with the conspirators 
in a similar manner.' By 1867, the interest of the public had 
moved on from the Lincoln murder to Reconstruction policy, 
the power struggle in President Johnson's cabinet, and the 
possible impeachment of the President. The trial of Dr. Mudd 
and the other conspirators before a military commission in 
1867 may well have resulted in a different outcome than 
before the 1865 military commission. 
Before Dr. Mudd could be convicted by the military com-
mission he first had to be tried before that body. As with the 
grand jury process by means of which defendants are brought 
to trial before civil courts on criminal charges, it took more 
than just being a Southern-leaning doctor who had treated the 
President's assassin to be named a defendant before the 
military commission. The government's list of defendants 
who were ultimately brought to trial for the murder of 
Abraham Lincoln was a curious one, not so much because 
innocent citizens were dragged before this military body as 
for the fact that so many individuals who might reasonably 
have been indicted were not. 
The government decided not to prosecute Samuel Cox, 
Thomas Jones,' John Lloyd, 10 and James Maddox, 11 all known 
to have aided Booth's escape or to have obstructed justice. 
There were others who almost certainly knew about the 
conspiracy, but against whom no hard evidence had been 
gathered. Booth's brother, Junius Brutus Jr., was the author 
of, and recipient of, some suspicious correspondence with 
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Wilkes Booth, and their sister, Blanch Booth DeBar, clearly 
knew of the plot.l' Anna Surratt, the daughter of Mrs. Mary 
Surratt and younger sister of John Surratt Jr., cannot seriously 
be considered to have been unaware of the plotting going on 
around her at her mother's boarding house and some papers 
that were confiscated at the Surratt house support this sug-
gestion.!' Sara Antoinette Slater, a Rebel spy and dispatch 
carrier who sometimes traveled withJohnSurrattJr., and who 
had stayed at the Surratt boarding house at the height of the 
plotting, hovered somewhere on the periphery of the plotting 
against Lincoln.14 Yet none of these was indicted. 
The government settled on nine conspirators: David E. 
Herold, Lewis Payne,'' George A. Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt, 
Edman Spangler,16 Samuel B. Arnold, Michael O'Laughlin/7 
and Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, all of whom were in custody, and 
John H. Surratt Jr., who was hiding in Canada. The inclusion 
of Dr. Mudd among the conspirators to be tried reflected the 
government's sense of the strength of the evidence that had 
been gathered against him, not some sinister plot to punish an 
innocent physician. 
However, a major question loomed: Before what tribunal 
should the conspirators be tried? President Andrew Johnson 
turned to Attorney General James Speed, 18 who, on April28, 
at what one writer calls "the prodding of the War Depart-
ment,"19 advised the President that trial before a military 
commission, rather than before a civil court, was proper. 20 
This was not a universally-accepted opinion. Gideon 
Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was of the opinion that Secre-
tary of War Stanton had pressured Speed into this opinion, 
perhaps even converting the Attorney General from an earlier 
inclination. Welles wrote in his diary on May 9, 1865: "[T]he 
rash, impulsive, and arbitrary measures of Stanton are ex-
ceedingly repugnant to my notions, and I am pained to 
witness the acquiescence they receive. He carries others with 
him, sometimes against their convictions as expressed to 
me."21 
Former Attorney General Bates shared the view that 
Stanton was behind Speed's opinion. He wrote in his diary on 
May 25, 1865: "I am pained to be led to believe that my 
successor, Atty Genl. Speed, has been wheedled out of an 
opinion, to the effect that such a trial is lawful. If he be, in the 
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lowest degree, qualified for his office, he must know better ... 
. I do not doubt that that unwise determination was the work 
of Mr. Stanton. He believes in mere force, so long as he wields 
it, but cowers before it, when wielded by any other hand." 22 
Bates then summed up the problem with a remarkable proph-
esy: "[I]f the offenders be done to death by that tribunal, 
however truly guilty, they will pass for martyrs with half the 
world."23 
Bates exhibited a incredible sense of clairvoyance. While 
he was imprisoned, not executed, the martyrdom of Dr. Samuel 
A. Mudd began with the difficult question of the jurisdiction 
of the military commission. 
A great deal of the difficulty stems from the fact that no 
real precedent existed for what the government faced- the 
trial of civilians engaged in paramilitary actions at the close of 
a civil war. Military commissions were created during the 
Mexican War to try civilians who committed crimes normally 
cognizable by a civil court, and they had limited jurisdiction 
to try civilians for crimes not cognizable by a court martial, 
but committed during a period of martial law; and for viola-
tions of the laws of war.24 
The two major arguments raised against the commission 
which tried Dr. Mudd were that the laws of war did not apply 
with respect to the American Civil War and, even if they did, 
the Civil War was over and the civil courts were open, so no 
necessity required trial before a military commission. 
The first of these arguments was grounded on the conten-
tion that the United States had not formally recognized the 
Confederacy as a belligerent, 25 a condition deemed necessary 
for the application of the laws of war. But this argument was, 
at best, a weak reed. Three years before the President's 
murder the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Grier in 
The Prize Cases,26 said that: 
Insurrection against a government may or may not 
culminate in an organized rebellion, but a civil war 
always begins by insurrection againstthe lawful authority 
of the government. A civil waris never solemnly declared; 
it becomes such by its accidents - the number, power 
and organization of the persons who originate and carry 
it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a 
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hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared 
their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have 
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against 
their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as 
belligerents, and the contest is war. They claim to be in 
arms to establish their liberty and independence in order 
to become a sovereign state, while the sovereign party 
treats them as insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance, 
and who should be punished with death for their treason 
.... As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine 
against its insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our 
domestic history which the court is bound to notice and 
to know.27 
Moreover, the Confederate Congress had formally recog-
nized the existence of war on May 6, 1861.28 The Act declared 
that "war exists between the Confederate States and the 
Government of the United States and the States and territories 
thereof except the States of Maryland, North Carolina, Tennes-
see, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, and Delaware, and the 
territories of Arizona and New Mexico, and the Indian Terri-
tory south of Kansas," thus suggesting the Confederate Con-
gress' conception of where the authority of the Confederacy 
extended (and placing Dr. Mudd's home State of Maryland 
squarely within the Confederacy)." 
General Orders No. 100, which was issued after the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Prize Cases, recognized that the 
rebellion was "civil war. "30 And the mere fact that the Union 
did not document its recognition of the Confederacy's status 
as a belligerent did not alter the fact that both sides accorded 
the other belligerent rights.31 
The central issue, however, in the trying of the conspira-
tors before a military commission was whether a military 
commission was the proper body to try the conspirators since 
(1) the civil courts were open in the District of Columbia at the 
time the commission was convened, and (2) with the surren-
der of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia on April9, 1865, and 
of Joseph E. Johnston's army on April26,1865, the Civil War 
had ended in the East, and, thus, there was no "military 
necessity" such as to justify trying the conspirators before a 
military commission. 
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In 1867, the Supreme Court held, in Ex parte Milligan,32 that 
military commissions organized during the Civil War, in a 
state not invaded and not engaged in rebellion and in which 
the federal courts were open and exercising their judicial 
functions, had no jurisdiction to try a civilian33 for any crimi-
nal offense. Supporters of Dr. Mudd and other conspirators 
have long sought to apply this decision to the trial of the 
Lincoln conspirators in an effort to demonstrate the trial's 
illegality. Fitting Milligan into the case of the Lincoln con-
spirators is a more difficult exercise than it first appears. 
The Milligan case arose out of Indiana, where federal 
authority had never been seriously challenged during the 
Civil War.34 In Washington, however, the threat to federal 
authority had been, and remained, very real. Despite the 
surrender of the armies of Lee and Johnston, the "war" had 
not yet ended. The government argued in the Mudd appeal 
that the United States and the Confederate States had fought 
a battle near the Rio Grande on May 12 and that Confederate 
warships continued to wage war against Union vessels until 
November 6, 1865. But the danger from Confederate "war-
time" activity was even more real to Union authorities in 
Washington, D.C. in early May, 1865, than the Government's 
argument suggested. 
John Singleton Mosby, the noted Confederate guerrilla 
leader, had disbanded his command, but still remained in 
hiding, a potential threat. Mosby had been Lewis Payne's 
commander and had, in 1863, captured General Edwin H. 
Stoughton from the midst of his army at Fairfax Court House, 
Virginia.35 On February 22, 1865,Lieutenant Jesse C. McNeill 
had led the McNeill Rangers" from near Moorefield, West 
Virginia, into Cumberland, Maryland, and there, from the 
midst of the Army of West Virginia a command of over 10,000, 
had spirited away Generals George Crook and Benjamin F. 
Kelly along with the command's adjutant and a passel of 
headquarters flags. 
A few days later, as Lieutenant Isaac Welton, McNeill's 
second-in-command, was escorting the prisoners to Rich-
mond by train, he encountered Colonel Mosby. In an obvious 
reference to his earlier capture of General Stoughton, Mosby 
told Lt. Welton, "You boys have beaten me badly. The only 
way I can equal this is to go into Washington and bring out 
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Lincoln."37 The threat posed by a man like Mosby could not 
be lightly dismissed. Lincoln might be dead, but Washington, 
D.C. contained other tempting targets. 
On May 8, 1865, Jesse McNeill and his Rangers had met 
with Union authorities on the Northwest Turnpike a mile 
west of Romney, West Virginia, deposited a pile of "arms" on 
the road, signed parole documents, and disbanded. But the 
"arms" they left on the road consisted of little more than 
ancient shotguns and nonfunctioning weapons of dubious 
ancestry." These hard-riding, hard-hitting cavalrymen were 
still armed and could be called into action. Undoubtedly, 
many of them would have relished taking to the hills and 
continuing the guerrilla war against the Yankees, as would 
many of Mosby's men and others who were not anxious to 
accept the fact of Southern defeat. 
Hindsight is always "20/20." We now know that, with 
Lee's surrender ofthe Army of Northern Virginia, the soldiers 
of the Confederacy marched off the battlefield into the peace-
ful glory of the "Legend of the Lost Cause." But in late April 
and early May of 1865 the direction of the rebel soldiers' 
march was not nearly so certain. Had Lee or some other 
charismatic Southern leader issued the call to guerrilla war-
fare, Mosby and McNeill and other still-armed and still-angry 
Southern soldiers may well have taken up the call, on the very 
outskirts of the nation's capital. The history of civil wars is 
that they end in this fashion far more commonly than as did 
the American Civil War.39 At the time of Attorney General 
Speed's opinion that trial before a military commission was 
proper and President Johnson's order establishing the mili-
tary commission, the idea that a "state of war" existed in 
Washington, D.C. was not a mere fanciful notion. 
One of the myths that surrounds the assassination of 
President Lincoln is that his death was uniformly mourned 
throughout the South, where it was seen as a catastrophe, at 
least by all but the most ardent firebrands. 
In truth, Southerners reacted to Lincoln's death much the 
same as Americans reacted to the news of the death of 
Mussolini.40 They saw it as the fitting end for a tyrant. 41 As the 
government brief in the appeal stated: 
Washington, D.C. remained a fortified city and 
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headquarters for directing military operations against 
the rebels during Mudd's trial. Sentries manned and 
controlled the flow of people into and out of the city. 
The city was fully guarded by national forces. 
Washington was a city policed by soldiers with the 
army as the protector as well as the defender of the 
Capitol ... . The war was still in effect and President 
Andrew Johnson did not declare martial law over and 
peace within the United States until20 August 1866.42 
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Whether it was politically astute to try the conspirators 
before a military commission or whether the conspirators 
received fair trials before the commission are not the issues 
here. The question is whether the United States had the legal 
right to try the conspirators before a military commission. It 
is clear that it did. 
H. THE QUESTION OF DR. MUDD'S GUILT 
Dr. Mudd's defense clearly rested on the argument that 
his treatment of Booth's leg had merely been the act of mercy 
of a medical doctor, performed on a man he had not recog-
nized, having met him briefly only once before. That position 
underlies the appeal of Dr. Mudd before the Special Court of 
Military Review. In the brief on behalf of Dr. Mudd,43 as well 
as in counsels' argument before the Special Court, there is 
virtually no reference to the evidence on which Dr. Mudd was 
convicted, except to argue that the testimony of the witnesses 
against Dr. Mudd had been discredited.<' 
That Dr. Mudd recognized Booth and knew at some time 
before Booth left his home that he had murdered President 
Lincoln, that Dr. Mudd might have been involved in the 
Confederate underground in Charles County, that Dr. Mudd 
was well acquainted with two of the main characters in the 
plot against Lincoln and had met with them on several occa-
sions, or that Dr. Mudd deliberately misled government offi-
cials in an effort to assist Booth and Herold in avoiding 
capture, are all matters that supporters of the doctor would 
prefer to pass over quickly. 
But it is not that simple. The facts are these. In November 
1864, Booth had gone into lower Maryland, armed with letters 
of introduction to Dr. William Queen and Dr. Mudd.45 He was 
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introduced to Dr. Mudd following church services on No-
vember 20. Later that afternoon, Dr. Mudd called for Booth at 
Montgomery's Hotel in Bryantown and brought him back to 
the Mudd farm. 46 Booth spent the night with the MuddsY 
During this visit Booth bought a horse from a George Gardiner, 
coming to Gardiner's place in the company of Dr. Mudd. 48 
On December23, 1864, Dr. Mudd was in Washington-in 
the company of John Wilkes Booth! That evening the doctor 
introduced Booth to Louis J. Weichmann, a friend of John H. 
Surratt Jr., and a clerk in the Office of the Commissary General 
of Prisoners, a bureau ofthe War Department. 49 As Weichmann 
described the meeting, he and Surratt were walking down 7th 
Street when Dr. Mudd hailed them, calling out, "Surratt, 
Surratt!" Weichmann and Surratt turned and saw Dr. Mudd 
with John Wilkes Booth. Surratt introduced Dr. Mudd to 
Weichmann and then the doctor introduced Booth to 
Weichmann.50 The four men went to Booth's room at the 
National Hotel where Mudd, Booth, and Surratt, all seated 
around a table, discussed what appeared to be a map Booth 
was sketching 5 1 While Weichmann claimed to have stayed in 
the room the whole time, he testified that at times the others 
went out into the hall for a while, with Booth and Dr. Mudd 
going out first, staying "not more than five or eight min-
utes."52 
At the conspiracy trial Dr. Mudd's former slave, Mary 
Simms, testified that John Surratt had visited with the Mudds 
during the summer of 1864. He visited there "often," she said 
in response to the Judge Advocate's leading question. "He 
was there from almost every Saturday night to Monday night. 
When he would go to Virginia, or come back from there, he 
would stop."53 Ms. Simms said he slept in the woods with 
others (most of whom were Confederate soldiers), and they 
took their meals in the house while the Mudds "put us all out 
to watch." The Mudds provided the bedclothes for the rebel 
soldiers to sleep on in the woods.54 Three other witnesses, 
Elzee Eglent, Melvina Washington, and Milo Simms, corrobo-
rated Ms. Simms' testimony.55 Bennett F. Gwynn, a neighbor 
of Dr. Mudd, testified that he and his brothers, who were 
trying to avoid arrest by General Dan Sickles, had slept in the 
woods behind the Mudd home, on bedclothes provided by 
the Mudds, and were fed by the Mudds. Gwynn testified he 
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feared arrest because he was a captain in the home guard, a 
militia unit organized "to stand by the State in any disloyal 
position it might take against the [United States] Govern-
ment," and that Dr. Mudd, knowing of his concern over being 
arrested (and being aware of why Gwynn was concerned, i.e., 
aware that Gwynn was a member of the Rebel militia), shel-
tered him. 56 Then Gwynn, under cross-examination, revealed 
a bit of information that serves to take Dr. Mudd out of the 
"civilian" class and into the class of "enemy soldier," so far as 
the United States government was concerned. He admitted 
that Dr. Mudd was a member of one of these militia compa-
nies57 If Bennett Gwynn's testimony is to be believed, and 
there is no reason not to believe it, Dr. Mudd was a member of 
the Confederate underground in Charles County and a mem-
ber of the organized Confederate militia. 
In another damaging, if not wholly credible bit of testi-
mony, one witness at the conspiracy trial, William A. Evans, 
a minister of the Presbyterian Church, swore he saw the 
doctor enter Mrs. Surratt's boarding house on H Street a day 
or two before Lincoln's second inauguration.58 In truth, Dr. 
Mudd's involvement in the rebel militia and his dealings with 
Booth and Surratt is less a condemnation of Dr. Mudd than a 
recognition that all of lower Maryland was rebel territory and 
that the men who lived in the area were very likely to be rebel 
sympathizers. In Maryland and the Confederacy, a book pri-
vately published in 1976 by Harry W. Newman, an author 
who describes himself as a "one-time member of the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans," and which is exceedingly sympa-
thetic to the Confederate cause, the author writes: 
If any portion of Maryland was the heart and soul of 
the Confederacy, Southern Maryland definitely 
possessed that quality, especially Prince Georges, 
Charles and St. Mary's Counties .... This portion of 
Maryland furnished more men to the Confederate 
Army and Navy than any other section and thus 
sustained the heaviest casualties and sorrows." 
But the important thing to understand here is that, while 
Dr. Mudd's behavior may well have been understandable, 
and certainly in line with that of his neighbors, it is nonethe-
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less a fact that he was involved in the pro-rebel underground 
in lower Maryland, that he was rather well acquainted with 
Booth and Surratt, two prime plotters against President Lin-
coln, and that he lied about all this. Understandable this may 
be (including his lying about it to save his neck), but that does 
not alter the evidence. 
To this decidedly suspicious portrait of Dr. Mudd must be 
added his curious behavior after taking Booth into his parlor 
shortly before dawn on April 15, 1865. After placing his 
visitor on the sofa in the parlor, the doctor went into the back 
bedroom to dress and to tell his wife who had barged in upon 
them at that hour. He explained that one ofthe men appeared 
to have broken his leg and asked his wife to tear some 
bandages for him. After dressing he returned to the parlor 
with a light and he and Herold helped Booth into the same 
upstairs bedroom where the actor had slept the previous fall. 
With Booth stretched out on an ornate Victorian bed in the 
corner of the room, the doctor cut a 12-inch slit in the actor's 
long riding boot and pulled the boot from the swollen ankle. 
On examination he found a straight fracture of the left tibia 
about two inches above the ankle, an injury he did not regard 
as particularly painful though Booth appeared to be suffering 
intensely. The doctor had no proper pasteboard for making 
splints so he took wood from an old bandbox and put together 
a homemade splint. Then, with his patient as comfortable as 
possible, he and Herold left Booth to rest as the faint light of 
dawn appeared across the sky60 
Dr. Mudd then either returned to bed (Mrs. Mudd's state-
ment}61 or went out into the barnyard to do his chores (Dr. 
Mudd's statement}.62 When breakfast was ready, he called 
Herold to the table and they ate. 
For the rest of the morning the doctor worked about his 
farm pretty much as usual. After the noon meal he took 
Herold and rode over to his father's place to see about a 
carriage for the wounded man, a rather strange accommoda-
tion for two men he later described as total strangers. Finding 
no carriage available, the two went into Bryantown to look for 
a conveyance. Dr. Mudd said later that only Herold went into 
Bryantown and gave the impression, though he did not clearly 
say so, that he had called on a neighbor instead of going to 
town. And, so he implied, he had missed learning of the 
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President's death, the news of which had all of Bryantown 
abuzz. 
However, a number of witnesses at the conspiracy trial 
recalled seeing Dr. Mudd and Herold riding into town to-
gether and several remembered seeing the doctor alone in 
town that afternoon. 63 Both prosecution and defense wit-
nesses agreed that word of the President's murder reached 
Bryantown by the time the doctor arrived and that Lincoln's 
assassin had been identified as a man named "Booth."" 
On his return from Bryantown the doctor stopped at the 
farm of a neighbor, John F. Hardy. At the conspiracy trial 
Hardy was called as a defense witness for Dr. Mudd but, 
curiously, was not questioned about this visit. Later, how-
ever, he was called to the stand for the prosecution and 
testified that Dr. Mudd had told him during the visit that he 
had learned in Bryantown that "the President and Mr. Seward 
and his son had been assassinated the evening before." 65 The 
assassin was John Wilkes Booth, Dr. Mudd said, and Hardy 
asked if Booth had not visited the doctor the previous au-
tumn. Dr. Mudd replied that he didn't know whether his 
visitor was the same man or one of his brothers. He said 
nothing, however, about the two horsemen who had called at 
his home before dawn. Francis R. Farrell, Hardy's hired hand, 
corroborated this testimony.66 
While Hardy and Farrell were both called by the prosecu-
tion, neither man could be called a hostile witness. Both 
witnesses seemed genuinely sympathetic to Dr. Mudd and 
said that he had expressed his sorrow at the death of the 
President and that this expression of sorrow seemed genu-
ine.67 
Dr. Mudd returned home an hour or so before dark, just as 
Booth and Herold were leaving, he later testified. Herold 
asked for directions but the doctor claimed he did not see 
them leave. "I do not know where they went" he told a federal 
officer the day after his arrest68 
Doctor and Mrs. Mudd put together a fanciful tale about 
the visit of Booth and Herold which has been universally 
accepted by the doctor's supporters and repeated as if it were 
Holy Writ. Yet this story is so incredible as to nearly collapse 
of its own weight, and it came very close to sending Dr. Mudd 
to the gallows. Studied carefully, the Mudds' story was a 
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classic case of the use of the magician's favorite tool -
misdirection. Much was made of the doctor's" duty" to assist 
the injured Booth, while the crux of the case against Dr. Mudd 
was not that he had given medical aid to an injured nighttime 
visitor, but that he had delayed telling authorities of the visit 
of the President's assassin long enough to permit him to 
escape. 
The Mudds always claimed that the doctor became suspi-
cious about his visitors about an hour after he returned home 
on Saturday afternoon (after his guests had already left) and 
decided he had best go into Bryantown and notify the authori-
ties." Mrs. Mudd agreed that the men were suspicious all 
right but said that she begged the doctor not to leave her alone 
because she was afraid there might be guerrillas about. 
So it was not until the following morning at church that 
Dr. Mudd sought out his second cousin, Dr. George Mudd, an 
older man with a reputation as a staunch Union loyalist and 
a resident of Bryantown. Dr. George Mudd was close to Sam 
and had served as his preceptor in the study of medicine. 70 
Sam told George that two strangers had come to his home a 
little before daybreak on Saturday; that they were very ex-
cited; that one of the men had a broken leg; that he had set the 
leg and improvised some crutches for him; that the man had 
shaved his mustache; and that the pair had left in the direction 
of Parson Wilmers' place.71 
At least that is what George Mudd later testified under 
oath that his cousin had told him. And considering George's 
reputation and the candid nature of his testimony, it seems 
likely that this was precisely what Sam had related to his 
cousin. In any event, the two doctors parted with the under-
standing that the elder Mudd would pass this information on 
to the military authorities in Bryantown. And the following 
morning, Monday, April 17, George reported to Lieutenant 
David D. Dana the story Sam had told him of the strangers' 
visit to his farm. 
On Tuesday Lt. Dana sent Lieutenant Alexander Lovett 
along with Dr. George Mudd and three "special officers" to 
the Samuel Mudd farm to question the doctor. The doctor's 
statements to Lt. Lovett and his men that day are of scant 
comfort to those who insist that the doctor tried to be helpful 
to the federal authorities. 
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Dr. Mudd told Lt. Lovett: (1) His visitors had remained at 
the farm for" a short time" (from which the lieutenant reason-
ably inferred that they had left Dr. Mudd's on Saturday 
morning, instead of Saturday evening, as was actually the 
case); (2) He had learned of the President's assassination at 
church on Sunday (which, if the pair had left his home on 
Saturday morning, would have placed Dr. Mudd's knowl-
edge of the crime at twenty-four hours after the departure of 
his visitors, a circumstance which argued strongly for the 
doctor's innocence); and (3) The lame man walked away on 
crutches (a disclosure which would have encouraged the 
federal troopers to look for" a man on crutches" instead of two 
men on horseback)." Understandably, Lt. Lovett left the 
Mudd farm with more questions than answersn 
Three days later, on Friday, April 21, Lt. Lovett and his 
men returned to Dr. Mudd's and questioned him again. When 
the lieutenant announced that he would have to search the 
place, Dr. Mudd suddenly "remembered" that, since the 
soldiers' last visit, he had "found" the boot he had cut off the 
injured man. The doctor said something to his wife and Mrs. 
Mudd went upstairs and returned with the boot. She handed 
it to Lt. Lovett who turned the top of the boot down and spied 
the name "J. Wilkes" written in it. Dr. Mudd said he had not 
noticed the name before but that it now appeared that his 
injured guest had indeed been John Wilkes Booth.74 
The atmosphere in the room changed immediately. Lt. 
Lovett had stumbled over the assassin's trail and Mudd was 
in deep trouble. Both men sensed it. The lieutenant asked the 
doctor if either of his visitors had been armed. Dr. Mudd 
replied that the "injured man" - he still could not bring 
himself to call him "Booth" - "had a pair of revolvers." He 
did not mention Herold's carbine, a more effective defense to 
pursuing cavalry.75 
Lt. Lovett had heard enough. He placed the doctor under 
arrest and they took off for Washington. The next day, Dr. 
Mudd was brought before Colonel H.H. Wells and interro-
gated at length. At the conclusion of that interview he signed 
a sworn statement for Wells in which he continued his game 
of playing the loyal Southerner for his neighbors and the 
cooperating witness for the federal officials." 
Dr. Mudd said that Booth, his former house guest and 
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sometime companion in Washington - a man he surely 
should have recognized - did not show his face at all. He 
"had his cloak thrown about his head," said Dr. Mudd, strange 
and mysterious behavior for one whose injury was at the 
other end of his body. Yet the doctor professed not to have 
been curious. He merely set the man's leg, presumably 
without asking him the sorts of professional questions one 
would expect of a doctor treating an injured patient, and went 
about his daily business. 
At breakfast, the doctor's statement continued, the in-
jured man's companion was talkative. He gave his name as 
"Henston" and said that his injured companion's name was 
"Tyson." The only thing he thought suspicious, Dr. Mudd 
said, was that after breakfast the wounded man asked for a 
razor and he later noticed that "Tyson" had shaved his mus-
tache but that he still had his beard. Mrs. Mudd said she 
noticed his whiskers had become partially detached as the 
stranger was coming downstairs and concluded that the whis-
kers were false .77 
Covered up head, face to the wall, shaved mustache, false 
whiskers, and fictitious name. On this slender thread hung 
Dr. Mudd's story that he did not recognize his nighttime 
visitor. Viewed in the cold light of hindsight, Dr. Mudd's 
statement to Colonel Wells raises more questions than it 
answers. 
First, the doctor said, "I have never seen Booth since that 
time to my knowledge" (i.e., since Booth's firstvisitto Charles 
County in November 1864).78 He later admitted, however, 
that he had seen Booth in Washington on December 23,1864.79 
Why would Dr. Mudd lie about this relationship with Booth 
if the relationship were innocent? 
Second, the doctor said he did not recognize Booth as the 
injured man who called at the house on AprillS because: (1) 
he had his head covered; (2) he kept his face turned to the wall; 
(3) he shaved his mustache; ( 4) he wore false whiskers; and (5) 
he and Herold gave fictitious names. 
In 1877 Dr. Mudd and Samuel Cox Jr. were Democratic 
candidates of the Maryland Legislature from Charles County. 
Cox told O.H. Oldroyd in 1901 that when he and the doctor 
were alone during that campaign Mudd talked often of the 
assassination. He told him, Cox related, that Booth came to 
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him early in the morning of Aprill5, 1865, without any effort 
at concealment of his identity but without telling him of his 
deed. The doctor treated his injury and made him as comfort-
able as possible and that afternoon went into Bryantown 
where he learned of the murder and of Booth's involvement. 
He went home and upbraided Booth angrily for involving 
him and his family, and Booth pleaded pitifully, in the name 
of his mother, not to deliver him up to the authorities. Dr. 
Mudd yielded, he said, but he made Booth and Herold leave 
his home immediately.80 
Cox's story has a ring of truth to it and is not altogether 
unflattering to the doctor. Even with his admission that he 
recognized Booth, however, the story doesn't fit. Dr. Mudd 
also told Cox he had met Booth only once before, on the 
weekend of November 12, 1864, when the actor spent the 
night at his farm. Since we know that Dr. Mudd also saw 
Booth in Washington on December 23, it is obvious the doctor 
still felt constrained to lie about his role in the kidnap con-
spiracy as late as 1877. 
Yet, aside from Cox's story, a mass of circumstantial 
evidence suggests that Dr. Mudd was lying about not know-
ing Booth when he set the assassin's leg that morning. 
The doctor's story that Booth kept his cloak over his head, 
for example, is discredited by his detailed description of his 
patient's forehead- "He had a pretty full forehead and his 
skin was fair."- and his hair-" ... black and seemed to be 
inclined to curl."81 
That he kept his face turned to the wall, as Dr. Mudd 
swore, is also highly unlikely, particularly since the doctor 
noted later that he had shaved off his mustache. How could 
he have known Booth had shaved his mustache if he had not 
seen the mustache earlier and how could he have seen it if 
Booth had kept his head covered and his face to the wall? 
Admittedly this argument runs to the ridiculous but only 
because Dr. Mudd's story leads it there. 
The shaved mustache is yet another story. Dr. Mudd's 
apologists use this fact as a central argument in support of the 
doctor's claim that he did not know who his visitors were. 
There is, however, substantial evidence that Booth did not 
shave his mustache at Dr. Mudd's. In Thomas A. Jones' little 
book, John Wilkes Booth, Jones described his introduction to 
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Booth on April16, the morning after the pair had left Mudd's 
place. "Though he was exceedingly pale and his features bore 
the evident traces of suffering, I have seldom, if ever, seen a 
more strikingly handsome man," Jones wrote. "He wore a 
mustache and his beard had been trimmed about two or three 
days before."82 
Lieutenant A.R. Bainbridge, one of three young Confeder-
ates who came upon Booth and Herold at the Rappahannock 
crossing on April 24, nine days after they had left Dr. Mudd's, 
described that experience: "His long dark mustache swept 
over his mouth in a straggling, unkempt manner, though it 
was evident that he had tried to preserve its shape by frequent 
handling. "83 
Richard B. Garrett was an eleven-year-old boy when Booth 
came to his father's farm to die. Garrett, who grew up to be a 
Baptist minister, wrote his recollection of Booth's brief visit to 
his father's farm and in the early 1880s often lectured on the 
subject. In his written account, the Reverend Garrett recalled 
going into Booth's room early one morning: "The stranger 
was still sleeping and as I dressed myself his face was turned 
toward me. I remember vividly the impression made upon 
me at that time. I had never seen such a face before. Jet black 
curls clustered about a brow as white as marble and a heavy 
dark mustache shaded a mouth as beautiful as a babe's."84 
The conclusion is inescapable- Booth did not shave his 
mustache at Dr. Mudd's. The Mudds also insisted that Booth 
wore false whiskers. Since he made no effort to conceal or 
alter his appearance anywhere else along the escape route, 
even though his description was being widely broadcast 
throughout the land, this, too, can be dismissed as another 
effort to explain away their failure to recognize their "mys-
tery" guest. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that no 
one else with whom Booth came into contact during his flight 
mentioned whiskers, false or otherwise. None were found on 
his body or discovered along the route. The reason is, of 
course, because it is highly unlikely that Booth wore such an 
absurd device. 
Dr. Mudd and Mrs. Mudd also insisted that their guests 
gave fictitious names and did not mention their involvement 
in the assassination, an exceedingly curious assertion in view 
of the conduct of the pair elsewhere along their flight. Booth 
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gave his name to Sergeant Cobb at the Navy Yard bridge as he 
fled the city.85 At Lloyd's Tavern Herold was acquainted with 
the proprietor and no introduction was necessary. Booth did, 
however, volunteer to Lloyd: "We have assassinated the 
President."86 When the pair finally emerged from Zekiah 
Swamp and made their way to Colonel Samuel Cox's farm, 
about seven miles from Bryantown, they told Cox who they 
were and what they had done.87 They made no effort to 
conceal their identities or their deed from Thomas A. Jones 
who hid them for five days. 
Across the Potomac, they appear to have identified them-
selves to Mrs. Quesenberry who nervously refused to help 
them. At the Rappahannock River, the pair readily identified 
themselves, first to Major Ruggles and then to Jett and 
Bainbridge, as "the assassins of the President." Only at the 
Garrett farmhouse do they appear to have used aliases and 
even that is questionable since everything the Garretts told 
about their mysterious visitors must be balanced against the 
family's interest in avoiding the gallows for harboring the 
assassins. Assuming, however, that the Garrelts' story is true, 
Booth's alias of "John William Boyd" makes a great deal more 
sense, in view of the initials "JWB" which Booth had tattooed 
on his hand, than the name "Tyson." 
Thus if Booth and Herold so readily identified themselves 
and talked openly of their accomplishment to almost every-
one they encountered along the escape route, how can we 
believe the Mudds' incredible story that the pair identified 
themselves only by the names of "Tyson" and "Henston?" 
Third, the final absurdity in Dr. Mudd's statement to 
Colonel Wells was his story that, though he gave the pair 
directions, he did not know where they went when they left 
his home. From other sources we know, however, that the 
pair departed, not by the main road but by a path through 
Zekiah Swamp since the country was crawling with soldiers 
searching for them. Not even Herold, whose intimate knowl-
edge of the lower Maryland countryside had brought him into 
the plot, was acquainted with the interior of the Zekiah 
Swamp. No, Dr. Mudd, though he wanted very much to keep 
it a secret, had sent his visitors on a hidden route to Colonel 
Cox's plantation. As accessory before the fact to the kidnap 
conspiracy, Dr. Mudd became an accessory after the fact to the 
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murder of the President by aiding his killer's escape. 
The Mudds always insisted that the doctor did not return 
to Bryantown on Saturday night to inform the authorities 
about his visitors because Mrs. Mudd was afraid to be left 
alone. Her fear appeared to be centered in a Confederate 
guerrilla, John H. Boyle, a desperate character who had assas-
sinated Captain Thomas H. Watkins of Anne Arundel County, 
near the Prince Georges County line, on March 25, and who 
was still at large. This fear of Boyle would have been perfectly 
justified. At the time of the general election of 1864, Boyle-
who knew of Dr. George Mudd's Union sympathies- sent 
word to him that he would kill him and steal his horses. Mrs. 
Mudd surely heard of this threat to her husband's cousin. 
Moreover, about ten days before the President's murder, 
Boyle was allegedly involved in a robbery and murder near 
Nottingham in Prince Georges County and federal authorities 
were on the lookout for Boyle even as the search for Booth was 
taking place. 88 
By Saturday morning, April 15, Lt. Dana was sent into 
Southern Maryland to search for the two suspicious charac-
ters who had crossed the Navy Yard bridge late the night 
before. He became convinced that the "person who murdered 
Secretary Seward is Boyce or Boyd, the man who killed 
Captain Watkins in Maryland."89 That afternoon someone 
put Dana straight as to the names and the feared desperado 
John H. Boyle was identified as Seward's "assassin." When 
the doctor told Mrs. Mudd that Boyle was supposedly in-
volved, she understandably became frightened and asked 
him not to leave her that night. 
This does not, however, explain Dr. Mudd's roundabout 
way of sending his suspicions about his visitors to the au-
thorities in Bryantown. He left Mrs. Mudd alone while he 
rode to church when, if he were truly concerned about inform-
ing the authorities, he could as well have ridden to Bryantown 
and back and been gone from home no longer than he was on 
his trip to church. And Lt. Dana would have had the word 
twenty-four hours earlier. 
Yet the truth was that Dr. Mudd was trapped. He knew 
who his visitors were and what they had done, and realized 
that sooner or later the federal authorities would make the 
connection to his former association with Booth. Surratt's 
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name was also appearing as a conspirator and the doctor had 
met with him as well and this association, too, was bound to 
surface and cause him trouble. On the other hand he could not 
turn Booth over to the Federals without becoming an outcast 
among his neighbors, who were largely pro-Southern. Then 
there was Boyle. Mrs. Mudd later swore that she begged her 
husband not to leave her alone that Saturday night. "I told 
him that if he went himself that Boyle was reported to be one 
of the assassins and who had killed Captain Watkins ... might 
have him assassinated for it .... " 90 So the doctor tried to 
straddle the issue and failed. 
Everything considered, however, the most damning evi-
dence against Dr. Mudd is circumstantial. The doctor's de-
fenders have always insisted that Booth and Herold were 
merely seeking medical attention when they stopped at Dr. 
Mudd's, and that this gentle country physician was simply 
obeying his Hippocratic oath when he set Booth's leg that 
night. But this argument ignores the fact that by 1865 Dr. 
Mudd was no longer a practicing physician. Charles County 
had two or three other physicians, all competing for what 
little medical business there was in a 19th century rural 
county, and medicine was not a particularly easy way to make 
a living. Dr. Mudd's father had given him a 500-acre farm and 
ten slaves, and Sam had sensibly abandoned a medical prac-
tice which had earned him little to become a full-time farmer. 
He was not, then, the simple country doctor who has 
become an American folk hero, a kindly follower of 
Hippocrates who hitched up his buggy night after night and 
drove across the lower Maryland farmlands to care for the 
sick. He was a farmer, and Booth's early morning call to his 
home had less to do with his medical knowledge than his past 
association with Booth in conspiracy against Lincoln. 
Consider. When Booth fled south on the night of April14, 
he passed near the dwellings of at least three other physicians 
whose presence would likely have been known to him or to 
Herold. Given Davy Herold's intimate knowledge of South-
ern Maryland and Booth's recent trips to the area, either or 
both of them must have been aware of the presence of one or 
more of these doctors. And there were, very likely, other 
medical practitioners whose presence in 1865 we cannot be 
certain of today, and of whom Booth and Herold would have 
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been aware. Yet the fugitives raced south, ignoring these 
medical doctors and abandoning the route which Atzerodt 
said they intended to follow (straight south to Maryland 
Point) in their haste to reach Dr. Mudd's house.91 
They did not make their way to Dr. Mudd's then, simply 
because Booth was in need of any doctor. They arrived there, 
having ignored the presence of other doctors who could have 
afforded Booth relief earlier, because they knew Mudd was a 
fellow conspirator on whom they could rely. The doctor 
himself indirectly suggested as much in his sworn statement 
to Colonel Wells. He said Booth "wanted to get back, or get 
home and have [his leg] done by a regular physician."92 Yet he 
had already by-passed a number of "regular physicians" on 
his way to Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, a retired, or inactive, physi-
cian. The selection of Dr. Mudd had, it seems, a good deal 
more to do with the doctor's politics than with his medical 
reputation. 
In August 1865, Captain George W. Dutton of Company C, 
lOth Regiment of the Veterans' Reserve Corps, who was the 
commanding officer of the guard which accompanied Dr. 
Mudd to Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, made a sworn 
statement before a notary public in Washington. He swore 
that Dr. Mudd had told him while under his charge enroute to 
prison that Mudd knew Booth when he came to his house with 
Herold, on the morning after the assassination of the Presi-
dent; that he had known Booth some time but was afraid to tell 
of his having been at his house on the 15th of April fearing that 
his own and the lives of his family would be endangered 
thereby; that he was with Booth on the evening referred to by 
Weichmann in his testimony (December 23, 1864); and that he 
came to Washington on that occasion to meet Booth by ap-
pointment." 
From his prison cell at Fort Jefferson, Dr. Mudd denied 
having made this confession, and there is no way of knowing 
who was telling the truth on this score. It is difficult to 
imagine what would have prompted Capt. Dutton to swear to 
such an outrageous lie as Dr. Mudd suggested the "confes-
sion" was, particularly sinceitis in accord with what we know 
the facts to be. It is equally difficult to imagine why Dr. Mudd 
would have abandoned the story he had stood by publicly 
when public belief in his innocence was his one big hope of 
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ever leaving prison a free man. 
Dr. Mudd's repudiation of Captain Dutton's statement 
does confirm to us, however, his position within the Rebel 
underground. The doctor said that Booth, on his visit to the 
farm in November 1864, had inquired into the political senti-
ments of the residents of lower Maryland and the contraband 
trade that existed between the North and the South. "These 
and many minor matters spoken of," Mudd wrote, "caused 
me to suspect him to be a Government detective and to advise 
Surratt regarding him. "94 So Dr. Mudd would have us believe 
that he suspected Booth of being a federal detective when he 
first met him, though the opposite is almost certainly true. 
The doctor nonetheless admitted that his reaction to the 
suspected presence of a Union spy was to warn a known 
Confederate agent. It is a telling commentary on the loyalty 
of Dr. Samuel Alexander Mudd. 
But we should not be surprised. Dr. George Mudd, testi-
fying as a witness for Dr. Sam, said of his cousin at the 
conspiracy trial: "From my association with him, I have to 
consider him as sympathizing with the South."" 
That he did. And when the time came he sided with the 
South in a dangerous game - protecting the assassin of 
President Lincoln. The wonder is that Dr. Mudd did not hang. 
Yet, the Special Military Court of Appeals would now set 
aside Dr. Mudd's conviction, two judges because they believe 
the military commission lacked jurisdiction and one because 
he believed Dr. Mudd's guilt was not proven. 
CONCLUSION 
The effect of this decision cannot be underestimated. It 
was more than a mere exercise in the moot court process of 
training lawyers. Because of the prominence of the lawyers 
and judges involved, the United States Government will now 
be required to take notice. The decision ofthis "court" will 
demand respect, no matter how flawed it might be. It will 
become an important tool in the Mudd family's struggle to 
overturn the conviction of the 1865 military commission. Dr. 
Richard Mudd, the 92-year-old grandson of Dr. Mudd has 
already declared: "This will be a wonderful help in dealing 
with the Secretary of Defense and [President] Clinton."96 
Lincoln, as might be expected, has the last word. On 
204 Forest J. Bowman 
December 1, 1862, in his Annual Message to the Congress, the 
President said, "Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history."" 
He was right, of course. We cannot escape history. But, as the 
Special Military Court of Appeal has shown, we can try to alter 
it. 
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10, at 268 (Testimony of Lt. Alexander Lovett). He d.id say, however, that he and 
Herold went to Dr. Mudd's father's house to see if he could get a carriage for "the 
wounded man." War Department Archives, Records, File "E," 315, JAO. See also 
THEODORE ROSCOE, THE WEB OF CONSPIRACY 539-42 (1959). This seems a 
rather strange accommodation for two men Dr. Mudd insists were strangers. 
70 2 POORE, supra note 10, at 386 (Testimony of George D. Mudd). 
11 2 id. at 391. 
72 One of the great mysteries of the Booth flight is that some soldiers 
searching for Booth and Herold reported catching glimpses of a lame man on 
crutches and his companion darting into the swamp near the farm. The tracks of 
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the two led nowhere and the best modern opinion is that Rebel sympathizers in the 
area were using decoys to keep the Federals off of Booth's trail. ROSCOE, supra 
note 69, at 351. 
73 1 POORE, supra note 10, at 258-72 (Testimony of Lieutenant Alexander 
Lovett). 
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shaved off his mustache, upon his lip and face was a beard of some ten days' 
growth." !d. at 494 (emphasis supplied). 
We cannot have it both ways. If Booth had shaved his mustache at Mudd's 
there would have been none for Jones to have seen and, even with ten days growth, 
it would not have been long enough to have swept over his mouth by the time 
Bainbridge saw Booth. Someone is mistaken or someone is lying. Fortunately for 
the sake of historical accuracy, we know that other facets of Ruggles' account are 
false, leaving his recollection of Booth's mustache open to question. Then, too, 
aside from the Mudds, Ruggles was the only eyewitness to Booth's flight who 
spoke of his mustache having been shaved. Most witnesses to the flight and those 
who viewed his body later never mentioned his mustache. This omission would 
not be unusual if the mustache were still in place but would be very curious if it 
had been shaved. 
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1966). 
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LAND (Philadelphia, G.M. Hopkins 1878). This atlas reveals the dwellings or 
offices of no fewer than fourteen physicians along that portion of Booth's escape 
route that ran through Prince George County. Undoubtedly, some of these 
physicians were not there in 1865, but no doubt many of them were. And there 
I j: 
I . ,. 
L 
n 
' ~· 
~i 
212 Forest 1. Bowman 
were at least two other physicians Charles County in 1865. The physicians in 
Prince Georges County in 1878 were as follows: 
At the little crossroads village of Good Hope, still in the District of 
Columbia, Booth's route passed, on his right, the home of a Dr. Wadsworth. /d. 
at 36. Just beyond Silver Hill, about two-and-one-half miles out of Washington 
and barely a mile beyond the District line, the residence of Dr. McKim sat just off 
the road to the right of Booth's route. !d. at 22. Perhaps a mile south of Dr. 
McKim's by road and no more than half a mile across country, Dr. William Gunton 
made his home near the gristmill on Hensons Creek. /d. 
At Surratsville the pair was less than a mile from the home of Dr. John L. 
Waring, a physician in the Robeystown-Surrattsville area since 1841. !d. at 11. 
Four-fi fths of a mile out of Surrattsville the road branched to the right southwest 
toward the Potomac. About a mile down this road, in the spring of 1865 (and since 
1842) lived the country doctor and member of the Doctors' Line (a Confederate 
underground dispatch route), Dr. Edward H. Wyvill. A mile beyond Dr. Wyvill's, 
in Piscataway Post Office, lived two physicians, Dr. Hurtt and Dr. Edelin. /d. at 
19. But Booth and Herold rode on past the two physicians who were undoubtedly 
there in 1865, bearing to the east toward Dr. Mudd 's. 
At the same time they declined to turn west to Dr. Wyvill' s home for 
medical care their route passed the home of Dr. P. H. Heiskell , just a mile due east 
of the Surrattsville-Tee Bee Road. /d. at 26. As they raced on toward Tee Bee their 
route passed by the roadside residence of Dr. Joseph H. Blanford and, to the east, 
a mile off the main road, sat the home of Dr. Morgan. /d. at 27. In Tee Bee tbe 
pair ignored the presence of Dr. JosephS. Latimer, a physician since 1825, and 
made an abrupt turn to the southeast, beading for Dr. Mudd's and abandoning their 
direct route south to the Potomac. /d. at 11 . 
Their new route took them within two miles of the homes of Dr. Richard 
Perry and Dr. Lewis Mackall, both nestled along a back road where cavalry was 
unlikely to look in the first dragnet. /d. at 18, 27. Assuming the pair had taken that 
route and found Doctors Perry and Mackall unavailable, they would have been 
only a mile's ride from the home of yet another physician of the area, Dr. J.H. 
Skinner. /d. at 10, 18. 
Still they rode on toward Dr. Mudd 's. At Horse Head their route took them 
within half a mile of Dr. Skinner's. /d. at 18. Just a mile or so southeast of Horse 
Head sat the home of Dr. M.R. Latimer. /d. at 23. 
These fourteen physicians are merely some of those scattered along the 
route followed by Booth and Herold through Prince Georges County, Maryland, 
in 1878. Three of them, Drs. Waring, Wyvill, and Joseph S. Latimer, the Atlas 
reveals, were along Booth's route in 1865. Undoubtedly, others from the 1878 
Atlas were also there in 1865. Moreover, Drs. Waring, Wyvill and Latimer were 
better situated for immediate medical care than was Dr. Mudd. 
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93 LOUIS J. WETCHMANN, A TRUE HISTORY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF 
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Was the Assassination 
of Abraham Lincoln a 
War Crime? 
Howard S. Levie* 
There does not appear to be any dispute about the follow-
ing facts concerning the assassination of President Abraham 
Lincoln: that on 14 April1965, while sitting in a box at Ford's 
Theater in Washington, D.C., watching a performance of 
"Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed by John 
Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage 
(where he delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement) 
one of Booth's spurs caught on a flag decorating Lincoln's box 
with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that despite this 
he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington; 
that he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that 
Dr. Samuel Mudd, a Booth acquaintance living in Maryland, 
treated Booth' sleg and provided him with a makeshift crutch; 
and that all this occurred five days after Lee's surrender to 
Grant at Appomattox. 
From that point on there is little agreement on the facts 1 -
and even less on the applicable law. However, as to some of 
the facts which are disputed, there is really no basis for 
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argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with Lee's 
surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came 
to an end. That is not so. Lee had merely surrendered the 
Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate States of America 
had other armies in the field, armies which continued to fight, 
armies which did not surrender until well after the date of the 
assassination2 Moreover, because of the presence of thou-
sands of Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial 
law had been declared for that city, which was fortified and 
heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status still existed 
on 14 April1865, when the assassination took place. 
The current manual on the law of war of the United States 
Army defines a war crime as "a violation of the law of war by 
any person or persons, military or civilian."' Adopting this 
definition, the sole question that this article will attempt to 
answer is: Was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John 
Wilkes Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law 
of war and, hence, a war crime? To refine our discussion even 
further: Is the murder of an individual committed in wartime 
by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the 
victim a war crime? 
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, under 
the law of war a military commission would unquestionably 
have jurisdiction to try the accused persons, including Dr. 
Samuel Mudd, brought before it charged with such an of-
fense. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the 
question of the jurisdiction of a military commission becomes 
one of constitutional and national law which is beyond the 
purview of this discussion.' 
For our purposes we will assume the worst case for the 
accused: 1) that the evidence established that there was a 
conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln; 2) that the eight 
individuals convicted by the military commission on 30 June 
1865, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, as well as others who were 
not charged, were parties to that conspiracy;' 3) that all of the 
conspirators charged, being residents of the District of Co-
lumbia or of the State of Maryland, were nationals of the 
Union; 4) that, nevertheless, all of the conspirators were 
strong supporters of the Confederate cause; and 5) that the 
conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was motivated by a desire 
on their part to help that cause.6 
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The charge with respect to which the military commission 
opened its hearings on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight 
accused pleased "Not Guilty" on the following day, alleged 
that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously" com-
bined, confederated, and conspired to kill and murder 
Abraham Lincoln and others? There is no allegation that their 
acts were in violation of the law of war. The wording of the 
charge itself demonstrates that the prosecution considered 
the offense charged to be a conspiracy to commit treason by 
murdering the President and his successors-to-be and that it 
did not consider this to be a war crime.' As the present author 
has said elsewhere:' 
There are a number of actions which, while they are 
wartime criminal offenses and are punishable by the 
injured belligerent, do not come within any definition 
of war crimes. Thus, while there is a wide-spread 
belief that espionage and treason are violations of the 
laws and customs of war and are, therefore, war 
crimes, 10 this is not soY International law does not 
forbid espionage and treason; national laws do12 
Presumably, the accused, Union citizens, assumed their acts 
of assassination would in some manner benefit the Confeder-
ate cause, even at that late date in the war. Their acts were, 
therefore, traitorous- but, as it has just been shown, treason 
is not a violation of the law of war, and it is not a war crime. 
The post-World War II trials in which Germans tried 
Germans, Austrians tried Austrians, Hungarians tried Hun-
garians, etc., were not true war crimes trials. For the most part 
they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many cases, 
prosecuted misuse or abuse of power. Nor were the euthana-
sia cases or the concentration camp cases (involving actions 
which took place prior to, and after, 1 September 1939, the 
official date of the beginning of World War II in Europe), 
which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes cases. They 
were violations of German criminal law, which had existed at 
the time of the offenses, but which, for obvious reasons, had 
not been enforced by Nazi officials13 
In the Nordhausen Concentration Camp case, the review 
of the case contains the following statement: 
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For an illegal act to be a war crime certain elements 
must be present, viz., (1) the act must be a crime in 
violation of international law; (2) there must be a 
disparity of nationality between the perpetrator and 
the victim; and (3) the criminal act must have been 
committed as an incident of war. 14 
These elements were not present in the trial of those alleged 
to have been parties to the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham 
Lincoln. The act charged was not a violation of international 
law; there was no disparity of nationality between the persons 
charged as perpetrators and the victim; and it is extremely 
doubtful that the assassination of Lincoln may be considered 
to have been an incident of the war. Therefore, it was not a 
war crime. 
Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed 
the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, a Union citizen, by 
those who were likewise Union citizens, will find support in 
the trial of Mariano Uyeki, 15 a case for which the present 
author can find no justification: 
Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in Iloilo, Panay, the 
Philippines, of Japanese parents. When the war broke 
out in 1941 he apparently suffered at the hands of his 
Filipino schoolmates because he was pro-Japanese 
and it was alleged that on 10 May 1942, after the 
Japanese occupation of Panay, and without any 
justification, he shot and killed a fellow Filipino 
teenager. There was some evidence at that period he 
was acting as an interpreter for the Japanese and that 
he was wearing at least parts of a Japanese Army 
uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the 
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a 
prisoner of war on 1 September 1945. Early in 1946 he 
was tried for the murder by a United States Military 
Commission. He was convicted and sentenced to 
death. That conviction was vacated because "the 
validity of the proceedings is faulty." Unfortunately, 
there is no explanation of the basis for that statement. 
He then made an application to the Supreme Court of 
the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming 
Was the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln a War Crhne? 
that he was a Filipino citizen and that the United States 
Military Commission had no jurisdiction to try him. 
His application was denied on the ground that even if 
he had originally been a national of the Philippines, he 
had forfeited that nationality by rendering military 
service to the Japanese Government. This was not a 
decision that the military commission had jurisdiction 
to try him, it was a decision that the Supreme Court of 
the Philippines had no jurisdiction to rule on the 
jurisdiction of the United States court because he was 
not a citizen of the Philippines. He was retried by 
another United States Military Commission in April 
1946 and was again convicted and sentenced to death. 16 
Concerning this case the present author went on to say: 
When the offense was committed in 1942, it was a 
matter of the murder of one (pro-American) Filipino 
civilian by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino civilian. It 
was a violation of the criminal law of the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Surely, this was a 
case for the courts of the Philippines and not a war 
crime for trial by a United States Military Commission. 
Even though the accused may have lost his Filipino 
nationality in 1944, upon entering the Japanese Army, 
and even though the Philippines were not yet fully 
independent, it did have its own fully-developed 
criminal justice system. It is difficult to find a basis for 
the jurisdiction of the United States military 
commission for this offense committed in 1942. 
Regrettably, no application for a writ of habeas corpus 
was made to the United States Courts17 
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In other words, it is not believed that motive alone can 
convert an offense which is a violation of national law into one 
which is a violation of international law. Had Booth and his 
fellow conspirators been disappointed office seekers, the as-
sassination of President Lincoln would certainly not have 
been a war crime; and the fact that they acted as they did 
because of their political motivation, because of their desire to 
support the Confederacy, does not convert a common law 
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national crime into an international crime. 
The conclusion is reached that the assassination of Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth and his fellow 
conspirators was not a violation of the law of war and, there-
fore, was not a war crime, but was a politically motivated, 
treasonous act committed by Union citizens in the hope that 
it would help the Confederate cause. Accordingly, even if we 
assume that the evidence supported Dr. Mudd's conviction of 
conspiracy to commit treason and murder under national 
law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military 
commission at that time and place complied with the consti-
tutional and statutory law of the United States. 
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The Appeal of 
Dr. Samuel Mudd 
Jeffrey F. Addicott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Legal Forum did an outstanding job in sponsoring the 
moot appeal of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd. From start to finish, the 
logistics of the presentation were superbly handled. 
Set against the backdrop of the War Between the States, 
the most tragic and yet defining historical event in our nation, 
the audience was guaranteed a production sure to capture the 
imagination. While the legal arguments on both sides clearly 
demonstrated how our system of jurisprudence has evolved 
since the War Between the States, in a larger sense, the moot 
appeal also challenged the audience to reflect back on 
many of the fundamental issues attendant to the war. 
In weighing the appeal of Dr. Mudd, the moot court of 
appeals faced two primary issues - jurisdiction and suffi-
ciency of evidence. Of these two issues, only the evidentiary 
question was easily and expeditiously resolved. 
H. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Regarding the sufficiency of evidence question, even un-
der the most favorable standard available to the government 
- a "more like! y than not standard" - the moot court of 
*Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Attorney at Law; Office of the Judge Advocate 
General, International & Operational Law Division. 
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appeals was certainly obliged to overturn Dr. Mudd's convic-
tion. Indeed, a fair review of the evidence presented against 
Dr. Mudd revealed that there was probably not enough of a 
case developed to charge Dr. Mudd, let alone bring him to 
trial. 
There can be little serious debate that the public hysteria 
surrounding the assassination of President Lincoln and the 
attempted assassination of several members of the Union's 
top leadership had completely prejudiced the impartiality of 
the fact finders.' Accordingly, the three member appellate 
panel was unanimous in finding that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at Dr. Mudd's trial to sustain the guilty 
findings of the military tribunal. 
HI. JURISDICTION 
The jurisdictional question faced by the moot court of 
appeal posed a more difficult issue. Indeed, there were two 
theories by which the tribunal could have asserted jurisdic-
tion: (1) under the test set out in Ex parte Milligan,' or (2} under 
the traditional "common law of war" standard. 
In spite of the existence of these two distinct theories for 
establishing jurisdiction, most of the attention of the moot 
court was directed toward assessing the Milligan approach. 
The" common law of war" approach, which is a firm basis on 
which to assert jurisdiction, did not receive due consider-
ation. Thus, on the question of whether the military tribunal 
had jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd, the three member moot 
court split, with the majority finding that no jurisdiction 
existed. In my opinion, gauged by either the Milligan ap-
proach or the common law of war approach, this conclusion 
was erroneous. The military commission had jurisdiction to 
try Dr. Mudd. 
A. Milligan 
The test for asserting jurisdiction as set out in Milligan is 
rather straightforward. In short, the Court in Milligan held 
that a military tribunal' could not properly try a civilian 
unless "exigent circumstances" exist, e.g., unless legitimate 
government control is seriously challenged. 
Simply put, the question is whether such exigent circum-
stances existed in Washington City' at the time that the com-
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mission asserted jurisdiction over Mudd and the other con-
spirators. Two of the moot panel members found that no such 
exigent circumstances existed, and therefore held that the 
accused should have been tried in a civilian court. 
The greatest obstacle in evaluating historical events rests 
in the ability to accurately grasp the full range of facts sur-
rounding the event in question. Although one might argue 
that this task is not difficult, as hindsight is "20 /20," many 
fundamental issues relating to the War Between the States are 
extremely complex and require careful study. 
In this sense, it seems that the primary problem in prop-
erly gauging the exigencies related to the Milligan standard 
turn on accurately comprehending issues related to the very 
nature of the war. Unfortunately, even after 130 years, there 
exists much confusion about the War Between the States. This 
confusion ranges from a fair understanding of the causes,' to 
the very name of the conflict- it was not a "civil war."6 
The exigencies that allowed jurisdiction under Milligan 
are fairly convincing. First and foremost, the war had not 
ended when the plot was carried out, nor at the time the 
military tribunal was established by President Johnson. In 
addition, Washington City was still the seat of the Union war 
effort. Although the Army of Northern Virginia had surren-
dered in April 1865, there were several major Confederate 
armies still in the field.' The closest to Washington City after 
the assassination of Lincoln was Confederate General Joe 
Johnston's in North Carolina (30,000 strong). This force was 
only a few days' march away. Indeed, it was not inconceivable 
that Washington City might once again be attacked by a 
detached portion ofthat army, as it had been in the Fall of 1864 
when General Lee detached General Jubal Early from his 
army to strike north behind enemy lines. 
Second, the Confederate cabinet was still intact and opera-
tional as it traveled through Virginia and into Georgia with 
the design to reach the trans-Mississippi region. President 
Davis was actively engaged in gathering forces to carry on the 
war and was not captured until May 10, 1865.8 
Finally, bands of armed Confederates were still operating 
in Maryland and Virginia 9 This, coupled with a war that had 
already caused over 600,000 casualties, convinced many promi-
nent Union officers that the assassination of Lincoln was part 
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of a last ditch effort by the Confederacy.10 
The majority opinion failed to properly recognize these 
pertinent historical facts that supplied sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances. The conclusion of the court that exigent circum-
stances were absent, was inaccurate and reflected a misunder-
standing of the historical facts that should have been applied 
to the Milligan standard. 
13. Common Law of War 
Customary international law has long recognized the le-
gality of military commissions or tribunals to try those ac-
cused of violations of the laws of nations or, to use the generic 
term, those accused of "war crimes." A war crime is a generic 
term for all illegal actions relating to the inception or conduct 
of warfare. 11 
A military commission derives its authority from the U.S. 
Constitution which provides that Congress has the power to 
"define and punish offenses against the law of nations."12 In 
turn, Congress has traditionally turned jurisdiction over to 
the military to conduct military tribunals for those accused of 
war crimes. Armed with this authority, military tribunals 
have tried hundreds of individuals since the War for Indepen-
dence. 
During the War Between the States, the jurisdictional 
basis for trying war criminals was specifically authorized in 
Article XIII of General Orders No. 100 (issued April24, 1863), 
promulgated as "Instructions for the Government of the 
Armies of the United States in the Field," and known as the 
Lieber Code13 "Military jurisdiction is oftwo kinds: first, that 
which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which 
is derived from the common law of war." In addition, Article 
VIII of General Orders No. 30 (issued April 22, 1863) states: 
"The laws of war apply equally to all portions of our country 
while war exists." 14 Thus, the President had the authority to 
use military commissions or military tribunals to try those 
accused of committing war crimes. 
Customary international law holds that anyone can com-
mit a war crime, since the offense is a violation against the 
laws of nations. Thus, the fact that Dr. Mudd was a civilian 
does not exclude him from being tried in a military tribunal as 
a war criminal. The critical question is whether the killing of 
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President Lincoln by the conspirators was a war crime in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. 
President Lincoln, as the Commander in Chief of all Union 
forces, was a legitimate war target. For example, had Presi-
dent Lincoln been shot and killed by a regular Confederate 
cavalry attack into Washington City, the killing would have 
been lawful. Under this set of facts, and because a state of 
hostilities existed between the Confederate States and the 
United States, President Lincoln would have been a legiti-
mate military target and the Confederate soldiers would have 
been lawful combatants, entitled to all the protection of pris-
oners of war. 
In the case of the Booth conspiracy, however, while Lin-
coln was still a legitimate military target, Booth and his 
conspirators were not lawful combatants. Therefore, the co-
conspirators had no lawful right to kill President Lincoln, 
hence, the term assassination is used to describe the unlawful 
killing. Those who committed the killing of President Lin-
coln, as well as those who conspired, were guilty of a violation 
of the law of war under customary international law. 
To address such war criminals, General Orders No. 30, 
Section II, specifically defined individuals who conduct ac-
tivities outside of the color of legitimate authority. 15 The 
Booth conspirators could fall under either the definition for 
the "brigand," or the "guerrilla proper." The brigand is 
described as one who "assails the enemy without or against 
the authority of his own Government."16 The guerrilla proper 
is defined as those who do not abide by the laws of war and do 
not belong "to a regular army, consisting of volunteers, per-
haps self-constituted."17 General Orders No. 30 prescribes 
that all who fall under either category shall "suffer death, 
according to the usage of nations, by sentence of a military 
commission." 18 
In the case ofthe Booth conspirators, it is certain that none 
were in the military service of the Confederacy, nor were they 
acting under any authority whatsoever from Confederate 
authorities, civil or military19 These individuals were en-
gaged in acts of unlawful belligerency. Although they sought 
to hinder the Union war effort - the plot had been in the 
planning stage for over a year- they had no standing under 
the laws and customs of war to do so. Thus, they were clearly 
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guilty of committing war crimes and subject to being tried by 
a military commission for their acts. 
III. CONCLUSION 
More than a century and a quarter after the original trial of 
Dr. Mudd, amid the vastly different modus vivendi of modern 
American society, the moot appeal offered a unique opportu-
nity to visit the origins and early applications of legal prin-
ciples that most citizens now take for granted. 
Although the court reached the correct conclusion- that 
Dr. Mudd should have been released- this conclusion should 
have rested on the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than on 
a jurisdictional basis. 
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The Case Against 
Dr. Samuel Mudd: 
Why His Family's Vanity 
Does Not Justify Rewriting 
Dr. Mudd's Story 
Andrew C. Carington* 
with Floyd E. Risvold** 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1865, a nine-man military commission, presided over 
by Major General David Hunter,' convicted Dr. Samuel A. 
Mudd of complicity with John Wilkes Booth in the assassina-
tion of President Lincoln. The commission sentenced Dr. 
Mudd to life imprisonment and he was sent to Fort Jefferson, 
a federal prison on an island off the gulf coast of Florida. Less 
than four years later, on February 8, 1869, President Andrew 
Johnson pardoned him. By definition, a pardon reaches both 
the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the 
offender2 
Dr. Samuel Mudd was not satisfied with his pardon and 
neither is his grandson, Dr. Richard D. Mudd, an elderly 
resident of Saginaw, Michigan. Richard Mudd has conducted 
a long and highly skillful public relations and political cam-
paign to clear his grandfather's name. Since the pardon 
already did this in the eyes of the law, Richard Mudd is really 
seeking historical vindication of his grandfather. 
Pressed by Richard Mudd and several members of Con-
gress, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records 
*J.D., 1995, University of Richmond; B.A. cum laude, 1990, Denison University. 
** Editor of Louis Weichmann' sA True History of the Assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln and the Conspiracy of 1865 (Alfred A Knopfed., 1975) and author of The 
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agreed to review Samuel Mudd's 1865 conviction and con-
sider expungement of the record created by the military 
commission. 
The Board held a hearing in the Pentagon on January 22, 
1992, taking testimony only from those sympathetic to Dr. 
Mudd. As a result of this hearing, the Board recommended to 
the Secretary of the Army that the conviction be set aside 
because the military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. 
Mudd. Concluding that Dr. Mudd should have been tried in 
a civil court, the Board did not proceed to rule on his guilt or 
innocence. Subsequently, William D. Clark, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, denied the Board's recommendation 
for two reasons: (1) that it is not the role of the Board to settle 
historical disputes; and (2) that the Board had no judicial 
function.' 
Later in 1992, the T.C. Williams School of Law at the 
University of Richmond organized a "moot appeal" from Dr. 
Mudd's 1865 conviction, inventing a fictional Special Court of 
Military Appeal for this purpose. Three highly regarded 
judges with military and international law backgrounds were 
recruited to hear the appeal. Law students were assigned to 
prepare briefs for Dr. Mudd's counsel and for the government's 
counsel. The case was argued at the law school on February 
12, 1993. 
Afterward, two of the judges decided that the military 
commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd. The third 
thought that Dr. Mudd's trial by military authorities was 
legal, but that the evidence presented was insufficient for 
conviction. 
Careful review of the arguments made for Dr. Mudd in 
this court reveals several errors and omissions. Our intent 
here is to call the public's attention to the many facts ignored 
in the mock appeal and thus to defend the integrity of history. 
This article will begin by taking a look at the man who was Dr. 
Mudd. It will then go on to discuss procedural and evidentiary 
matters, demonstrating how their correct resolution by the 
appellate tribunal would have left a case by the prosecution 
sufficient to sustain Dr. Mudd's conviction. Finally, certain 
misleading statements made to the appellate tribunal on 
behalf of Dr. Mudd in the brief and oral arguments will be 
analyzed and corrected. 
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DR. SAMUEL A. MUDD 
In evaluating Dr. Mudd's actions, it is proper to start with 
the man. Viewed by some as a simple country doctor, he was 
not only avowedly pro-Confederate, but also demonstrably 
pro-slavery. The 1860 slave census shows that Dr. Mudd's 
father, Henry L. Mudd, owned sixty-one slaves and that 
Samuel Mudd owned five himself. At the 1865 trial, two 
Mudd slaves, Mary Simms and her brother, Elzee Eglent, 
testified that Dr. Mudd shot Elzee for not obeying orders.4 
Concerning his views on slavery, Dr. Mudd did not differ 
from his state and his community. In the election of 1860, 
92,502 votes were cast in Maryland, of which only 2,294 were 
for Lincoln. In Charles County where Dr. Mudd lived, 1,197 
votes were cast in that election, of which only six were for 
Lincoln.' Dr. Mudd had little reason to be an admirer of 
Abraham Lincoln or of the Union. 
On January 13, 1862, Dr. Mudd wrote a long letter to O.A. 
Brownson, the publisher of Brownson's Quarterly Review. In 
this missive, Dr. Mudd gives the full flavor of his views on 
slavery, "the north" and its people, and Lincoln (the "head of 
the government") and his administration. Dr. Mudd was not 
only "pro slavery," but also anti-Lincoln. He supported the 
Confederacy and its war aims. To take just one quote from 
that letter: "I confidently assert, that if there was any other 
man at the head of the Government of true conservative and 
constitutional principles, the Revolution would immediately 
cease so far as the South is concerned."' 
TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION 
Much attention has been given to whether the Booth 
conspirators should have been tried by a military court. 
Proper analysis of this issue requires placing in military and 
political context PresidentJohnson's decision to refer the case 
to a military commission. Because of the crisis gripping 
Washington at the time of the conspirators' arrests, prosecu-
tion in a military court was justified. Washington was the 
wartime headquarters of the armed forces of the Union. The 
city was ringed by some sixty forts. It had been invaded in the 
summer of 1864, and great battles had been fought around or 
near it. At the time President Lincoln was assassinated, the 
rebellion had not yet been extinguished. There were still 
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substantial Confederate armies in the field, and Confederate 
leaders continued to express hope of ultimate success. Under 
conditions such as these, any attempt to assassinate the Com-
mander in Chief by persons sympathetic to the enemy should 
be viewed as a furtherance of the war efforts of the enemy, and 
accordingly prosecuted under the laws of war. 
At the time, President Johnson asked Attorney General 
James Speed for his opinion regarding the jurisdiction of a 
military commission to try the assassination conspirators. 
Mr. Speed's opinion confirmed the legality of this jurisdic-
tion. In essence, the Attorney General's opinion held that, in 
time of war, the military could try civilians if they were 
"public enemies." The opinion rested in part on a constitu-
tional provision regarding offenses against the law of nations' 
and on common rules called the "laws of war."8 With respect 
to the term "public enemies," it is worth noting that a con-
spiracy to assassinate the heads of government, that is Presi-
dent Lincoln, Vice President Johnson, and Secretary of State 
Seward, for the purpose of affecting the course of the war, 
could hardly have been organized by "friends." 
The whole purpose of the conspiracy, whether to capture 
Lincoln or to assassinate him, was to throw the Union govern-
ment into confusion and disrupt its military operations. The 
assassination of Abraham Lincoln was a threat to the very 
existence of the government. There was a crisis. 
DR. MUDD'S HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
It is important to remember that a question of jurisdiction 
is one of procedure. While resolution of procedural questions 
in a defendant's favor may moot any examination by a court 
of facts related to the underlying substantive offense, it does 
not magically erase those facts from existence. In this case, 
facts unrelated to jurisdiction prove Dr. Mudd conspired, as 
charged at the 1865 trial, to "advise, encourage, receive, 
entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid, and assist the said John 
Wilkes Booth."' Neither a subsequent presidential pardon, 
nor a modern-day judgment that a military commission was 
the wrong tribunal, can change the facts that prove Dr. Mudd's 
guilt. 
With respect to the question of jurisdiction, Candida Steel 
at the "mock appeal" argued on behalf of Dr. Mudd that the 
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December 1866 Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Milligan 10 
applied retroactively to the 1865 trial of Dr. Mudd and the 
other conspirators. Lambdin P. Milligan, a rabidly pro-Con-
federate Indiana man, was arrested by military authorities for 
clearly treasonable activities. He was brought to trial before 
a military commission convened in Indianapolis on October 
21, 1864. He was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. The 
execution was delayed, and the case ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court by way of an appeal from a lower federal 
court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In a 
complex decision, the Court held that circumstances in Indi-
ana did not justify the use of a military commission because 
law and order had not broken down under invasion or threats, 
and because the civil courts were open and free to function. 
Four justices, led by Chief Justice Chase, dissented in partY 
Prompted by the decision in Milligan, Baltimore attorney 
Andrew Sterrett Ridgely filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus for Dr. Mudd with Chief Justice Chase on December 
19, 1866. Chase returned the petition on December 29th with 
a brief note suggesting that it be filed " ... in the District in 
which the prisoner is held." This was the Southern District of 
Florida. 
In 1868, such a petition, Ex parte Mudd et al., came before 
Judge Thomas J. Boynton of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida. Judge Boynton reviewed 
Milligan and held that the circumstances in Washington, 
where the assassination conspiracy case arose, were funda-
mentally different. In his September 1868 opinion, Judge 
Boynton concluded that Milligan did not apply to the military 
trial of the Lincoln conspirators and denied the writ. The key 
paragraph of his opinion reads thus: 
The President was assassinated not for private 
animosity nor for any other reason than a desire to 
impair the effectiveness of military operations and 
enable the rebellion to establish itself into a 
Government; the act was committed in a fortified city 
which had been invaded during the war, and to the 
northward as well as the southward of which battles 
had many times been fought, which was the 
headquarters of all the armies of the United States, 
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from which daily and hourly went military orders. 
The President is the Commander in Chief of the army, 
and the President who was killed had many times 
made distinct military orders under his own hand, 
without the formality of employing the name of the 
Secretary of War or Commanding-General. It was not 
Mr. Lincoln who was assassinated, but the Commander 
in Chief, for military reasons. I find no difficulty, 
therefore, in classing the offense as a military one, and 
with this opinion arrive at the necessary conclusion 
that the proper tribunal for the trial of those engaged 
in it was a military one."12 
An appeal from Judge Boynton's decision reached the 
Supreme Court in late February 1869 as Ex parte Arnold and 
Spangler. Dr. Mudd's name was deleted from the title of the 
case because he had already been pardoned by President 
Johnson. The Supreme Court calendar shows that this case 
was argued on February 26 with P. Phillips appearing for the 
other two conspirators and Assistant Attorney General Ashton 
appearing for the government. Before the Court could reach 
a decision and write an opinion, President Johnson pardoned 
both Arnold and Spangler. Consequently, Chief Justice Chase 
ordered the appeal dismissed on March 19, 1869, presumably 
because the pardons had rendered it entirely moot. This 
action by Chase left Judge Boynton's decision on the propri-
ety of military jurisdiction undisturbed and in place. His 
opinion that the facts of the Milligan and Mudd cases were 
sufficiently different so that the former decision did not 
control the latter has never been reversed. It seems clear from 
this history of Dr. Mudd's habeas petition that it cannot today 
be asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte 
Milligan should dictate the outcome of a "mock appeal" in Dr. 
Mudd's case. 
THE RIGHTS OF DR. AND MRS. MUDD TO TESTIFY 
In the brief filed on behalf of Dr. Mudd in the "mock 
appeal," it is charged that: 
1. Dr. Mudd was denied the right to offer testimony on 
his own behalf;13 and 
2. Mrs. Mudd should have been deemed competent to 
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testify." 
These charges plainly infer that both Dr. Mudd and his wife 
had a legal or Constitutional right to testify and that the 
military commission perversely denied them that "right." 
The Constitution, however, is silent on the point, and accord-
ing to the common law of the time, the defendant in a criminal 
case was not a "competent witness." Such testimony was 
considered an invitation to perjury. 15 Unless there was a 
statute permitting a defendant to testify, the common law 
governed in all criminal cases, both federal and state. In 1865, 
only Maine by law permitted testimony by the defendant in 
criminal cases. 16 It was not until March 16th, 1878, that 
Congress enacted a similar lawY Therefore, no testimonial 
right belonging to the accused, Constitutional or otherwise, 
was violated by the military commission in the trial of the 
conspirators. Under the prevailing law, Dr. Mudd was sim-
ply not a competent witness. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the records of the 1865 
trial before the military commission to show that Dr. Mudd's 
attorneys ever sought to call him as a witness. They certainly 
were not clamoring to put him on the stand. Indeed, it is 
doubtful that they would have taken this risky step even if it 
had been permitted. 
With respect to Mrs. Sarah Mudd, there was no legal bar 
in 1865 to calling her as a defense witness. Even so, there was 
no record in the transcript that the defense ever attempted to 
call Mrs. Mudd. It is therefore disingenuous for Mudd's 
counsel to say in the petitioner's brief that her testimony was 
"not allowed" by the military commission. The question 
simply did not come up. Dr. Mudd's original attorneys, 
General Thomas Ewing and Frederick Stone, were good law-
yers and probably recognized that Mrs. Mudd might have 
tripped on a material fact under cross-examination and 
wrecked the defense plans. 
DID MUDD RECOGNIZE BOOTH THAT NIGHT? 
At roughly four o'clock in the morning on Saturday, April 
15, 1865, two men, one with a broken leg, came to the door of 
Dr. Mudd's country farm house. It was on that morning that 
Dr. Mudd set the broken leg of and otherwise assisted Lincoln's 
assassin. 
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A question long debated by Lincoln historians is whether 
Dr. Mudd recognized the injured man as John Wilkes Booth. 
The answer bears on Dr. Mudd's membership in the con-
spiracy. Dr. Mudd claimed that he never recognized either of 
the men who visited that morning. Why would he lie if not to 
conceal his own culpable involvement? When Dr. Mudd was 
questioned by Lt. Alexander Lovett, he said that the injured 
man had borrowed a razor to shave off his mustache. Lovett 
then asked Mudd if this man had any other beard. According 
to Lovett, Dr. Mudd replied, "'Yes, he had a long pair of 
whiskers."' When asked if they might be false, Mudd was 
said by Lovett to have answered "he did not know." 18 Later, 
Dr. Mudd admitted to another Union officer that the beard 
may have been false. However, according to that officer, 
Mudd insisted that the man whose leg he set '"had his cloak 
thrown around his head' and that he 'did not see his face at 
all"' the entire time he was being treated. 19 This self-serving 
account of the doctor's is uncorroborated; other evidence 
shows that Dr. Mudd in fact knew whom he was treating. It 
shows that Dr. Mudd had met Booth before the assassination; 
indeed it establishes several meetings between the two. 
The first meeting between Dr. Mudd and John Wilkes 
Booth took place on November 13, 1864, at St. Mary's Catholic 
Church in Bryantown, Maryland. Booth had come from 
Washington by stage the day before and spent the night as a 
guest of Dr. William Queen, an elderly leader of the Confed-
erate underground apparatus in Charles County. Booth 
brought with him a letter of introduction to Dr. Queen. It had 
been given to Booth in Montreal about two weeks before by a 
Confederate agent, Patrick Charles Martin.20 The purpose of 
Booth's visit to Bryantown was to line up clandestine assis-
tance for a Confederate plan to capture Lincoln and carry him 
off to Richmond. The cover story used to explain Booth's visit 
was that Booth had an interest in buying land. John C. 
Thompson, Dr. Queen's son-in-law introduced Booth to Dr. 
Mudd at church that Sunday morning. There is no other 
satisfactory explanation of why Dr. Mudd was at St. Mary's 
that day; his own church, St. Peter's, was some eight miles 
distant and nearer to his home. 
The second meeting between Dr. Mudd and Mr. Booth 
took place between December 17 and December 22, also in 
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Bryantown. Booth again carne by stage from Washington and 
spent one night as a guest of Dr. Queen. Dr. Mudd had 
requested Confederate agent Thomas H. Harbin (alias Wil-
son) to come up from Virginia to meet Booth and discuss the 
plan to capture Lincoln. Dr. Mudd was present for this 
discussion, which was held in Booth's room at the old 
Bryantown tavern. Harbin agreed to participate in the plan 
and was active in carrying out details along the lower Potomac 
River right up to the time Lincoln was shot. After the war, 
Harbin told the famous war correspondent George Alfred 
Townsend about his meeting with Booth and Dr. Mudd. 
Townsend published an account of this meeting years later in 
the Cincinnati Enquirer for April18, 1892. 
During his second visit to Bryantown, Booth was an over-
night guest in Dr. Mudd' shorne, probably on Sunday, Decem-
ber 18. The next morning the two rode over to the horne of Dr. 
Mudd's near neighbor, George Gardiner, where Booth pur-
chased a one-eyed horse for eighty dollars. He rode the horse 
back to Washington." It was this horse that Lewis Payne used 
on the night of April14, 1865, when he attacked Secretary of 
State William H. Seward and members of his household. 
There was yet a third meeting between Dr. Mudd and Mr. 
Booth before the assassination. This occurred on December 
23, 1864, when Dr. Mudd carne to Washington to meet Booth 
by appointment. It was during this meeting that Dr. Mudd 
met with Confederate agent and courier John H. Surratt. 
Evidently, this encounter grew out of the Booth, Harbin, and 
Mudd conference in Bryantown a day or so before. On the 
evening of December 23, Dr. Mudd met Booth at theN ational 
Hotel and the two set out for the boarding house of Mrs. Mary 
E. Surratt with the intent of finding her son.22 On the way, 
they accidentally ran into John Surratt and one of his mother's 
boarders, Louis J. Weichrnann, on the street. After introduc-
tions, the four went to Booth's room to talk and have refresh-
ments. At the 1865 trial, Weichrnann testified that he was 
present at this meeting, did not hear all that was said there, 
and did not quite understand what he did hear. He said that 
the three others, Booth, Surratt, and Mudd, frequently stepped 
out into the hallway for private discussions.23 
On the witness stand, Weichrnann recalled the hotel meet-
ing as having taken place on or about January 15, 1865. He 
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went on to say that he could be more precise as to the date if 
he had access to the register of the Pennsylvania House where 
Dr. Mudd had a room that night. Thomas Ewing, Jr., Dr. 
Mudd's attorney, knew the correct date to be December 23, 
not January 15. Thus, Ewing was able to exploit Weichmann' s 
confusion about the date by calling witnesses to show that Dr. 
Mudd was not in Washington on or about January 15. Ewing 
argued that Weichmann should not be believed on other 
matters as well and argued that his testimony should be 
disregarded. Judge Advocate John A. Bingham countered 
with the argument that any uncertainty about the date did not 
change the substance ofWeichmann's testimony, and the fact 
of a meeting of Mudd, Surratt, and Booth remained.24 
Ewings' arguments on this point were ultimately to no 
avail. Whatever the Commission may have thought about 
Weichmann's error, it obviously did not deter them from 
finding Dr. Mudd guilty. Afterward, Mudd admitted in a 
statement issued from his prison cell at Fort Jefferson that 
the meeting described by Weichmannn had, in fact, taken 
place, on December 23, not January 15. 
At the "mock appeal," the Mudd attorneys argued that 
Weichmann's testimony could not be believed, because he 
had been "largely discredited." On the contrary, additional 
evidence emerged after Dr. Mudd's conviction that goes to 
establish the relationship between Dr. Mudd and Booth and 
the credibility of Weichmann. Captain George W. Dutton, 
who commanded the guard detail on the ship transporting 
Dr. Mudd to prison, signed an affidavit dated August 22, 1865 
in which he stated in part: 
[Dr. Mudd] confessed that he knew Booth when he 
came to his house with Herold, on the morning after 
the assassination of the President; that he had known 
Booth for some time, but was afraid to tell of his having 
been at his house on the 15th of April, fearing that his 
own and the lives of his family would be endangered 
thereby. He also confessed that he was with Booth at 
the National Hotel on the evening referred to by 
Weichmann in his testimony; that he came to 
Washington on that occasion to meet Booth, by 
appointment, who wished to be introduced to John 
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Surratt; that when he and Booth were going to Mrs. 
Surratt's house to see John Surratt, they met, on Seventh 
Street, John Surratt, who was introduced to Booth."" 
THE FALSE BEARD 
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These three prior meetings make it difficult to believe Dr. 
Mudd did not recognize Booth when the assassin called at 
Mudd's home on April 15, 1865. However, the mysterious 
false beard still persuades some that Booth could remain 
incognito for as long as he was in Dr. Mudd's company. The 
only mention by anyone of a beard or whiskers occurs in Dr. 
Mudd's statement to Colonel H.H. Wells at Bryantown,'' and 
in the reports of interviews of Dr. Mudd and his wife by 
federal detectives." More curious still is that, after the assas-
sination, Booth felt comfortable sharing his identity with 
complete strangers, but not with Mudd, a man whom he had 
met three times in the past. 
Eyewitness reports described Booth's sudden appearance 
on the stage at Ford's Theater. A well-known actor, Booth was 
certainly recognizable by many of those theater goers who 
witnessed the attack and the assassin's dramatic exit across 
the stage. Hundreds in the audience or backstage saw Booth; 
some afterwards identified him to the authorities. None 
spoke of a beard. 
Some twenty minutes later, when Booth paused at the 
Navy Yard bridge, he gave his true name to the provost guard, 
Sergeant Silas Cobb. 28 Cobb never mentioned a beard; how-
ever, he did identify Booth from a beardless picture. 
Later that night, David E. Herold, another conspirator, 
caught up with Booth on the road out of Washington. The two 
stopped briefly at the Surratt tavern in Prince Georges County, 
Maryland. The reason for the stop was to pick up arms and a 
set of field glasses. John M. Lloyd, the tavern operator, saw 
and talked with both men. Lloyd testified aboutthis midnight 
meeting both at the conspiracy trial in 1865 and at John 
Surratt's trial in 1867.29 Lloyd said he recognized Herold but 
not the other man. Lloyd never described the stranger as 
wearing a beard. In addition, Herold included no mention of 
a disguise in his long statement made on April 27, while a 
prisoner aboard the warship Montauk. 
After Booth and Herold left the Mudd farm late in the 
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afternoon of April15, they met and talked with several people 
as they fled to the Garrett farm in Caroline County, Virginia. 
Not one of those who later described meeting the two fugi-
tives during this period ever mentioned Booth's wearing a 
beard, false or otherwise. 
Among the people on record are Oswald Swann, Samuel 
Cox, Jr., Thomas A. Jones, William Bryant, Dr. Richard Stuart, 
William Lucas, William Rollins, John Garrett, William Garrett, 
and three ex-Confederates: Lt. Mortimer B. Ruggles, Pvt. A.R. 
Bainbridge, and Pvt. William S. Jett. Private William Jett 
testified at Dr. Mudd's trial that he and two other Confederate 
soldiers met Herold and Booth at the Rappahannock River 
ferry. According to Jett, Herold first sought to pass Booth and 
himself off as brothers, James W. and E. Boyd, but later, 
bragging to the three veterans that he and his companion 
were the "assassinators" of President Lincoln, he revealed 
their real names. Recounting this story to the miliary commis-
sion, Jett never mentioned that either of the fugitives made an 
attempt at disguise.30 
The brief filed with the Special Court of Military Appeal 
on behalf of Dr. Mudd argues that the doctor should be 
excused for not recognizing his injured visitor because of his 
false whiskers disguise. Blatantly bootstrapping, the brief 
cites the testimony of Lt. Alexander Lovett as the basis for its 
claim that Booth visited Mudd incognito. As a close reading 
of the trial transcript shows,31 however, Lovett was not him-
self asserting that the actor arrived at Mudd's farm in dis-
guise; Lovett was merely reporting what Mudd had told him 
at the time of the doctor's arrest on April 21. According to 
Lovett, Dr. Mudd told him that Booth had "had a long pair of 
whiskers." 
An objective look at the false beard claim leads to the 
conclusion that it is fiction concocted by Samuel Mudd as a 
desperate attempt to shore up his claim that he did not 
recognize Booth during his stay at the Mudd home on April 
15, 1865. In effect, Samuel A. Mudd hid behind a false beard 
- notJohn Wilkes Booth. 
DID DR. MUDD KNOW BOOTH HAD 
ASSASSINATED LINCOLN? 
It ought to be clear by now that Dr. Mudd recognized 
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Booth when the assassin came to the doctor's home in the 
early morning of April 15. This leaves the important ques-
tions of how and when Dr. Mudd learned that Lincoln had 
been assassinated and that Booth was being sought as the 
assassin. 
On appeal, counsel for Dr. Mudd argued that the record 
showed that Dr. Mudd did not even learn of the asssassination 
until Sunday, April16, when he attended mass at St. Peter's 
Catholic Church. According to counsel, Dr. Mudd would 
have had no reason to suspect his two visitors of anything 
until after they had left his farm. Bootstrapping again from Lt. 
Lovett's testimony, counsel pointed to the Lieutenant's state-
ment, "He told me that he heard, at church, that the President 
had been assassinated, but he did not mention by whom." 
Lovett was merely repeating what Dr. Mudd had told him, so 
only the defendant's self-serving statement made out of court 
supports his claim of ignorance after the early-morning ar-
rival of Herold and Mudd at his door. 
In Dr. Mudd's holographic statement given to Colonel 
H.H. Wells at Bryantown, Dr. Mudd stated that he first learned 
of Lincoln's assassination on April15 at roughly three o'clock 
in the afternoon. Dr. Mudd did not indicate to Colonel Wells 
who had told him this, nor did he refer to Booth as the 
reported assassin. Twelve years later he would supply such 
details. 
In 1877, Dr. Mudd told a friend, Samuel Cox, Jr., how and 
bywhomhe was first informed of the assassination. In the fall 
of 1877, the two were the Democratic candidates for the two 
Charles County seats in the state legislature. They traveled 
around together seeking votes. Cox was very interested in the 
Lincoln assassination. As an eighteen year-old boy, he was at 
the home of his adoptive father, Samuel Cox, when Oswald 
Swann brought Booth and Herold to their door at midnight on 
April15. Therefore, the matter of Dr. Mudd's part in this was 
a natural subject of conversation. 
As Cox subsequently recalled the discussion, Dr. Mudd 
said he learned of the assassination when he rode into 
Bryantown on the afternoon of April 15 to forward some 
clandestine rebel mail. He was stopped by a Union cavalry 
picket, who informed him that Lincoln had been assassinated 
by Booth. 
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On August 7, 1893, Samuel Cox, Jr., wrote out his recollec-
tion of this discussion on the blank pages and wide margins of 
his copy of a book written by a former Confederate agent." 
Here is the pertinent portion of this entry by Cox: 
[W]hen Booth and Herold came to his [Dr. Mudd's] 
home the night after the assassination they told him 
they were just from Virginia and that Booth's horse 
had fallen soon after leaving the river and had broken 
his [Booth's ]leg. That he had rendered him medical 
assistance while in utter ignorance of the assassination. 
That after he had set the broken leg, he, Dr. Mudd ... , 
letters he had but a short time gotten through the 
contraband mail for distribution, and that in going to 
Bryantown to mail them he was surprised to find the 
village surrounded by soldiers and being stopped by a 
sentry ... he was horrified when told the President had 
been shot the night before, and, upon asking who shot 
him the fellow had answered Booth. He then told me 
his first impulse was to surrender Booth, that he had 
imposed upon him, had twice forced himself upon 
him, and now the third time, had come with a lie upon 
his tongue and received medical assistance which 
would be certain to have him in serious trouble. But he 
determined to go back and upbraid him for his 
treachery which he did. And that Booth had appealed 
to him in the name of his mother, whom he professed 
to love so devotedly and that he acted and spoke so 
tragically that he told them [Booth and Herold] they 
must leave his house which they did and after getting 
with Oswald Swann they were piloted to Rich Hill 
[home of Samuel Cox].33 
Coupled with the affidavit of Captain George W. Dutton 
(Dr. Mudd's previously mentioned escort aboard the vessel 
taking him to prison), the Cox recollections of what Dr. Mudd 
told him in 1877 utterly destroy any contention that Dr. Mudd 
did not recognize Booth when he came to the Mudd home on 
the morning of April 15. 
The testimony of two of Dr. Mudd's neighbors, Francis R. 
Farrell and John F. Hardy, shows that Dr. Mudd knew Booth 
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had assassinated Lincoln before Booth and Herold left the 
Mudd farm. On his way home from Bryantown on the after-
noon of April 15th, Dr. Mudd stopped off at the Farrell home, 
where Hardy was visiting. Dr. Mudd told Farrell and Hardy 
that Lincoln had been assassinated. When asked by Farrell 
who had assassinated the President, Dr. Mudd responded: "A 
man by the name of Booth."" In Dr. Mudd's statement to 
Colonel Wells, Dr. Mudd stated that after leaving Bryantown 
on April 15, "I then went down to Mr. Hardy's, and was in 
conversation with him fully an hour when I returned home 
leisurely, and found the two men were just in the act of 
leaving. "35 
One can almost feel the grim reaction of the court as Farrell 
and Hardy testified. The members knew from circumstances 
and from bits and pieces of prior testimony that Booth and 
Herold were still at the Mudd farm at the time Dr. Mudd 
stopped to talk with Farrell and Hardy at about 4:00p.m. on 
April 15. So here was testimony that Dr. Mudd knew that 
Booth was being sought as the President's assassin while the 
doctor was in town and the actor was back at the farm. Why 
did Dr. Mudd not notify the troop commander at Bryantown, 
Lt. David Dana, that the two men he sought were then at 
Mudd's house? Dr. Mudd faced a dilemma. To surrender 
Booth might be to reveal Dr. Mudd's prior participation in the 
plot to capture the President, a scheme that led directly to 
Lincoln's assassination. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, 
Dr. Mudd went to prison and almost to the gallows. 
THE MISSING CONFESSION OF GEORGE A. A TZERODT 
The confession of George A. Atzerodt is perhaps the most 
convincing evidence of Dr. Mudd's complicity in the assassi-
nation. The confession was taken between eight and ten 
o'clock in the evening of May 1, 1865, at the Arsenal Prison, 
Washington, D.C., by Maryland Provost Marshal James L. 
McPhail and one of his detectives, John L. Smith. Smith was 
Atzerodt's brother-in-law. A letter book of General John F. 
Hartranft, found at Gettysburg College, shows that the Gen-
eral admitted McPhail and Smith to the prison that night for 
the interrogation. This confession, by Atzerodt, never reached 
the War Department. 
In 1867, former Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas T. 
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Eckert, was asked about this confession while testifying be-
fore the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 
during the Johnson impeachment investigation. Eckert ad-
mitted knowledge of it and said it had been taken by one of 
McPhail's men named Smith. Eckert supposed the confession 
might be found in War Department files. At the 1865 trial, 
McPhail testified 
that a brother-in law of Atzerodt is on my force, and for 
a time a brother of the prisoner was on it, and they 
repeatedly told me that Atzerodt desired to see me. 
After consulting with the Secretary of War, a pass was 
given me, and I saw the prisoner. I saw him first on the 
gun-boat, and afterward in his cell. There was no 
threat, or promise, or inducement of any kind made.36 
There was no move to produce this confession for the commis-
sion trying the conspirators." At one point in the confession, 
Atzerodt made the following statement about Dr. Mudd and 
his relationship with Booth, "I am certain that Dr. Mudd knew 
all about it, as Booth sent (as he told me) liquor & provisions 
for the trip with the President to Richmond, about two weeks 
before the murder to Dr. Mudd."38 This shows that Dr. Mudd 
was cooperating with Booth in late March, when Booth still 
planned to capture Lincoln and ransom him for Confederate 
prisoners of War. 
Atzerodt' s statement on this point is not without support. 
In early December 1881, F.A. Burr, a crack reporter for the 
Philadelphia Press, located John Matthews, an actor friend of 
Booth. Matthews had been in the cast at Ford's Theater on the 
night Lincoln was shot. Matthews told Burr that, in March 
1865, Booth had asked him to take a trunk to Baltimore to be 
routed on to another destination. The trunk was filled with 
provisions to feed a captive Lincoln on the way to Richmond. 
Matthews refused to give Burr the names of those involved 
because some were stillliving.39 
WHAT MUDD'S LAWYER THOUGHT OF 
MUDD'S GUILT AS AN ACCESSORY 
In June of 1883, the reporter George Alfred Townsend 
made a swing through the lower counties of Maryland and 
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interviewed several people who had knowledge of the Lin-
coln assassination. He called on Frederick Stone and, among 
other things, discussed Dr. Mudd. Townsend (who also made 
public the Confederate agent Harbin's account of the con-
spiracy) published this interview, under the heading, Broad-
wayNote Book, in the NewYorkTribune for June 17,1883. In 
pertinent part, Townsend quoted Stone as saying: 
The court very nearly hanged Dr. Mudd. His 
prevarications were painful; he had given his whole 
case away by not trusting even his counsel, neighbors, 
or kin. It was a terrible thing to extricate him from the 
coils he had woven about himself. He denied knowing 
Booth when he knew him well. He was undoubtedly 
accessory to the abduction plot, though he may have 
supposed it would never come to anything, when this 
was preposterous. He had been even intimate with 
Booth. 
Frederick Stone here spoke of Dr. Mudd's prevarications. 
Consider, for example, the doctor's sworn statement to Colo-
nel Wells. In this statement, Dr. Mudd told of going with 
Booth to the nearby home of George Gardiner, where Booth 
purchased a one-eyed horse for eighty dollars. This was on 
Monday, December 19, 1864. Dr. Mudd went on to tell 
Colonel Wells that "I have never seen Booth since that time to 
my knowledge until last Saturday night [April 15]."40 Dr. 
Mudd was obviously concealing from the Union authorities 
his conference with Booth at the National Hotel on December 
23, 1864. Surely, this is one of the prevarications that Stone 
had in mind. 
CONCLUSION 
A simple country farmer, Dr. Mudd was not. 
Well-documented confessions and testimony taken near the 
time of the trial, coupled with common sense establish this 
fact, and it has been ratified by accounts coming to light only 
long afterward. Although it might be convenient to believe 
that a false beard could disguise an acquaintance with whom 
Dr. Mudd had met recently more than once, that argument 
has already been made, and properly been rejected. Dr. Mudd 
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may have gotten his pardon, but he doesn't deserve to have 
his record expunged. To do so would be to rewrite history as 
fiction, a result that threatens the meaning of our past, and 
serves to dictate our future. 
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Incidently, the Brief for Petitioner quotes ·only the emphasized portion of 
this testimony and astonishingly construes this to be proof that "Dr. Mudd was 
eager to cooperate with investigators," and that such cooperation showed that "Dr. 
Mudd was not guilty of any crime." The full testimony of Wells, on this point, 
does not support such sweeping conclusions. On the contrary, Wells thought that 
Mudd was evasive and was concealing the facts of the case. 

Appendix A: 
The Decision Denying Dr. 
Mudd a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release 
from imprisonment SAMUEL A. MUDD, SAMUEL ARNOLD 
AND EDWARD SPANGLER, who were sentenced by a mili-
tary commission sitting in the City of Washington, in the 
Spring of 1865, to military confinement at Fort Jefferson, 
within this judicial district. 
It is usual rather than otherwise for judges or courts to 
grant the writ of habeas corpus on application, and await the 
return and response of the person to whom the writ is ad-
dressed, before deciding the main question, whether the 
petitioner ought to be discharged from custody (3 Peters, 193; 
4 Wallace, 100), but where the petition states the facts fully, 
and the return can throw no new light on the matter, or where 
the petition contains insufficient allegations on which to base 
a demand of discharge, the provision of the Constitution, 
relating to this subject, is as fully answered by a determina-
tion of the question, whether there ought to be a discharge 
from imprisonment, in the first instance, on the application, 
as by the granting of the writ and its determination afterward. 
And the propriety of this course has been fully remarked 
upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Milligan, the 
principal case relied upon in this application, so that I need 
not further occupy attention with my reasons for pursuing 
that course in this case. The facts here are a part of the history 
253 
254 Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination 
of the country: the return of the officer who has charge of the 
prisoners would add nothing to the date on which a decision 
ought to be based. 
Let us proceed, therefore, at once to the question, whether 
the prisoners ought to be discharged. Two points are relied 
upon in support of the affirmative of this question: First, that 
the military commission had at the time and the place at 
which it was held no jurisdiction to try and sentence for the 
offense these persons were charged with. Second, if they were 
rightfully imprisoned up to the 4th of July last past, they were 
pardoned by the proclamation of the President of that date, 
and ought now to be set at liberty. 
I think there are clear, definite and solid reasons which 
necessitate the overruling of both these points, and the conse-
quent refusal of the application. The reported case princi-
pally relied upon in support of the first position, is that of Ex 
parte Milligan (4 Wallace, Sup. C.R., 110), in which the Su-
preme Court decided that the trial and conviction of a resident 
of Indiana by a military commission during the war were 
invalid, and generally that miliary tribunals have no author-
ity to try civil offences in districts where the regularly orga-
nized civil courts of the country are in undisturbed possession 
of all their powers. There was a minority opinion by four 
members of the Court in this case, in which it was maintained 
that the Congress may, if it chooses, in time of war, establish 
military tribunals in parts of the country undisturbed by war 
operations to exercise the functions ordinarily exercised by 
the civil courts of the country. The decisions of the Supreme 
Court are binding on the inferior courts; and no decision was 
every more willingly followed than would be the decision 
and the reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court in 
Milligan's case by this court in any case where that decision 
was in point. I believe that the further we recede from 
troublous times the more will the public judgment, from calm 
reflection, settle down on the opinion that the power to detain 
evil-disposed or suspected persons until the public peril has 
ceased, is all the power the Government can ever need in time 
of war for purposes of national security, or can ever exercise 
with safety to private rights. If the Supreme Court had been 
equally divided in opinion on this point, I should find it 
impossible to follow any other reasoning in any case present-
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ing that point, than such as would lead to the conclusion 
arrived at by the majority of the Court. But I do not think that 
Ex parte Milligan is a case in point here. There is nothing in the 
opinion of the Court in that case, nor in the third article of the 
Constitution, nor in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, to lead to 
the conclusion that if an army had been encamped in the state 
of Indiana, (whether in the immediate presence of the enemy 
or not), and any person, a resident of Indiana or any other 
state (enlisted Soldier or not) had, not from any private 
animosity, but from public reasons, made his way within the 
Army lines and assassinated the Commanding General, such 
a person could not have been legally tried for his military 
offense by a military tribunal and legally convicted and sen-
tenced. 
The President was assassinated not from private animos-
ity nor any other reason than a desire to impair the effective-
ness of military operations and enable the rebellion to reestab-
lish itself into a Government; the act was committed in a 
fortified city, which had been invaded during the war, and to 
the northward as well as the southward of which battles had 
many times been fought, which was the headquarters of all 
the armies of the United States, from which daily and hourly 
went military orders. The President is the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, and the President who was killed had 
many times made distinct military orders under his own 
hand, without the formality of employing the Secretary of 
War or commanding general. It was not Mr. Lincoln who was 
assassinated but the Commander-in-Chief of the army, for 
military reasons. I find no difficulty, therefore, in classing the 
offense as a military one and with this opinion arrive at the 
necessary conclusion that the proper tribunal for the trial of 
those engaged in it was a military one. 
I understood the counsel who last addressed the Court in 
support of the application to admit at least a doubt whether 
the original trial was illegal; but he contended that the 
President's proclamation of amnesty and pardon of July 4, 
1868 embraces these persons, and that they ought therefore to 
be discharged. But that proclamation plainly excludes all 
persons standing in the position of these petitioners, whether 
they have been convicted or not. It pardons the crime of 
treason; that is, it pardons persons who have levied war 
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against the United States, or given aid and comfort to their 
enemies, within the laws and usages of war; but it pardons no 
person who has transgressed the laws of war, no spy, no 
assassin, no person who has been guilty of barbarous treat-
ment of prisoners. Let us bring out the point by a supposed 
case. Two soldiers or officers fight side by side in the same 
battle; their forces remain masters in the field. After the 
battle, one conducts himself in an unimportant manner, and 
the other sabres the wounded or prisoners. They are both 
guilty of treason, but one is guilty of treason with an impor-
tant plus sign added. It is the opinion of the Court that the 
proclamation of the President reaches one of these cases and 
not the other. Can it be supposed that if England and France 
were at war, and a party of men (soldiers or not) should, for 
the purpose of affecting military operations, enter the mili-
tary lines of one of the armies of one nation and assassinate the 
commanding general, that a subsequent peace, with provi-
sions for the rendition of ordinary prisoners of war, would 
necessitate the delivery of those persons? I think not. Such a 
provision would refer to those prisoners who had made open 
and honorable war, and not transgressed the fearfully wide 
rules which war allows to be legal. 
The proclamation ofMay25, 1865, the principal proclama-
tion of pardon anterior to the one here recited, pardons "all 
persons who have, directly or indirectly, participated in the 
existing rebellion," on certain conditions, and with fourteen 
excepted classes. If the present proclamation had employed 
the same language and not excepted these persons or persons 
in their position, I should have doubted whether they ought 
longer to be imprisoned. But the proclamation grants "to all 
and every person who participated, directly or indirectly in 
the late rebellion (with certain exceptions) full pardon and 
amnesty for the crime of treason against the United States or 
the adhesion to their enemies during the late civil war." 
I think it is clear that the President, wishing no longer to 
make other than necessary exceptions, and to pardon all who 
were only guilty of participating in the rebellion, purposely 
chose this language to effect his purpose; and no other one. I 
do not see that under it a person who transgressed the laws of 
war, who was guilty not only of treason but of additional 
military crimes, may not still be tried for additional crimes. 
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It is not improper to add a word upon a point not neces-
sary to be alluded to for the purpose in this decision. It is a 
matter of public notoriety that some persons, more or less 
acquainted with the evidence on which these convictions 
were based, doubt the fair sufficiency of that evidence to 
necessitate beyond reasonable doubt the conclusion arrived 
at. but this is a question with which I have nothing to do. For 
the purposes of this application the prisoners are guilty of the 
charge on which they were convicted - of a conspiracy to 
commit the military crime which one of their number did 
commit, and some of them of more or less participation. The 
question which I have to decide is whether the military 
tribunal had jurisdiction to try and sentence, and whether the 
proclamation of the President reaches their case. It is my 
opinion, for the reasons which I have stated, that the military 
commission not only had jurisdiction, but was the proper 
tribunal for the purposei and that the President's proclama-
tion does not embrace the situation occupied by these peti-
tioners. 

Appendix B: 
The Report of the 
Board for Correction 
of Military Records 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Board for Correction of Military Records 
1941 Jefferson Davis Highway, 2nd Floor 
Arlington, VA 22202-4508 
PROCEEDINGS: 
IN THE CASE OF: 
BOARD DATE: 
MUDD, SAMUEL A., M.D. (Deceased) 
22 JANUARY 1992 
DOCKET NUMBER: AC91-05511 
I certify that hereinafter is recorded the true and complete 
record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of 
Military Records in the case of the above-named individual. 
The following members, a quorum, were present. 
Mr. Charles A. Chase 
Mr. James C. Hise 
Mr. John Lee 
Mr. James T. Lucas 
Mr. Eugene P. Visco 
Mr. David R. Kinneer 
Mr. Richard H. Allen 
Chairperson 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Executive Secretary 
Examiner 
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The applicant, who is the grandson of Dr. Mudd, ap-
peared before the Board and was represented by counsel. 
The applicant requests correction of military records as 
stated in the application to the Board and as restated herein. 
The Board considered the following evidence: 
Exhibit A: Application for correction of military records. 
Exhibit B: Summary of Archival Records (including advi-
sory opinions). 
Exhibit C: Case Summary. 
Exhibit D: Transcript of Hearing. 
FINDINGS: 
1. The applicant has exhausted all administrative rem-
edies afforded by existing law or regulations. 
2. The applicant requests, in effect, that his grandfather, 
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, now deceased, who was tried and 
convicted by a "military commission" in June 1865 of con-
spiracy to assassinate President Lincoln, be declared inno-
cent. 
3. The applicant states that his grandfather's trial was 
illegal because the civilian courts were open and functioning. 
Further, that his grandfather's only act was to medically treat 
and harbor a disguised John Wilkes Booth while not then 
knowing that President Lincoln had been assassinated. 
4. The applicant submits a copy of Dr. Mudd's defense 
counsel's argument to the military commission in May 1865, 
questioning whether the commission was even a court and 
whether it had jurisdiction over his client and the other seven 
individuals with whom he was jointly tried, or over the crimes 
with which they were charged. A copy of the defense counsel's 
argument on the pertinent law and the evidence in Dr. Mudd's 
case is also submitted. Two independent reports to contem-
porary Presidents are also submitted, one by the applicant, 
the second by a Lincoln scholar, which attempt to prove Dr. 
Mudd's innocence. He also submits correspondence from 
several members of Congress who support the granting of the 
requested relief, and he states that a number of state legisla-
tures have gone on record supporting relief. Finally, he 
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submits information intended to show why Dr. Mudd did not 
know about the plans of John Wilkes Booth to kidnap Presi-
dent Lincoln, and a map which he contends shows that the 
route most likely to have been used to move the kidnapped 
President to the Confederate lines was not even close to his 
grandfather's home. 
5. The applicant has made two prior applications to this 
Board. Until now, the Department's position had been that 
while this Board might have jurisdiction to review the case, 
the Secretary of the Army did not have the authority to set 
aside the conviction. The applicant had also previously been 
advised by the Office of the President that no Presidential 
relief, other than the pardon issued by President Andrew 
Johnson, could be granted by that office. 
6. Then, on 7December 1990and 24June 1991, in connec-
tion with the applicant's current submission, the offices of the 
Judge Advocate General and the Army General Counsel, 
opined that not only may it review the case, but that this 
Board, under certain circumstances, may recommend to the 
Secretary that he set aside the conviction. In expansion of 
their opinions, each stated, in essence, that the Board may 
review the record of conviction, but only to determine whether 
the Commission lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd, or over 
the offense (that is, whether he was convicted of an offense for 
which he was not charged, or not arraigned, or which was not 
a crime at all) or that Dr. Mudd was denied due process to 
such an extreme extent that it amounted to fundamental 
unfairness. The General Counsel also opined that since clem-
ency has already been granted in the form of the pardon by 
President Johnson, the only meaningful relief that could be 
granted by the Secretary would be to set aside the conviction. 
7. History records that Dr. Mudd was born on 20 Decem-
ber 1833, in Charles County, Maryland. He was educated at 
several institutions of higher learning and was certified as a 
physician in 1856. He then returned to his home in Charles 
County, where he set up a medical practice and farmed 
tobacco. He married and fathered nine children. He never 
served in the military, and during the Civil War continued to 
practice medicine and to farm. On 21 April 1865, he was 
arrested by Federal authorities on suspicion of being involved 
in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. He was subse-
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quently tried and convicted of conspiracy to assassinate the 
President and then spent four years of a "life" sentence in a 
military confinement. After his pardon in 1869, he returned to 
his home in Maryland and resumed his medical practice and 
farming. He died in January 1883 at the age of 49 from 
pneumonia. 
8. On 3 March 1863, because of the Civil War existing 
between the various states, Congress passed" An Act Relating 
to Habeas Corpus and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in 
certain Cases." In effect, this law authorized the President to 
suspend the right to request a writ of habeas corpus from a 
civilian court in any part of the United States, whenever it was 
deemed necessary to ensure the public safety. This empow-
ered the military to establish martial law in any given area of 
the United States and to arrest violators, either military or 
civilian. Under this law, not only were military personnel to 
be tried by courts-martial for violations of military rules and 
regulations, but civilians who violated any laws, military 
rules or regulations, or the laws of war, were also subjected to 
immediate arrest by military authorities. Theoretically, these 
civilians could then be tried by a military commission com-
prised of military officers, and if convicted, fined, impris-
oned, or even put to death. A military commission was, 
therefore, akin to a military court-martial and operated under 
the same general principles. 
9. As is generally accepted by historians, John Wilkes 
Booth, a fairly famous actor in 1865, entered the Presidential 
Box at Ford's Theater on Friday evening, 14 April 1865, at 
approximately 22:15 hours, and shot President Lincoln in the 
head while he was watching a play at the theater. Booth then 
jumped from the box to the stage, injuring his left ankle/leg, 
but escaped on horseback. At about the same time, an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made by Lewis Paine (alias Powell) else-
where in Washington to assassinate Secretary of State Will-
iam Seward. Early the next morning, Booth and a companion, 
David E. Herold, knocked on the door of Dr. Mudd's home 
and requested medical assistance. The story ostensibly given 
was that Booth's horse had fallen on his leg and ankle. Dr. 
Mudd examined the leg and found that it was broken just 
above the ankle. After cutting off his boot, Dr. Mudd placed 
a homemade cast on Booth's leg and fashioned some crude 
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crutches. Supposedly, he was paid $25.00 for this treatment. 
Later in the morning of the same day, Dr. Mudd and Herold 
attempted to rent a carriage in the area for movement of 
Booth, but were unsuccessful. While the two men were still at 
his home, Dr. Mudd is said to have gone into the nearest town 
where he learned of the assassination of President Lincoln. 
Federal troops were already in the area looking for the assas-
sin. Booth and Herold supposedly left Dr. Mudd's home on 
horseback, at about the time he returned in the late afternoon, 
having asked for directions to a minister's house, which was 
across a large swamp near Dr. Mudd's farm. 
10. On the next day, after attending Easter Sunday church 
services, Dr. Mudd, expressing no sense of urgency, asked his 
cousin, a respected local citizen and also a physician, to report 
the details of the visit of the two "strangers" to his home to the 
military authorities in the nearby town. His cousin informed 
the local military authorities on Monday; however, the local 
military authorities did not visit Dr. Mudd until Tuesday, and 
then asked only a few questions before leaving. On Friday, 21 
April1865, Dr. Mudd was arrested. At that time Booth's boot, 
which had been left behind, was produced by the family. Two 
written statements were also obtained from Dr. Mudd that 
day. In both statements he maintained that he had not 
recognized Booth, claiming the injured man had been wear-
ing false whiskers. These disclaimers were made despite the 
fact that Dr. Mudd supposedly knew Booth, having met him 
on one or more previous occasions. He was then taken to 
Washington and held in a military prison, along with the 
other alleged conspirators, and witnesses in the case. There is 
no evidence that he was ever charged with any offense during 
the investigative phase of the case. 
11. Booth was subsequently killed on 26 April 1865, in a 
tobacco barn on the Garrett farm, near Bowling Green, Vir-
ginia. Herold was taken prisoner at that time and was also 
taken to Washington to await trial. 
12. On 1 May 1865, President Andrew Johnson ordered 
the establishment of a military commission by the Depart-
ment of War to try the persons implicated in the assassination 
of President Lincoln and the attempt on the life of the Secre-
tary of State. This order was supported by a one-line opinion 
from the Attorney General that the military had jurisdiction 
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in the case. 
13. Accordingly, on 9 May 1865, a military commission 
was convened at the Old Penitentiary Building located at the 
Washington Arsenal, now known as Fort McNair. The nine-
member Commission, chaired by Major General David Hunter, 
consisted of six more general grade officers, a colonel and a 
lieutenant colonel. The chief prosecutor was Brigadier Gen-
eral Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General of the Army. He 
was assisted by a special prosecutor, the Honorable John A. 
Bingham, a former Congressman, and Brevet Colonel H. H. 
Burnett. 
14. Eight persons, including Dr. Mudd, were arraigned 
and charged, on 9 May 1865, with conspiring to kill the 
President and other government and military officials. Dr. 
Mudd was also specifically charged with conspiring with the 
named conspirators to aid and assist in their escape from 
justice after the assassination. 
15. The commission's rules were established at the first 
session. The eight defendants, all of whom were handcuffed 
and some of whom were also in foot chains, were to be tried 
jointly. The defendants were entitled to defense counsels (but 
were unable to obtain them until after the initial session on 9 
May. The actual trial process began on 10 May.) The commis-
sion overruled all requests for a change in venue to the 
civilian courts in the District of Columbia, which were open 
and functioning. Several requests by some of the defendants 
to separate the trials were also denied. The defense attorneys 
were to present evidence only on matters raised by the pros-
ecution or the commission. Dt. Mudd and the other defen-
dants were not permitted to testify in their own behalf. The 
trial lasted from 10 May to 30 June 1865. 
16. Dr. Mudd had two defense counsels, Mr. Thomas 
Ewing, Jr., formerly a brigadier general and military lawyer, 
and Mr. Frederick Stone, a well-known local attorney. Twenty-
four witnesses were presented by the government against Dr. 
Mudd. Seventy-four witnesses appeared on his behalf. 
17. All eight of the conspirators were found guilty of the 
charge and specification. Four were sentenced to be hanged 
and were hanged after review of their sentences by the Presi-
dent. Dr. Mudd and two other conspirators were sentenced to 
life imprisonment, initially at Albany, New York. The place 
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of confinement was later changed to Fort Jefferson, Dry 
Tortugas, Florida (a military prison on an island approxi-
mately 70 miles by water from Key West). The eighth con-
spirator was sentenced to six years in prison. 
18. In the summer of 1867, a very serious yellow fever 
epidemic struck Fort Jefferson. After the regularly assigned 
military medical officer died early in the epidemic, Dr. Mudd 
served for a time as the prison physician. He was credited 
with saving many lives, both prisoners and military troops 
assigned to guard the prison. He, himself, contracted the 
disease, but survived. 
19. On 9 February 1869, President Andrew Johnson issued 
a pardon directing that Dr. Mudd be released from Fort 
Jefferson. In the pardon, the President stated that Dr. Mudd's 
direct involvement in the assassination was only after the fact, 
that it was within the obligations of professional duty, and 
that there was uncertainty as to the true measure and nature 
of his complicity in the escape of the assassins. The President 
then cited Dr. Mudd's dedicated efforts during the yellow 
fever epidemic. 
20. After the war had ended, John Surratt, a named con-
spirator who had escaped to Canada before the trial, and the 
son of Mary Surratt, the lone woman conspirator who was 
hanged, was found in Europe and brought back for trial. He 
was tried by a civil court in Washington in the summer of 
1867. The jury, however, was unable to reach a unanimous 
verdict; therefore, it was dismissed, and the government 
chose not to prosecute the case further. 
21. In July 1865 the Attorney General issued a written 
opinion expanding his earlier guidance to the President in 
May 1865, in which he had stated that a military commission 
had jurisdiction to try the eight conspirators for the assassina-
tion of the President. His assessment was that the Civil War 
was still going on; Washington was a city under "siege" and 
was surrounded by fortifications; the President was the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces; and the laws of war 
were in existence at the time of the conspiracy and assassina-
tion. Referencing the Constitution, which speaks of "law of 
nations" and the "laws of war," he opined that since the 
offenses were essentially against the President and the mili-
tary, and the acts were a violation of the laws of war, the 
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offenses should be tried by the military authorities, under 
such rules and regulations that were in effect at the time. The 
Attorney General went on to state that if the offenses had been 
civilian in nature, then the matters could have been settled in 
the civil courts, which he acknowledged were open and in 
operation. 
22. On 3 April 1866, the United States Supreme Court 
decided by a vote of five to four in Ex Parte Milligan, that the 
military authorities in Indiana had not had jurisdiction to try 
a citizen of the United States for such offenses as conspiracy 
against the government in the time of war or for inciting 
insurrection. In the opinion of the Court, as written by Justice 
Davis, it was noted that the 3 March 1863 Act of Congress 
authorizing the President to suspend the right of a citizen to 
request a writ of habeas corpus, required that if the military 
had arrested a civilian, that fact and the particulars of the case 
must be reported to a civilian judge of the nearest district or 
circuit court within 20 days of the arrest. Further, it was noted 
the law required that if a grand jury then met and did not 
indict or present the case for trial, the individual should be 
released from military confinement and discharged. In re-
viewing the Milligan case, the Court observed that he was a 
United States citizen of a non-secessionist state; that he was 
not held as a prisoner of war; and that he had never served in 
the military or naval service. The Court also noted that his 
arrest by the military had never been reported to a Federal 
court as required by the Act. 
23. The Supreme Court's opinion went on to note that the 
Constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury in all cases 
involving a crime, except impeachment. Further, the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution states "that no person shall 
be called to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime 
unless on presentment by a grand jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of public danger, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process oflaw." The opinion 
next noted that, "The Constitution ofthe United States is a law 
for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers 
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
under all circum-stances." The Court then questioned the 
judicial power of the commission which tried Milligan and his 
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companions stating that the commission was not a court 
ordained or established by Congress; rather, it had been 
created at the mandate of the President, who is charged with 
the execution of the law, not to make laws. The Court noted 
there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be 
had as a source of jurisdiction." Therefore, the rights of 
Milligan were infringed upon because he and his companions 
were tried by a court not ordained and established by Con-
gress, and not composed of judges appointed "during good 
behavior." 
24. The Court emphasized that martial law could not be 
imposed solely by a military commander because of a "threat-
ened" invasion; it must be an actual invasion, with closure of 
the courts and loss of civil administration. That had not been 
the case in Indiana in 1864 and 1865. The civilian courts had 
been open and operating. The Court also noted that the 
imposition of martial law should only be temporary, until the 
return of civilian law and the civilian courts were again in 
operation; any further imposition of martial law beyond that 
point would be a "gross usurpation of power." 
25. The minority opinion in that case, which was written 
by Chief Justice Chase, while concurring in the granting of the 
writ of habeas corpus in the Milligan case, stated that Con-
gress could, in fact, legislate the imposition of martial law, 
even if the civilian courts were open and operating during the 
time of war. 
26. Dr. Mudd's case was appealed to the Supreme Court 
early in 1867, and to a district court in the state of Florida later 
in 1867, citing the decision in Ex Parte Milligan. However, the 
appeals were denied. 
27. In the processing of this case, the staff of the Board has 
reviewed the Articles of War, 1806 (Chapter XX, Statute I, 
Ninth Congress, session 1) and the Articles of War, 1874 (Title 
XIV, United States Code, chapter 5), as well as various trea-
tises written between 1841 and 1943 on the subject of military 
courts-martial and military commission rules of operation, 
including "The Practice of Courts Martial" by Major General 
Alexander Macomb, 1841; "Observations on Military Law, 
and the Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial" by Cap-
tain William C. De Hart, 1846 and 1859; "A Treatise on 
Military Law and the Practice of Courts-Martial" by Brevet 
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Lieutenant Colonel S.V. Benet, 1866 and 1868; "An Abridg-
ment of Military Law by Lieutenant Colonel W. Winthrop, 
1892 and 1893; "A Treatise on the Military Law of the United 
States: by Major General George B. Davis, 1898, 1913 and 1915; 
and "The Law of Martial Rule" by Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
Fairman, 1930 and 1943. There appears to be a general 
consensus that an accused should be presented (arraigned on) 
the charges on a timely basis, that the trial should be held 
within a short period of time (the term of 8 days is sometimes 
quoted) and that the accused had the right to a defense 
counsel. It appears that in the mid-1800s, the accused was 
expected to conduct his own defense, with the assistance of 
counsel; however, the counsel usually was not permitted to 
verbally present any matters to the court. One more recent 
authority (ibid., Fairman) noted that military commissions, 
while generally following the procedural methods of a court-
martial, could make deviations which would not entitle the 
accused to an acquittal. 
28. The official record of the proceedings before the Hunter 
Commission is not maintained by the Department of the 
Army. That record, entitled: "Investigation and Trial Papers 
Relating to the Assassination of President Lincoln," consist-
ing of more than 4400 handwritten pages, all of which were 
reviewed by the staff of this Board, is maintained by the 
Archivist of the United States, under Record Group 153, 
Office of the Judge Advocate, War Department. It is also 
available on microfilm, National Archives Microcopy No 599. 
In addition, several other references were reviewed by the 
staff of the Board, to include the Pitman and Poore versions of 
the testimony before the commission, the book "Come Retri-
bution" by William A. Tidwell, with James 0. Hall and David 
Winfred Gaddy, 1988, and "The Milligan Case" by Samuel 
Klaus, 1929. 
29. During the formal hearing before this Board, the 90-
year old applicant appeared with counsel, two of them being 
descendants of Dr. Mudd, the third being a descendant of Mr. 
Ewing, Dr. Mudd's primary defense counsel in 1865. Several 
expert witnesses were called. Much of the testimony centered 
on the lack of proof of direct involvement of Dr. Mudd in any 
conspiracy to assassinate or kidnap the President. Another 
witness testified as to the professional requirement for Dr. 
Appendices 269 
Mudd to provide medical treatment for the injured Booth, 
irrespective of whether he knew him. One witness, a recog-
nized expert on the constitutional aspects of civilian versus 
military law, concentrated on the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion to try Dr. Mudd for the alleged offenses, noting that the 
civilian courts were open in the District of Columbia and that 
no state of war existed in the area. He further noted that Dr. 
Mudd was a citizen of Maryland, a Northern state which did 
not secede from the Union. He stated that the principles cited 
by the Court in the Milligan case also applied in Dr. Mudd's 
case. He then went on to compare the criteria for martial law 
and trial by military commissions. He observed that in 
several more recent decisions by the Supreme Court and by 
lower Federal courts during World War II, it was ruled that 
United States citizens are entitled to trial by civilian courts, 
even if the offenses were military in nature and had occurred 
in a military theater of operation. In conclusion, he stated that 
in his expert opinion, Dr. Mudd had been denied his right to 
due process under the Constitution. 
30. Title 10, United States Code, section 1552, provides, in 
pertinent part, that the secretary of a military department, 
acting through boards of civilians, may correct any military 
record of that department when he considers it necessary to 
correct an error or remove an injustice. The statute further 
provides that except when procured by fraud, a correction 
under this authority is final and conclusive on all officers of 
the United States. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
1. The record of Dr. Mudd's conviction is a military 
record over which this Board has jurisdiction under Title 10, 
United States Code, section 1552. 
2. Under that authority and within the guidelines set 
forth in the recent opinions of The Judge Advocate General 
and the Army General Counsel, this Board has carefully 
reviewed the available records to determine if the Military 
Commission had jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd and, if so, whether 
he was denied due process to such an extent that it amounted 
to fundamental unfairness. Those guidelines do not autho-
rize the Board to consider the innocence or guilt of Dr. Mudd. 
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3. In its analysis of the case, the Board has had the 
advantage of hindsight and, therefore, has looked at the facts 
and circumstances of the case with more calmness, delibera-
tion, and detachment than was possible in the emotionally 
charged atmosphere that existed after the Civil War. 
4. Another advantage the Board has had is the availabil-
ity of the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Milligan, which 
was decided after Dr. Mudd's trial, but which the Board finds 
so analogous to Dr. Mudd's case that it should not be ignored. 
5. Borrowing from the rationale in that case, the Board 
concludes that the evidence submitted by the applicant and 
the information uncovered during the Board's research clearly 
show that the civilian courts were fully open and operating in 
the District of Columbia in the spring of 1865; that at the time 
President Lincoln was assassinated, Dr. Mudd was a civilian 
and a citizen of Maryland, a nonsecessionist state; and that he 
had never served in the military or naval service. Notwith-
standing the Attorney General's opinion in 1865, the crimes 
he is alleged to have committed were not uniquely military in 
nature, and none of the individuals with whom he was al-
leged to have conspired were members of, or closely involved 
with, the military. 
6. Furthermore, the Board notes that General Robert E. 
Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on 9 April1865, a month 
before the trial began. There is no evidence that the capital 
was "under siege" or that any Confederate forces had in-
vaded or were likely to invade the District of Columbia in the 
spring of 1865. 
7. Under these circumstances, the Board finds no good 
reason why Dr. Mudd should not have been tried by a civilian 
court. It, therefore, unanimously concludes that the military 
commission did not have jurisdiction to try him, and that in so 
doing denied him his due process rights, particularly his right 
to trial by a jury of his peers. This denial constituted such a 
gross infringement of his Constitutionally protected rights, 
that his conviction should be set aside. To fail to do so would 
be unjust. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
That the Archivist of the United States, the custodian of 
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the Hunter Commission's report of the conviction of Dr. 
Samuel A. Mudd for his complicity in the assassination of 
President Abraham Lincoln, a Department of Army record, 
correct the records in his possession by showing that Dr. 
Mudd's conviction was set aside pursuant to action taken 
under Title 10, United States Code, section 1552. 
/s/ Charles A. Chase 
Charles A. Chase 
Chairperson 

Appendix C: 
The Decision of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
Washington, D.C. 20310-1813 
22 July 1992 
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ARMY 
BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 
SUBJECT: Dr. Samuel A. Mudd 
I have carefully considered the records in this case, includ-
ing the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the 
Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), as 
set forth in its Report of Proceedings dated 22 January 1992. I 
have ultimately concluded that the ABCMR's recommenda-
tion should be denied. 
This application is founded upon actions which took place 
more than 127 years ago. The applicants, descendants of Dr. 
Samuel A. Mudd, have asked the Board to review the histori-
cal facts and declare Dr. Mudd innocent in the conspiracy to 
assassinate President Lincoln. 
I note at the outset that the ABCMR did not consider the 
guilt or innocence of Dr. Mudd, and that its recommendation 
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does not speak to the question of his guilt or innocence. 
The ABCMR concluded that the military commission which 
tried Dr. Mudd did not have jurisdiction over civilians and 
recommended that Dr. Mudd's conviction be set aside on that 
basis. 
Accordingly, my denial of that recommendation should 
not be taken as a determination of either the guilt or the 
innocence of Dr. Mudd. It is not the role of the ABCMR to 
attempt to settle historical disputes. Neither is the ABCMR an 
appellate court. The precise issue which the ABCMR pro-
poses to decide, the jurisdiction of the military commission 
over Dr. Mudd, was specifically addressed at the time in two 
separate habeas corpus proceedings, one before the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, the other before a U.S. District 
Court. There also was an opinion by the Attorney General of 
the United States. 
The effect of the action recommended by the ABCMR 
would be to overrule all those determinations. Even if the 
issue might be decided differently today, it is inappropriate 
for a nonjudicial body, such as the ABCMR, to declare that the 
law 127 years ago was contrary to what was determined 
contemporarily by prominent legal authorities. 
Accordingly, I have rejected the ABCMR's recommenda-
tion and have denied the application for relief. A memoran-
dum for the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Cen-
ter, indicating that the application has been denied, is at-
tached. 
Attachment 
/s/ William D. Clark 
William D. Clark 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) 
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MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, ARMY RESERVE 
PERSONNEL COMMAND 
ATTN: 
SUBJECT: 
DARP-PAS 
ABCMR application Regarding Dr. Samuel A. 
Mudd 
Having considered the findings, conclusions and recom-
mendations of the Army Board for Correction of Military 
Records, and under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1552, it is 
directed: 
That in the case of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, the application 
for correction of military records be, and hereby is, 
denied. 
/s/ William D. Clark 
William D. Clark 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) 
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